Emory University School of Law

Emory Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Articles
2021

The Human Capital Management Movement in U.S. Corporate
Law
George S. Georgiev
Emory University School of Law, ggeorgiev@emory.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the
Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
George S. Georgiev, The Human Capital Management Movement in U.S. Corporate Law, 95 Tul. L. Rev. 639
(2021).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/faculty-articles/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

7KH+XPDQ&DSLWDO0DQDJHPHQW0RYHPHQW
LQ86&RUSRUDWH/DZ
*HRUJH6*HRUJLHY 
Corporations cannot exist without workers, yet workers are not part of the formal or
informal governance structures established by U.S. corporate law. Commentators and
policymakers have bemoaned this state of affairs for decades, to little avail. Since the mid-2010s,
however, a concept related to workers, human capital management (HCM), has become an
increasingly prominent part of U.S. corporate governance. HCM is premised on the notion that
workers can be viewed as “assets” and ought to be managed just as carefully as firms manage
physical and capital assets. In practice, HCM is an expansive concept that has been used to
refer to workforce training, compensation and retention issues, gender pay equity, diversity and
inclusion, health and safety, matters related to corporate culture, employees’ ability to
participate in stock purchase programs, and various other matters.
The speed with which HCM has emerged and the depth and breadth of its reach have
been surprising. While broadly fitting within the rubric of environmental, VRFLDODQGJRYHUQDQFH
(ESG) factors, HCM has quickly surpassed more traditional ESG topics in terms of prominence
and uptake. Boards of directors have started to focus on HCM as part of their monitoring and
oversight responsibilities, including by amending committee charters to cover HCM matters.
Investors are actively engaging with firm management and boards on questions pertaining to
HCM. Despite its deregulatory posture at the time, in August 2020 the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) adopted a new rule requiring HCM disclosure by public companies.
Pending legislation could create HCM disclosure mandates that are considerably more
extensive. A variety of private standard-setting organizations have developed detailed
frameworks for HCM disclosure, and many firms have started reporting information in
accordance with these frameworks. Taken together, these developments represent a powerful
and heretofore unprecedented push to incorporate worker-related concerns in
corporate governance—a phenomenon I GHVFULEHDVDQ“HCM movement.” This Article is the
first to delineate the HCM movement and analyze its origins, development, impact, and
normative desirability. In the aftermath of the lingering economic dislocation caused by the
2008 financial crisis and the still-ongoing public health and economic crises unleashed by
the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a tangible willingness by policymakers, firms,
investors, and others to reconceive institutional arrangements that have been taken for
granted for decades. This Article’s timely analysis of the HCM movement seeks to inform
some of the attendant public and corporate governance policy choices.
Subject to certain qualifications, the Article views HCM as a broadly positive and
much-overdue corporate governance development: HCM disclosure contributes to more
accurate firm valuation by shining a spotlight on a key driver of success in the modern
knowledge-based economy; HCM oversight at the board level ensures that ILUPV focus
appropriately on the management of what has come to be referred to as a “mission-critical”
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asset. To realize HCM’s full promise, however, participants in the HCM movement should
seek to disambiguate the HCM concept by carefully defining it, breaking it down into its
appropriate constitutive elements, and, to the extent possible, focusing the relevant discussions
on those specific elements. The weight of the empirical evidence and the appropriate policies
for corporate boards, the SEC, and private standard-setters will vary depending on which
element is under consideration. In addition, boards should resist isomorphic approaches,
particularly ones developed by organizations such as large asset managers that are lacking in
regulatory legitimacy, accountability, and HCM expertise. The SEC can and should serve as a
nexus for coordination among the various participants in the HCM movement. As a first step,
the SEC should revisit the HCM disclosure rulemaking process and reject the unstructured,
“principles-based” approach reflected in the August 2020 HCM disclosure rule, which is based
on an impoverished understanding of the important concept of materiality. In its final part, the
Article considers the limits of HCM and sounds a note of caution with respect to HCM’s
potential to address problems outside corporate law. The rise of the HCM movement has
highlighted the need for a governmental human capital development and worker protection
agenda; in other words, current socio-economic conditions likely require new measures aimed
at the development and protection of human capital, not just its management.
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INTRODUCTION

One seemingly immutable feature of the U.S. system of corporate
governance has long been its focus on the interaction among three
constituencies—managers, directors, and shareholders—to the
exclusion of other stakeholders, most notably employees. Given that
conventional corporations are comprised of workers and cannot exist
without workers, this state of affairs is puzzling and, for many,
unsatisfactory. In the year 2021, labor’s importance to firm success is
arguably greater than it has ever been: at many firms, human resources
contribute more to total firm value than physical assets such as
manufacturing plants, equipment, and machinery; for some firms,
human capital is even more scarce than financial capital.1
The appropriate role and status of employees in corporate
governance, if any, is one of corporate law’s evergreen questions. Over
the years, scholars have generated a variety of reform proposals aimed
at empowering employees and giving them some parity, if not primacy,
in corporate governance.2 These proposals have focused on treating
workers more like shareholders by, for example, making it easier for
employees to take ownership stakes in firms, arguing for director
fiduciary duties to workers, and giving workers various consultation,
decision, and litigation rights under corporate law, to name but a few.3
Public officials have also made regular calls for raising the status of
workers. Former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Leo Strine recently
proposed an ambitious suite of reform proposals, a “new deal” for
workers, which incorporates many of the reform ideas from prior
decades and adds a number of new ones.4 Progressive politicians have
made a forceful case for requiring firms to place workers on corporate
boards.5 These worker empowerment proposals have yet to gain
serious traction. In August 2019, the Business Roundtable issued a
1.
2.
3.
4.

See discussion infra subpart III.B.
See discussion infra subpart II.B.1-3.
See discussion infra subpart II.B.1.
See LEO E. STRINE, JR., TOWARD FAIR AND SUSTAINABLE CAPITALISM, ROOSEVELT
INSTITUTE (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3461924.
5.
Press Release, Off. of Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Warren Introduces Accountable
Capitalism Act (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/
warren-introduces-accountable-capitalism-act [https://perma.cc/US28-SNXZ] (describing
how the bill would require large corporations to obtain a federal charter, require boards to
consider the interests of all stakeholders when making decisions, and enable employees to elect
at least 40% of the board of directors). See infra note 51 and accompanying text (summarizing
similar proposals by Senators Baldwin and Sanders).
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statement on “redefining” the purpose of the corporation in favor of
promoting the interests of constituencies beyond just shareholders,
including employees.6 Commentators have suggested that the
statement has not and will not result in changes to corporate policy:
many of the CEOs who signed it did so without obtaining board
approval for making a potentially sweeping change to corporate policy;
at least some firms argued that the statement simply reflected policies
already in place.7
Nevertheless, workers are starting to appear in various important
areas of U.S. corporate governance through a new and surprising
mechanism: the concept of human capital management (HCM). Since
2017, large institutional investors, including BlackRock, have called
for greater attention to HCM in their engagement with public
companies.8 In 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
adopted a new rule requiring HCM disclosure, after overwhelming
support for such disclosure from mainstream shareholder
constituencies and the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee.9 A wide
range of organizations have been working on frameworks for HCM
reporting, while legislators have put forward bills that would mandate
extensive HCM disclosure by public firms.10 And even though workers
may not have (yet) entered the boardroom, workers’ concerns already
have: boards increasingly treat HCM as a “mission-critical” area of
oversight and are changing their practices at the urging of legal
advisers, big-four accounting firms, and executive compensation
consultants, among others. In a development that has gone largely
unnoticed, board compensation committees have been expanding their
remit beyond matters of executive compensation to consider rank-andfile employee compensation and other HCM matters.11 Shareholder
6.
Press Release, Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines the
Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, (Aug.
19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purposeof-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/RE3LQ3DP] (“Investing in our employees. This starts with compensating them fairly and providing
important benefits. It also includes supporting them through training and education that help
develop new skills for a rapidly changing world. We foster diversity and inclusion, dignity and
respect.”).
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
7.
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2020).
8.
See discussion infra subpart III.B.1.
9.
See discussion infra subpart III.C.
See discussion infra subpart III.B.6-7.
10.
See discussion infra subpart III.B.2.
11.
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engagement agendas, board-level decisionmaking, and the SEC
disclosure regime: these are some of the key levers of U.S. corporate
governance. HCM has affected each of them in short order, giving rise
to what I call an “HCM movement”: a broad set of initiatives in support
of investor-facing HCM disclosure and board-level oversight of HCM
matters. This is an important development in need of academic
analysis.
What is human capital management? The term is based on the
concept of human capital, popularized by economist and Nobel
laureate Gary Becker. Human capital is defined simply as “the
knowledge, skills, competences and other attributes embodied in
individuals that are relevant to economic activity.”12 Human capital
management, in turn, has been described in a variety of ways, but they
usually share two important elements. First, HCM “addresses the
management of a company’s human resources (employees and
individual contractors) as key assets to delivering long-term value.”13
In other words, HCM views workers as productive assets, serving a
similar, though of course qualitatively different, function as capital
assets, such as machines. The goal of HCM is to maximize workers’
ability to deliver long-term value and maximize productivity. For this
reason, human capital is often described as an intangible asset, falling
in the same category as patents, copyright, franchises, goodwill,
trademarks, trade names, computer software, and data.14
The second component of the HCM definition relates to the
matters that are identified as contributing to workers’ ability to deliver
long-term value. According to one widely followed standard-setting
organization, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB),
HCM includes issues such as labor practices, employee health and
12. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON 9 (1998). A slightly expanded articulation of this definition states that human
capital is “the knowledge, skills, competencies and other attributes embodied in individuals or
groups of individuals acquired during their life and used to produce goods, services or ideas in
market circumstances.” See SVEN-ÅGE WESTPHALEN, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV.,
REPORTING ON HUMAN CAPITAL; OBJECTIVES AND TRENDS 10 (1999), https://www.oecd.org/
sti/ind/1948014.pdf [https://perma.cc/H94G-ZW2U].
13. SASB Materiality Map, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.
sasb.org/standards-overview/materiality-map [https://perma.cc/AT43-4XHB] (last visited
Mar. 20, 2021).
14. According to Accounting Standard Codification 350 (ASC 350) promulgated by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board, an intangible asset is an asset, other than a financial
asset, that lacks physical substance. See, e.g., BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES: MANAGEMENT,
MEASUREMENT, AND REPORTING 6-7 (2001).
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safety, employee engagement, and diversity and inclusion that “affect
the productivity of employees, management of labor relations, and
management of the health and safety of employees and the ability to
create a safety culture.”15 There is variation among the different
definitions with respect to the list of issues and the ways these issues
are described and categorized.16
The notion of HCM (also referred to as “human resource
management”) has been around for decades. Over time, it has
generated extensive bodies of work in fields such as labor economics,
industrial and labor relations, management science, organizational
psychology, and sociology.17 By contrast, law—and corporate law in
particular—has generally ignored human capital management (though
making occasional reference to the concept of human capital), in line
with the absence of a formal role for employees in corporate
governance noted at the outset.18
This Article is the first to focus on the present-day nexus between
HCM and corporate governance, and it does so by analyzing the myriad
of HCM-related initiatives and developments, which started to emerge
in the mid-2010s and had already gained traction by the late 2010s. The
Article puts forward new qualitative and quantitative evidence about
HCM’s integration into the legal and institutional framework for
corporate governance. Despite HCM’s swift rise and broad uptake,
however, to date there has been a relative lack of meaningful
coordination among the numerous participants in the HCM movement,
which has resulted in often-inconsistent messaging. One notable
15.
16.
17.

SASB Materiality Map, supra note 13.
See discussion infra subpart III.A.
See, e.g., RICHARD DONKIN, THE FUTURE OF WORK (2010); THOMAS O.
DAVENPORT, HUMAN CAPITAL: WHAT IT IS AND WHY PEOPLE INVEST IT (1999); ERIC
FLAMHOLTZ, HUMAN RESOURCE ACCOUNTING (1974); LESTER THUROW, INVESTMENT IN
HUMAN CAPITAL (1970).
18. See discussion infra subparts II.A-II.B, II.D. Work by corporate law scholars such
as Margaret Blair and Marleen O’Connor during the 1990s provides a limited exception and
foreshadows some of the HCM developments that have occurred since the mid-2010s. See,
e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995) [hereinafter BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL]
(proposing, inter alia, changes in the standard accounting system to measure and reflect the
value of human capital); Marleen A. O’Connor, Rethinking Corporate Financial Disclosure
of Human Resource Values for the Knowledge-Based Economy, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
527, 528-29 (1998) (identifying the absence of securities disclosure about “human resource
values” and arguing for changes to the disclosure regime). Though persuasive, these proposals
did not gain traction at the time. Other areas of law, such as intellectual property, tax, and labor
law, have made use of the concept of human capital (though not human capital management)
to varying degrees. See discussion infra Part V.
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exception is that virtually all participants in the HCM movement have
used the same justification for HCM’s importance to corporate
governance: workers should be regarded as important productive assets
and managed accordingly, in the interest of improving productivity
and firm performance. This shareholder-focused, workers-as-assets
justification stands in contrast to an alternative model for incorporating
human capital into corporate governance, which views employees as
human capital investors, not dissimilar from shareholders who invest
financial capital in the firm.19
The workers-as-assets vs. workers-as-human capital investors
distinction also relates to another important feature of the HCM
movement: the way it differs from prior labor-focused reform
agendas. These longstanding agendas, which I describe as a worker
empowerment agenda, a worker-shareholder agenda, and a stakeholder
primacy agenda, have generally sought to redefine the existing legal
and institutional arrangements, whereas by comparison the HCM
movement operates firmly within the existing framework.20 In a related
vein, a comparative perspective suggests that the HCM movement is a
distinct product of U.S. corporate governance, despite interest and
participation from international players. Recent labor-focused reforms
in the United Kingdom and the European Union have more in common
with the aspirational worker empowerment and stakeholder primacy
reform agendas than they do with the shareholder-focused HCM
movement.21
Subject to certain qualifications, this Article views HCM
as a broadly positive and much-overdue corporate governance
development: HCM disclosure contributes to better and more accurate
firm valuation by shining a spotlight on a key driver of success in the
modern knowledge-based economy; HCM oversight at the board level
ensures that boards focus appropriately on the management of what has
come to be referred to as a “mission-critical asset.” To realize HCM’s
full promise, however, all participants in the HCM movement should
seek to disambiguate the HCM concept by carefully defining it,
breaking it down into its appropriate constitutive elements, and, to the
extent possible, focusing the relevant discussions on those specific
elements.22 The weight of the empirical evidence and the appropriate
19.
20.
21.
22.

See discussion infra subpart II.D.
See discussion infra subparts II.B, III.D.1.
See discussion infra subparts II.C, III.D.2.
See discussion infra subparts IV.A-D.
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policies for corporate boards, the SEC, and private standard-setters will
vary depending on which element is under consideration.23 In addition,
boards should resist isomorphic approaches, particularly ones
developed by organizations such as large asset managers that are
lacking in regulatory legitimacy, accountability, and HCM expertise.24
The SEC can and should serve as a nexus for coordination among the
various participants in the HCM movement. As an important first step,
the SEC should revisit the HCM disclosure rulemaking process and
reject the unstructured, “principles-based” approach reflected in the
August 2020 HCM disclosure rule, which is based on an impoverished,
and arguably inaccurate, understanding of the important concept of
materiality.25 In its final part, the Article considers the limits of HCM
and sounds a note of caution with respect to HCM’s potential to address
problems outside corporate law. The rise of the HCM movement in
corporate law has highlighted the need for a governmental human
capital development and worker protection agenda; in other words,
current socio-economic conditions likely require new measures aimed
at the development and protection of human capital, not just its
management.26
Viewed through a wide lens, U.S. corporate governance in 2021
is in a state of flux. For the first time since the 1970s, there is a real
willingness by policymakers, firms, investors, and others to reexamine
questions that only a few years ago had seemed settled, and indubitably
so. These questions include: What is the purpose of the corporation?
Who should get a say in corporate governance? How should firms
navigate the inevitable tradeoffs among economic efficiency,
resiliency, and long-term sustainability? How can corporate law engage
with the ever-growing social, economic, political, and environmental
externalities of the business activities it was designed to enable? For
each of these important questions, some of the answers focus on
workers and invariably invoke the concept of human capital
management. To this end, understanding what HCM is—and what it is
not, what it can—and what it cannot do, who it stands to benefit—and
at what cost, is a vital part of the future blueprint for capitalism, whether
it be stakeholder, shareholder, or enlightened capitalism, that is being
written as we stand on the cusp of a new decade and a post-pandemic
23.
24.
25.
26.

See discussion infra subpart IV.A.
See discussion infra subpart IV.B.
See discussion infra subpart IV.C.
See discussion infra Part V.
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social and economic order full of both uncertainty and possibility.
***
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: Part II sets the
stage by describing the complex legal and institutional landscape
within which the HCM movement has arisen. Part III defines the HCM
movement, investigates its manifestations in various corporate
governance domains, and describes its key features; Part III also
examines the HCM movement in the larger context of corporate
governance and offers possible explanations for its swift rise and broad
uptake. Part IV presents normative and institutional critiques and offers
specific recommendations focused on the role of corporate boards, the
SEC, and financial accounting standard-setters. Part V considers the
need for a broader human capital regulatory agenda outside corporate
law.
II.

THE ROLES OF CAPITAL AND LABOR IN THE MODERN
U.S. CORPORATION

On a conceptual level, both human capital and human capital
management are hybrid notions created by the fusion of two distinct
constructs, capital and labor. To understand the novel HCM movement,
it is therefore necessary to first appreciate certain key aspects of the
underlying legal and institutional framework as it relates to capital
(represented by shareholders) and labor (represented by workers). This
Part discusses four background matters: (A) the traditional roles of
shareholders and workers in U.S. corporate governance; (B) the history
of reform efforts aimed at enhancing the status of workers within the
corporation; (C) the idiosyncratic nature of the traditional U.S.
arrangements when viewed in a comparative light; and (D) the two
distinct models of the nexus between human capital and corporate
governance.
A.

Corporate Purpose, Theory, and the Mechanisms of Governance

It is a truth (almost) universally acknowledged that shareholders
sit at the center of U.S. corporate law—both as participants in the
governance process and as the constituency in whose interest most
firms are managed—all the while there is vigorous debate on whether
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it ought to be so.27 By contrast, employees are neither participants in
governance nor the intended beneficiaries of the governance process;
indeed, as noted by one commentator, “the ‘employee’ category is not
a meaningful one when it comes to creating, sustaining, or dissolving
the corporation.”28
As a purely descriptive matter, the formal mechanisms of
corporate governance accord a variety of rights and powers to
shareholders—and none to employees. Under state law, shareholders
have the right to vote on important corporate matters, including bylaw
and charter amendments, director elections, mergers, and dissolution;
inspect the corporation’s books and records; and sue directors and
officers for fiduciary duty breaches.29 In public firms subject to the
federal securities laws, shareholders also have the right to make and
vote on shareholder proposals, express a view on executive
compensation, and receive detailed information about the firm on a
regular basis.30 The prevailing view on corporate purpose, at least as it
currently stands under Delaware law, is that directors and officers have
a duty to “promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders,”31 or, put differently, that “within the limits of their
discretion, [they] must make stockholder welfare their sole end.”32 This
precept, often referred to as shareholder primacy, serves as the baseline
against which corporate law reformers are pushing back when they
27. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2004 (2013) (“Many, and possibly most, public companies now
embrace a shareholder-centered vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes
‘maximizing shareholder value’ (typically measured by share price) over all other
corporate goals.”); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003) (discussing
federal and state law mechanisms for shareholder influence in corporate governance).
28. Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 1 (2011) (capitalization
simplified).
29. See, e.g., ALAN PALMITER, FRANK PARTNOY & ELIZABETH POLLMAN, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 399-536 (3d ed. 2019).
30. Id. at 447-541.
31. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
32. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015). For analyses of
corporate purpose affirming this view following the 2019 Business Roundtable Statement, see
Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate over
Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. (forthcoming Spring 2021); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Making Sense of the Business Roundtable’s Reversal on Corporate Purpose (UCLA Sch. of
L., L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 20-03, 2020), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3664078; Bebchuk
& Tallarita, supra note 7.
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seek to expand corporate purpose to include the interests of employees
and other stakeholders.
The traditional primacy of shareholder concerns in corporate law
has also been reflected in the development trajectory of the federal
securities disclosure regime. Until 2018, public companies were not
required to disclose any specific information about their non-executive
workforce apart from a single datapoint—the total number of
employees.33 In 2018, more than eight decades after the inception of
the disclosure regime, public companies were for the first time required
to disclose minimal information about non-executive compensation
through the CEO-median worker pay ratio.34 This was followed in
2020 by a mandate to disclose certain information about HCM
practices, in an open-ended manner and only to the extent deemed
material.35 On the one hand, these are positive signs that workers’
visibility in corporate filings is increasing, but, on the other, they also
highlight the still-limited nature of workforce disclosure compared to
disclosure pertaining to other matters.
The unique status of shareholders in the governance structure is
often explained by referencing contractarian theories of the firm, which
enjoy substantial, though not universal, acceptance in corporate law.
Under the basic contractarian model, the firm is a “nexus of contracts”
among the various participants in the corporate enterprise, including
shareholders, managers, employees, creditors, suppliers, customers,
and others.36 In the ordinary course, the relevant contracts give each of
these parties—except shareholders—a fixed claim on the firm’s assets.
Shareholders are said to be the only residual claimants, and, hence, they
arguably have the right set of incentives to act to maximize the firm’s

33. Regulation S-K, Item 101(c)(xiii), 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xiii) (2018) (requiring
firms to disclose “[t]he number of persons employed” by them). To be sure, under particular
circumstances workforce information may be captured in other disclosure rubrics of
Regulation S-K, such as the MD&A.
34. See Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Securities Disclosure as Soundbite:
The Case of CEO Pay Ratios, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1126 (2019). Specifically, Section 953(b)
of the Dodd-Frank Act requires public companies to calculate and disclose: (a) the annual total
compensation of the median worker; (b) the annual total compensation of the CEO; and (c) the
ratio of the two. Id. at 1136-37.
35. See discussion infra subpart III.B.5.
36. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (presenting
the now-classic formulation of the nexus of contracts model); see also Jill E. Fisch, Measuring
Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 656-62
(2006) (summarizing the application of the nexus of contracts model to corporate law).
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value.37 According to contractarian theories, this explains why
corporate law gives shareholders—and only shareholders—decision
rights, information rights, and litigation rights, and, even more, why it
is efficient to do so.38 In this framework, the relationship between
employees and the firm is strictly contractual and thus outside the scope
of corporate law. The basic contractarian model has been subject to
numerous elaborations as well as numerous critiques, including for its
inaccurate (or, at least, oversimplistic) treatment of employees as fixed
claimants.39 Irrespective of its accuracy or normative validity, however,
this model remains the most commonplace explanation for workers’
absence from the control structures of the firm.
To be sure, the fact that workers are not formally embedded in
U.S. corporate governance structures does not mean that they could
never affect corporate decisionmaking on an ad hoc basis through
informal means, including labor strikes, legislative and media
advocacy, or litigation. Such mechanisms, however, are diffuse and,
generally, ineffectual.40 Relatedly, there is a distinction between
employee participation in corporate governance, which is at issue here,
and so-called “operational participation”—a phenomenon whereby
employees have a say on various operational issues related to
improving productivity and working conditions.41 Operational
participation is not uncommon in the United States, but it is
qualitatively different from participation in corporate governance,
which pertains to economic and strategic matters.42 Finally, it is worth
37. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 63-67 (1991).
38. Id.
39. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (noting argument that employees are
best viewed as residual claimants like shareholders).
40. The challenges associated with influencing corporate governance through such
mechanisms stem from the well-documented decline of the labor movement over the course
of the 20th century. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2016)
(discussing the decline of labor’s power). Firms where employees hold disproportionate
leverage by virtue of skill scarcity, such as those in the high-tech sector, may offer a limited
exception, but even there, employee activism has been driven by specific hot-button issues,
without an accompanying push for more formal employee representation in governance. See,
e.g., Jennifer S. Fan, Employees as Regulators: The New Private Ordering in High Technology
Companies, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 973, 977-79, 988 (2019) (discussing the extent and limits of
high-tech employee activism).
41. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of
the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 684 (1996) (defining operational participation and noting its
widespread nature).
42. Id. at 686 (distinguishing between operational participation and strategic
participation).
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noting that there have been isolated instances of employees (or
employee representatives) serving on U.S. corporate boards in the past.
Those situations, however, have arisen through private ordering, under
unique circumstances, and outside any statutory framework.43
B.

Labor-Focused Reform Initiatives

The arrangements described in subpart II.A have been subject to
regular and intensifying criticism. Over the years—and long before the
rise of the HCM movement in the mid-2010s—academics,
policymakers, and activists have offered various proposals for
refashioning the traditional relationship between labor and capital
under U.S. corporate law. Some of these have focused on changing the
ends of corporate governance (i.e., corporate purpose) for the benefit
of workers, whereas others have sought to change the means of
corporate governance by giving workers certain governance rights.
Within the large universe of historical reform proposals, it is possible
to identify the contours of at least three distinct and coherent laborfocused reform agendas. These include what I call a worker
empowerment agenda, a worker-shareholder agenda, and a stakeholder
primacy agenda.44 Despite sharing strong thematic similarities with the
novel HCM movement, these older reform agendas differ from it in key
respects, which makes them instrumental to understanding what the
HCM movement is, and what it is not.45 As we will see, whereas the
reform agendas seek to redefine the existing legal and institutional
arrangements, the HCM movement operates firmly within the existing
framework. In addition, the reform agendas remain largely aspirational
despite a long history, whereas the brand-new HCM movement has
gained significant traction in the span of just a few years.
1.

Worker Empowerment Agenda

There have been a variety of proposals over the years to elevate
the role of workers in the decisionmaking and oversight structures of
the corporation. In effect, these proposals have sought to empower
43. See, e.g., Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at Work: The History of
Labor’s Vote in Corporate Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 697, 701-45 (2019) (discussing
the history of U.S. experimentation with workers on boards).
44. As with most taxonomies of socio-legal phenomena, there is no absolute separation
between categories, and some of the reform agendas discussed here share areas of overlap.
45. See discussion infra subpart III.D.1 (discussing the HCM movement in historical
perspective).
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workers by giving them many of the rights currently enjoyed by
shareholders alone, such as decision rights (e.g., director appointment
rights, consultation rights, veto rights, and other rights),46 litigation
rights (stemming from proposed fiduciary duties owed to workers),47
information rights (federal disclosure provisions, antifraud protections,
and intra-firm information sharing),48 and economic rights.49 Many of
these proposals arose in the aftermath of the leveraged buyouts of the
1980s, which greatly benefitted shareholders while hurting the
economic standing of workers, and which led to a stronger focus on
constituent concerns within corporate law discourse.50 The proposals
46. See BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, supra note 18, at 326-30 (proposing
employee representation on boards and other means of facilitating employee participation in
governance); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic
Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 334, 339-41 (2008) (arguing for employee
primacy in corporate decisionmaking and considering different options of employee control);
Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 904 (1993) [hereinafter
O’Connor, Reconceptualizing Corporate Law] (proposing that “[d]irectors [should] owe
fiduciary obligations to employees, including the duty to provide information and consult with
them about strategic decisions that affect job security and working conditions”).
47. See Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1189,
1235-46 (1991) (arguing that “directors should owe employees a fiduciary duty to provide
adequate severance pay, job retraining, and other benefits to ease the transition dislocated
workers face”); O’Connor, Reconceptualizing Corporate Law, supra note 46, at 954-57
(advocating for broad legally-enforceable fiduciary duties).
48. See Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63
STAN. L. REV. 351, 364-69 (2011) (advocating for a mandatory disclosure regime covering
information related to terms and conditions of employment); Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified
Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715, 785 (1997)
(advocating for antifraud liability for false or materially misleading corporate statements made
“in connection with the offering or provision of employment, the negotiation of the terms of
an employment relation, or the offering or continuing provision of employment benefits”);
Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule 10b-5,
88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 543 (2003) (advocating for antifraud protections under Rule 10b-5
for employees who receive stock options through company-wide plans); O’Connor,
Reconceptualizing Corporate Law, supra note 46 (advocating for director duties to provide
information to employees in respect of strategic decisions).
49. See, e.g., BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, supra note 18, at 328-30
(recommending that firms give explicit residual income and control rights to employees by
replacing part of their fixed compensation with restricted voting stock); Margaret M. Blair,
Douglas L. Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi, Employee Ownership: An Unstable Form or a Stabilizing
Force?, in THE NEW RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 241,
246-51 (Margaret M. Blair & Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000) (summarizing theoretical
arguments and policy proposals related to employee ownership).
50. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, The Separation of Corporate Law and Social
Welfare, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 780–81 (2017) (noting the wealth transfer from workers
to shareholders during the 1980s and the accompanying shift from general concerns about
social responsibility to constituent concerns in progressive critiques of corporate law).
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comprising the worker empowerment agenda share an interest in
transforming the mechanisms of corporate governance by increasing
the relative power of employees vis-à-vis shareholders—with the
expectation that this would in turn lead to the reallocation of some of
the firm’s surplus from shareholders to workers. None of these
proposals have come to pass, but some of them, such as the idea of
employee representation on corporate boards, garnered renewed
political support in the late 2010s.51
2.

Worker-Shareholder Agenda

The sizeable amount of financial capital represented by workers’
retirement savings is another mechanism through which labor can
influence corporate governance. Here, workers act in their capacity not
as workers but as shareholders, and they use the various powers
afforded to shareholders to push for labor-friendly corporate policies.
These may include substantive policies aimed at protecting jobs or
creating new ones, governance changes that might make such
initiatives easier to put forward, or policies believed to maximize the
long-term value of the firm in the interest of pension fund
beneficiaries.52 The basic logic underlying this channel for exerting
influence is sound and, indeed, intuitive: labor’s capital should be used
to advance labor’s interests.53 Nevertheless, even though labor union

51. See Press Release, Off. of Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Warren Introduces Accountable
Capitalism Act (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/
warren-introduces-accountable-capitalism-act [https://perma.cc/US28-SNXZ] (proposing that
employees be given the power to elect 40% of directors in large public corporations); Press
Release, Off. of Sen. Tammy Baldwin, U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin Reintroduces
Legislation to Rein in Stock Buybacks and Give Workers a Voice on Corporate Boards (Mar.
27, 2019), https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-releases/reward-work-act-2019 [https://
perma.cc/WCK3-2L7F] (proposing the Reward Work Act, which would give employees the
power to elect one-third of directors in large public companies); Corporate Accountability and
Democracy, BERNIESANDERS.COM, https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountabilityand-democracy [https://perma.cc/MZ6F-C3JT] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021) (proposing that
employees be given the power to elect 45% of directors in large public companies).
52. The corporate governance tools used to exert influence include say-on-pay voting,
shareholder proposals related to executive and non-executive pay, and serving as a lead
plaintiff in shareholder lawsuits. See David H. Webber & Michael A. McCarthy, Is Labor’s
Future in Labor’s Capital? A Debate, LPE PROJECT (June 12, 2019), https://lpeproject.org/
blog/is-labors-future-in-labors-capital-a-debate [https://perma.cc/FY5L-CXFN].
53. See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S
LAST BEST WEAPON (2018); see also Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the
Agency Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority of Americans Invest in the Market, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299 (2012) (arguing for the reconceptualization of shareholder identity
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pension funds and other labor-affiliated investment funds have long
been active in corporate governance, they have traditionally been most
successful when making garden-variety corporate governance
proposals, which attract support from other shareholders, rather than
narrower labor-related proposals.54 The very availability of SEC Rule
14a-8 has been highly variable over the years, from occasional
prohibitions on shareholder proposals concerning employee
directors,55 to the outright prohibition on all “employment-related”
shareholder proposals pursuant to the 1992 Cracker Barrel no-action
letter (subsequently repealed),56 to the frequent blocking of individual
labor-related proposals (including, for example, recent proposals
dealing with minimum wage and occupational health and safety
matters),57 to the successful campaign to raise eligibility and
resubmission thresholds for shareholder proposals in 2020.58 In sum,
even though labor advocates have had occasional success when using
the tools available to them in their capacity as shareholders, the promise
of the worker-shareholder agenda has never been fully realized.
3.

Stakeholder Primacy Agenda

As discussed in subpart II.A, the traditional view with respect to
corporate purpose is that corporations, particularly in Delaware, ought
to maximize shareholder wealth, which in practice means prioritizing
shareholders over other constituencies. Unsurprisingly, some of the
efforts to protect and promote labor interests within the firm have
around the notion of a “citizen shareholder,” thereby causing firms to take into account broader
societal concerns).
54. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1082-83 (1998).
55. See, e.g., American Telephone & Telegraph Company, SEC No-Action Letter,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 79,658 (1974) (permitting exclusion of shareholder proposal
concerning employee directors because it conflicts with state law).
56. Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1992–1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,418 (Oct. 13, 1992).
57. See Best Buy Co. Inc., SEC Response to No-Action Letter Request (Mar. 8, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2016/dominisocialbest030816-14
a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HDJ-P7XW] (permitting exclusion due to the fact that proposal deals
with “general compensation matters”); Pilgrims Pride Corp., SEC Response to NoAction Letter Request (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/
14a-8/2016/oxfamamerica022516-14a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7CB-BWZL] (permitting
exclusion on ordinary business grounds of proposal requesting report on certain occupational
health and safety matters).
58. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Amendments to
Modernize Shareholder Proposal Rule (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2020-220 [https://perma.cc/T46J-BMCK].
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focused on replacing the shareholder primacy view of corporate
purpose with an alternative that takes into account the interests of all
stakeholders, including workers. These efforts, which can be termed a
stakeholder primacy agenda, span many decades and have taken a
variety of forms: the adoption of constituency statutes in many
jurisdictions (though not Delaware);59 academic arguments that the
shareholder primacy norm is not, in fact, mandated by case law or
supported by economic theory;60 and attempts to redefine corporate
purpose, either by statute,61 or through private ordering.62 Past efforts
in this regard have been unsuccessful in changing the status of workers
within firms, and it remains to be seen whether current efforts will fare
differently. Like the worker empowerment and the worker-shareholder
agendas, the stakeholder primacy agenda is a natural point of
comparison for any new corporate governance initiative focused on
workers; the surprising lack of overlap between the existing agendas
and the HCM movement is an important part of understanding the
latter.
C.

International Counterpoints

The internal logic and consistency of the U.S. corporate
governance arrangements described in subpart II.A and the relative
lack of traction of the reform agendas discussed in subpart II.B should
not be taken to mean that, by definition, corporate governance must be
shareholder-centric. A brief look at non-U.S. systems of corporate
59. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 26-31 (1992); Michal Barzuza, The State of State
Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1973 (2009).
60. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 300-01 (1999) (“To earn the protection of the business judgment
rule, directors must show that a challenged decision satisfied three requirements: . . . (3) the
directors acted ‘in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.’ . . . [C]ase law generally interprets the ‘best interest of the company’ to include
nonshareholder interests, including those of employees, creditors, and the community.”); LYNN
STOUT ET AL., THE MODERN CORPORATION STATEMENT ON COMPANY LAW 2 (2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848833 (statement of over 50 prominent scholars noting that
“[c]ontrary to widespread belief, corporate directors generally are not under a legal obligation
to maximise profits for their shareholders”).
61. Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act would require large firms
to obtain a federal charter, which would obligate directors to consider the interests of all
stakeholders—shareholders, employees, suppliers, the communities in which the firms
operate, and the local and global environment. See Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th
Cong. (2018).
62. The August 2019 Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate Purpose represents
the most visible attempt to do so. See supra note 6.
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governance illustrates viable alternatives and shows that the complete
lack of labor participation in corporate governance in the United States
makes it an outlier, particularly when compared to otherwise-similar
market economies such as the United Kingdom and the European
Union.63
The structure and composition of corporate boards is one
prominent area of divergence. About half of the member states of the
European Union have laws requiring worker representation on boards
of directors.64 The provisions differ substantially across jurisdictions,
but in most cases, worker representatives comprise one-third of the
board, and those “employee directors” have the same powers to
participate in decisionmaking as shareholder-elected directors.65 The
representation of workers is particularly strong in Germany
where, pursuant to the longstanding practice of “quasi-parity
codetermination,” employee-elected directors comprise half the
members of the supervisory board of German companies with more
than 2,000 German-based employees.66 This translates into substantial
leverage over corporate policy because supervisory board members
have a statutory right to veto nominees for the management board and
because of norms favoring consensus at the supervisory board level.67
Another example of alternative corporate governance
arrangements involves the various consultation, information, and
approval rights accorded to “works councils” (institutionalized bodies
for representative communication between a firm and its employees).
These bodies are distinct from labor unions and represent employees
63. The discussion of non-U.S. corporate governance systems is abridged due to
limitations of scope and space. Importantly, the greater level of worker participation and
visibility in non-U.S. corporate governance systems does not obviate the role of shareholders.
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (discussing the international dissipation of U.S. ideas pertaining to the
role and status of shareholders). For a comparative account of corporate governance systems,
see MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003).
64. See ALINE CONCHON, EUR. TRADE UNION INST., WORKERS’ VOICE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 6 (2015). This requirement covers both public and
private companies in 13 out of 27 countries in the European Union. Id.
65. Id. at 24; see also Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmueller, Codetermination: A Poor
Fit for U.S. Corporations, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 870, 880 (2021) (providing a survey of
board-level codetermination and board structures in selected European countries).
66. See REINER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 90-91 (3d ed. 2017). Companies with fewer than
2,000 and more than 500 employees are subject to codetermination under a different law,
which provides that one-third of supervisory board members should be elected by employees.
See Dammann & Eidenmueller, supra note 65, at 885-86.
67. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 66, at 91.
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on certain governance matters, strategic decisions, and more routine
operational issues. All EU countries mandate that employees should
have the right to establish works councils.68 The applicable statutory
frameworks differ across countries and include such powers as the right
to formally submit the works council’s views on matters under
consideration at the annual general meeting (Netherlands),69 or the right
to send works council representatives as observers at board meetings
and submit resolutions at the annual general meeting (France),70 among
others. The sources of works councils’ powers are fragmented, with
some deriving from national law and others from various EU legal
provisions.71 Taken together, provisions relating to board composition
and works councils enable EU employees to have a voice in
governance matters in ways that are not available to U.S. employees;
while EU employees certainly do not enjoy decisionmaking parity with
shareholders, they do hold more power vis-à-vis shareholders than is
the case in the United States.
The United Kingdom, noteworthy because its corporate
governance system is on the whole most similar to that of the United
States, has in recent years diverged from the U.S. model in this area by
moving to expand the role of employees in corporate governance. The
2018 revision of the U.K. Corporate Governance Code identifies the
appointment of an employee-designated director as one of several
acceptable methods by which boards can fulfill the requirement to
engage with the workforce.72 Contemporaneous amendments to laws
68. See Employee Involvement—European Works Councils, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.
europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=707&langId=en&intPageId=211 [https://perma.cc/AED52CPM] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
69. CONCHON, supra note 64, at 25.
70. Id. at 21, 25.
71. See AOIFE KENNEDY, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, WORKERS’ RIGHT TO INFORMATION,
CONSULTATION AND PARTICIPATION (2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU
_2.3.6.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C88-ZKCD]; CONCHON, supra note 64.
72. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 5 (2018),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UKCorporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ48-M44M]. In addition to a
director appointed from the workforce, possible engagement mechanisms include the
establishment of a formal workforce advisory panel, designating a non-executive director
focused on the workforce, or “alternative arrangements” determined by the company. Id. The
Corporate Governance Code operates on a comply-or-explain basis. Id. at 2. The
accompanying guidance document notes that “[a] director appointed from the workforce will
bring a workforce view to the boardroom . . . [but] their role is not solely to represent the views
of the workforce.” FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 16 (2018),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/61232f60-a338-471b-ba5a-bfed25219147/2018Guidance-on-Board-Effectiveness-FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/4NKV-JS9U].
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applying to large and medium-sized companies require a statement
describing any employee empowerment initiatives pursued by the
company,73 and summarizing “how the directors have engaged with
employees” and “how the directors have had regard to employee
interests, and the effect of that regard, including on the principal
decisions taken by the company during the financial year.”74 Notably,
these provisions apply to all companies (both public and private) with
more than 250 U.K.-based employees. The 2018 amendments also
require large companies (both public and private) to describe with some
specificity how they have complied with their obligations under
Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006;75 this provision had already
established a director’s “duty to promote the success of the company
for the benefit of its [shareholders] as a whole, and in doing so have
regard (amongst other matters) to . . . (b) the interests of the company’s
employees.”76 Finally, listed (i.e., public) companies are required to
provide information about the pay received by the 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentile employee and report the respective CEO pay ratios.77 Even
though the 2018 reforms in their final form were a retreat from the 2016
Green Paper, which had mooted stronger employee representation
modalities,78 they are nevertheless significant because they stand in
stark contrast with numerous similar U.K. reform proposals that had
failed in the past,79 and, most relevant for our purposes, with the U.S.
model.

73. The relevant provisions are discussed in greater detail in subpart III.D.2. See infra
note 244 and accompanying text.
74. See The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/860
(UK). The requirements pertaining to engagement with employees are contained in Regulation
13 and amend Part 4 of Schedule 7 of the Large and Medium-Sized Companies and Groups
(Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008. Id. at Explanatory Note.
75. Id. at Regulation 4. This provision, which is referred to as a “Section 172(1)
statement,” amends the Companies Act 2006. Id. at Explanatory Note.
76. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, pt. 10, ch. 2, § 172 (UK), https://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/section/172 [https://perma.cc/MME2-2YP2] (capitalization
simplified). The relevant provision uses the term “members” instead of “shareholders”; another
section of the Act defines members to mean shareholders. See id.
77. See The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/860,
Explanatory Memorandum ¶ 7.3 (UK).
78. See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, ENERGY & INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REFORM, 2016, at 38-42 (UK) (discussing stakeholder advisory panels,
designated directors, employee representatives on boards, and enhanced reporting
requirements as potential reform options).
79. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise of Corporate Governance in the UK: When and
Why, 68 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 387, 399-404 (2015).
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The Concept of Human Capital in Corporate Governance: Two
Models

The final background matter that deserves consideration relates to
the concept of human capital itself. Notwithstanding the novelty of the
present-day HCM movement in the United States, the concept of
human capital is not entirely new to debates about U.S. corporate
governance. During the 1990s, proponents of the worker
empowerment and stakeholder primacy agendas described in subpart
II.B began referencing studies of human capital in making the case for
various corporate governance reforms. By that point, the concept of
human capital had already gained significant traction in the fields of
economics and management science.80
Importantly, the nexus between human capital and corporate
governance is not readily apparent—any discussion of the matter must
embrace, at least implicitly, a theoretical model. A close look at the
academic literature and policy debates since the 1990s discerns two
such models: one conceptualizing workers as assets, and one
conceptualizing workers as investors of human capital. Even though
these models are not mutually exclusive, they differ in how they view
the appropriate role and status of workers in the corporate enterprise.
As we will see in Part III, participants in the HCM movement have
leaned much more heavily on the workers-as-assets model, an insight
with important analytical and normative implications.
1.

Workers as Assets

This model relies on the analogy between the productive capacity
of physical assets, such as buildings, machinery, land, office
equipment, furniture, and vehicles (usually referred to as “property,
plant, and equipment”), and the productive capacity of the human
capital embodied in the firm’s employees. Traditionally, physical assets
have been the primary focus of board oversight and monitoring, firms’
80.
The figure who most contributed to the early theoretical development of the
concept of human capital in economics was University of Chicago economist Gary Becker.
Receiving the 1992 Nobel Prize in Economics gave his work on human capital additional
recognition and exposure. See Press Release, The Nobel Prize, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1992 (Oct. 13, 1992), https://www.
nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1992/press-release [https://perma.cc/Z32B-3YVV]
(noting that Becker’s “most noteworthy contribution is perhaps to be found in the area of
human capital, i.e., human competence, and the consequences of investments in human
competence”).
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internal accounting systems, and their externally facing financial
statements and disclosure reports.81 Structural changes in the economy
over time highlighted the importance of employees’ skills and
knowledge to the success of the firm, which, in turn, contributed to a
view that workers (or, more precisely, the human capital embodied in
them) should be viewed as assets, similar to other assets of growing
importance, such as intellectual property.82 Despite its somewhat shaky
conceptual foundations,83 the workers-as-assets view appealed to
common-sense intuitions and quickly entered policy debates and the
broader public domain.84 It also led even more firms to begin
incorporating into their corporate disclosure and broader
communication efforts the now-trite proclamation that employees are
their “most important” or “most valuable” assets.85 Corporate
governance reform proposals from the 1990s used the workers-asassets idea in two ways: to argue, broadly, for increased attention to
employees as actors within corporate governance because of the
81. The strict distinction between physical capital and what we today call human
capital was the result of a fork in the road in the development of economics as a discipline.
According to Theodore Schultz, neoclassical economist Irving Fisher’s work on economic
theory in the late 19th century “clearly and cogently presented an all-inclusive concept of
capital,” but subsequent dominant approaches, most notably the work of Alfred Marshall and
his followers, drew a more formal dividing line, not because of a rigorous theoretical
justification but mostly because physical capital was easier to quantify and analyze. See
Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Man: An Economist’s View, 33 SOC. SERV. REV. 109, 11112 (1959). Marshall wrote: “Regarded from an abstract and mathematical point of view,
[Fisher’s] position is incontestable. But he seems to take too little account of the necessity for
keeping realistic discussions in touch with the language of the marketplace.” Id. at 111 (quoting
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 787-88 (8th ed. 1930)).
82. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Thomas A. Kochan, Introduction, in THE NEW
RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 1, 1-2 (Margaret M. Blair &
Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000) (noting that by 1998 the book value of the physical assets of
public corporations represented only 31% of their enterprise value, compared with 83% in
1978, and attributing the difference to the rise of intangible assets).
83. It is true that human capital has a productive capacity, similar to physical assets,
but human capital is unlike other assets in that it is not capable of being owned by anyone other
than the person in whom it is embodied. Moreover, traditional assets are passive, whereas
workers have agency. Human capital also fails the technical definition of an asset employed
by financial accounting. See infra notes 345-346 and accompanying text.
84. See DAVENPORT, supra note 17, at 4 (“‘Workers are assets’ has become the
dominant metaphor of late twentieth-century management.”). Going even further, Business
Week, in a special issue on “The 21st Century Corporation” published in August 2000,
proclaimed that “[h]uman capital is the only asset.” The 21st Century Corporation, BUS. WEEK,
Aug. 28, 2000, at 278.
85. See, e.g., Teresa Amabile & Steve Kramer, Valuing Your Most Valuable Assets,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 10, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/10/valuing-your-most-valuable
(“Corporate leaders often proclaim that their employees are their most valuable asset. For many
people, though, this is an empty platitude.”).
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importance of the human capital they embody,86 and, more narrowly,
to encourage firms to disclose more information about the value of their
human capital assets in the interest of maximizing firm performance
and shareholder returns.87
2.

Workers as Investors of Human Capital

Instead of viewing workers as productive assets (akin to physical
assets), this model views workers as investors of human capital, akin
to shareholders who invest financial capital in the firm. Just as
shareholders make a firm-specific investment when they purchase
stock, so, too, do employees make a firm-specific investment when
they enter into an employment relationship. In the case of shareholders,
the firm-specific investment is induced and protected through the
variety of property and control rights embedded in corporate law. As
we have seen, employees do not benefit from such rights.88 The logic
behind existing arrangements has been questioned given employees’
firm-specific human capital investment and the fact that they can be
viewed as risk-bearing residual claimants alongside shareholders.89
These theoretical insights were developed primarily by Margaret
Blair, who has argued for various corporate governance reforms that
treat human capital investors (i.e., workers) more like financial capital
investors (shareholders) in order to protect their firm-specific
investment.90 Blair’s case for incorporating human capital
considerations in corporate governance is strengthened further by
recognizing that employees are differently vulnerable compared to
shareholders or other stakeholders (including bondholders).91 Unlike
86. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe, Introduction, in EMPLOYEES AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (introducing a
collection of research papers on the role of employees in corporate governance by noting that
“human capital is widely acknowledged to be the most important asset of many firms”).
87. See, e.g., BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, supra note 18; O’Connor, supra note
18.
88. See discussion supra subpart II.A.
89. See Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 66-67 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds.,
1999).
90. Id.
91. Bondholders, also investors of financial capital, are largely absent from the
traditional story, but the story’s logic can be extended to cover them. Bondholders’ firmspecific investments are induced through the promise of a guaranteed return and protected
through contractual means. Under the predominant at-will employment model in the United
States, workers do not enjoy any income guarantees or meaningful contractual protections in
respect of their human capital investment. Both bondholders and employees enjoy certain
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shareholders and bondholders, employees are incapable of riskmitigation through diversification, since they generally invest their
human capital in only one firm at a time. Moreover, unlike the return
on financial capital, the return on investment of firm-specific human
capital is substantially lower outside the firm than within it.92
Viewing workers as human capital investors also has other, more
modest implications for corporate governance. In a resourceconstrained environment, being able to attract and retain human capital
is an important part of a firm’s competitive strategy.93 This strategic
imperative is sometimes described as a “war for talent.”94 The task then
becomes to devise internal governance structures that recognize the
importance of making the workplace as attractive to human capital
investors as possible. Consequently, the workers-as-human capital
investors model appears more normatively appealing, at least at first
blush, than the workers-as-assets model. But the model’s analytical
reach is also potentially more limited. For one, it assumes the existence
of competitive labor markets where workers have multiple
employment opportunities—an assumption that has been called into
question by recent empirical studies.95 In addition, the model is a much
better fit for high-skill workers, who can be conceptualized as high networth human capital investors, than it is for lower-skilled workers,
whose labor inputs are undifferentiated and more abundant.
III. THE HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT MOVEMENT
After examining the traditional roles of capital and labor in the
modern U.S. corporation, the history of past labor-focused reform
efforts, and the use of the concept of human capital in corporate
governance, the Article now turns to the HCM movement itself. This
Part presents a detailed and original analytical account of the broad set
of initiatives in support of investor-facing HCM disclosure and boardstatutory protections under federal law through, respectively, the Trust Indenture Act and
various labor laws.
92. See, e.g., Louis S. Jacobson et al., Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, 83 AM.
ECON. REV. 685, 705 (1993) (reporting an approximately 20% drop in long-term earnings of
displaced manufacturing and non-manufacturing workers who find new jobs in the same
industry and indicating that “a substantial portion of [the] earnings losses result from the loss
of some highly firm-specific component of earnings”). The findings of this classic study have
been replicated in subsequent research.
93. See DAVENPORT, supra note 17, at 7-16.
94. See, e.g., ED MICHAELS ET AL., THE WAR FOR TALENT 1-6 (2001) (emphasizing the
strategic importance of human capital for firm performance).
95. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
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level oversight of HCM matters. The exploration of the HCM
movement proceeds in five stages: (A) an overview of the movement
and select definitions of the term “human capital management”; (B) a
comprehensive account of the myriad of private, regulatory, and
legislative initiatives—pulled together for the first time here—that
comprise the HCM movement; (C) a discussion of the HCM
movement’s key features; (D) a discussion of the HCM movement in
historical and comparative perspective; and (E) an attempt at
explaining the HCM movement’s swift rise and broad uptake over the
course of just a few years. Relatedly, the Appendix contains a table
summarizing the primary HCM categories according to the
organizations that have been most active in the HCM space.
A.

Overview and Definitions

Human capital management is an expansive concept that can
accommodate virtually any issue related to the workforce. This
attribute makes HCM a very useful shorthand for the multitude of
employee-related matters, both narrow and broad, that arise within
modern firms, but it can also render the concept unwieldy and difficult
to define. Perhaps conscious of this difficulty, the SEC declined to put
forward a definition of HCM during the rulemaking process that
resulted in the adoption of an HCM disclosure requirement in August
2020.96 For us, a useful starting point to understanding HCM would be
to look at general definitions as well as the specific mix of categories,
issues, and metrics that different organizations include as part of HCM.
As noted in Part I, according to SASB’s definition, HCM
“addresses the management of a company’s human resources
(employees and individual contractors) as key assets to delivering longterm value.”97 SASB goes on to note that HCM “includes issues [such
as labor practices, employee health and safety, and employee
engagement, diversity and inclusion] that affect the productivity of
employees, management of labor relations, and management of the
health and safety of employees, and the ability to create a safety
culture.”98 The Conference Board offers a different articulation that
covers similar ground: “HCM is how the organization attracts, hires,
develops, retains, enables, and engages the entire workforce, including
96.
97.
98.

See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
SASB Materiality Map, supra note 13.
Id.
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full-time and part-time employees, contractors, freelancers, and
crowdsourced workers. It is how human capital is managed in concert
with other resources to execute the organization’s business model.”99
These definitions suggest that the introduction of HCM into corporate
governance is premised on the ability to improve the firm’s economic
performance through greater transparency of workforce practices and
the appropriate valuation and management of human capital as a
strategic resource.
HCM can refer to compensation and employee retention issues,
such as workforce pay, promotion opportunities, gender pay equity, and
employees’ ability to participate in stock purchase programs. In
addition, HCM may cover effective employee policies, such as
business codes of conduct, whistleblower policies, equal employment
opportunity policies, health and safety guidelines, diversity and
inclusion, and training and development programs to encourage
employee engagement and wellness. HCM also deals with various
issues of corporate culture. Some organizations define HCM to include
matters of human rights and labor issues within the supply chain.
Different organizations generally include a different mix of indicators
and metrics; in some cases, these apply across the board, whereas in
other cases they are industry-specific. The table in the Appendix
summarizes the categories used by the various participants in the HCM
movement discussed in the following subpart.
Before proceeding to the detailed presentation of the
developments that comprise the HCM movement, a note regarding
terminology is in order. In some areas of law, the term “movement”
carries specific meaning stemming from the rich literature on law and
social movements.100 Labeling a phenomenon as a social movement
has certain epistemic consequences, and as a result, there is often
debate on whether or not the label fits a particular set of

99. PAUL WASHINGTON ET AL., THE CONF. BD., BRAVE NEW WORLD: CREATING LONGTERM VALUE THROUGH HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND DISCLOSURE 3, 5 (2021)
[hereinafter CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT], https://www.conference-board.org/research/bravenew-world [https://perma.cc/V36B-LM2F] (“[HCM] is not a passing fad: Boards and
management should devote sustained time and attention to evaluating their firm’s human
capital capabilities, needs, and performance, including developing a human capital strategy
that supports the company’s broader business strategy.”).
100. See Angela M. Banks, Challenging Political Boundaries in Post-Conflict States,
29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 105, 133 n.98 (2007) (providing an overview of scholarly understandings
of the term “social movement”).
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developments.101 To be clear, no argument is made that the HCM
movement represents a social movement. Instead, I use the term
“movement” in its common meaning to denote concerted, looselycoordinated, and mutually-reinforcing actions by multiple different
actors to bring about a particular change in policy and practice. The
actors here include institutional investors, board advisors, regulators,
legislators, and standard-setters; the change is to incorporate
HCM considerations into corporate governance. In this sense, the
HCM movement resembles other corporate governance phenomena
that have been described as movements by commentators, such as the
director independence movement,102 the shareholder empowerment
movement,103 the pay-for-performance movement,104 and the corporate
social responsibility movement.105
B.

The HCM Movement’s Elements and Manifestations

This subpart presents a textured description of the HCM
movement drawing on both qualitative and, where available,
quantitative evidence. The full suite of distinct, mutually-reinforcing
101. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, “One of These Things Does Not Belong”:
Intellectual Property and Collective Action Across Boundaries, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 280 (2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/qone-of-these-things-does-not-belongintellectual-property-and-collective-action-across-boundaries [https://perma.cc/H4BR-Y77S]
(questioning whether “access to knowledge” is a “[social] movement, mobilization, or interest
group”); Amy Kapczynski, Linking Ideas to Outcomes: A Response, 117 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 289, 292 (2008), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/698_sfbju5k9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YC8S-CX8K] (justifying the application of the social movement label to
“access to knowledge” activism).
102. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Independent Director Model Broken?, 37
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 775, 780 (2014) (noting that “the independent director movement did not
usher in an era of corporate accountability”).
103. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1928 (2013) (identifying a “‘shareholder empowerment’ movement [that]
began to pick up steam” in the early 1990s).
104. See, e.g., Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive
Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1217 (2011) (“The pay-forperformance movement of the 1990s led boards of directors and their compensation
consultants to adopt equity-based compensation schemes.”).
105. See, e.g., John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish:
Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 1
(2005) (stating that “[o]ne of the most striking developments in the business world over the
last decade has been the emergence of a coherent and energetic ‘corporate social responsibility’
(CSR) movement”); see also Omari Scott Simmons, Chancery’s Greatest Decision: Historical
Insights on Civil Rights and the Future of Shareholder Activism, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1259, 1304 (2019) (setting out questions about shareholder activism and civil rights that ought
to be considered with respect to the “ESG movement”).
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developments that comprise the HCM movement have not been
analyzed together in the academic literature or the general corporate
governance literature to date. These developments include initiatives
by institutional investors and asset managers, various changes in boardlevel governance, voluntary HCM reporting undertaken by firms, SEC
rulemaking in respect of HCM disclosure, legislative efforts seeking to
mandate HCM disclosure, private standard-setting initiatives in respect
of HCM disclosure from domestic and international organizations, and
prescriptive statements from board advisors drawing firms’ attention to
the importance of board-level HCM oversight.
1.

Investor Initiatives: HCM as an Engagement Priority

Firm-shareholder engagement—regularized interactions and
exchange of information between firms’ management teams and
boards, on the one hand, and shareholders, on the other, is an
established part of today’s corporate governance landscape, even
though in its present form it dates back only to the early 2010s.106
BlackRock in particular has made frequent use of the practice through
the annual open letters of its outspoken CEO, Larry Fink, as well as
through the periodic release of detailed engagement priorities and
proxy voting guidelines.107 This kind of firm-shareholder engagement
constitutes one of the earliest and most visible manifestations of the
HCM movement.
HCM first emerged as an area of focus for BlackRock in 2017. In
his letter to CEOs released in January 2017, Larry Fink touched on
106. See Deloitte, Shareholder Engagement: A New Era in Corporate Governance,
WALL ST. J.: CFO J. (Oct. 1, 2013), https://deloitte.wsj.com/cfo/2013/10/04/shareholderengagement-a-new-era-in-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/4EEQ-HH78] (describing
shareholder engagement as the beginning of a “new era” in corporate governance). Initially,
firm-shareholder engagement was primarily a tool for dealing with activist shareholders, but
the rise of the “big three” asset managers changed that. See TREVOR NORWITZ ET AL., LEXIS
PRAC. ADVISOR, MARKET TRENDS: PROXY ENHANCEMENTS 7 (2018). According to Equilar, the
share of S&P 100 firms disclosing such engagement in their proxy statements rose from 12%
in 2012 to 63% in 2016. See David McCann, The Growing Importance of Proxies, CFO (Feb.
10, 2017), https://www.cfo.com/governance/2017/02/growing-importance-proxies [https://
perma.cc/A7MU-SV76].
107. See Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2012 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK, https://www.
blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2012-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/E26U
-3A9U] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021) (setting out BlackRock’s approach to “corporate
governance and responsible investing” and highlighting the importance of firm-shareholder
engagement); see also John C. Wilcox, Getting Along with Blackrock, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov.6, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/11/06/gettingalong-with-blackrock [https://perma.cc/UY79-UBXD] (analyzing BlackRock’s approach,
focus on sustainability, and significant influence as a global shareholder).
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many issues that fall within the scope of HCM.108 For example, Fink
argued that firms must “fulfill their responsibilities to their employees”
by improving internal training and education so that employees can
leap over the “skills gap” and increase their earnings potential, thereby
“helping the employee who once operated a machine learn to program
it.”109 In addition, Fink suggested that “companies must lend their voice
to developing a more secure retirement system for all workers,
including the millions of workers . . . not covered by employerprovided plans,” and assist employees in building financial literacy in
preparation for retirement.110 Because of BlackRock’s stature and the
widespread publicity that accompanies Fink’s letters, this was the most
prominent worker-focused pronouncement from the mainstream
shareholder community in some time. Each of Fink’s annual letters
since 2017 has maintained the spotlight on HCM topics; in terms of
prominence, HCM has ranked second only to concerns related to
climate change.111
BlackRock’s statement of engagement priorities for 2017-2018,
released just two months after Fink’s 2017 letter, noted that it had added
“developing areas like climate risk and human capital management” to
the traditional areas of engagement such as governance, strategy, and
compensation.112 This statement provided an insight into BlackRock’s
early thinking on HCM:
BlackRock believes creating an engaged and stable workforce is a
competitive advantage, particularly given the current talent-constrained
environment. BlackRock views a company’s approach to human capital
management, employee development, diversity and commitment to
equal employment opportunity, health and safety, labor relations and
108. See Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2017 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK, https://www.
blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2017-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/8Z8
M-9H47] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://
perma.cc/GLS6-NDMB] (last visited Mar. 20, 2021) (“Are we working to create a diverse
workforce? Are we adapting to technological change? Are we providing the retraining and
opportunities that our employees and our business will need to adjust to an increasingly
automated world? Are we using behavioral finance and other tools to prepare workers for
retirement, so that they invest in a way that will help them achieve their goals?”).
112. See Abe Friedman & Robert McCormick, BlackRock’s 2017-2018 Engagement
Priorities, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 17, 2017), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2017/03/17/blackrocks-2017-2018-engagement-priorities [https://perma.cc/W6
LB-H987].

2021]

HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

669

supply chain labor standards, among other topics, as a window into the
company’s culture, operational risk management practices and quality of
its board oversight. In engagement, BlackRock will ask how boards
oversee and work with management to improve performance in these
areas.113

In a statement of engagement priorities issued in 2018, BlackRock
provided a much more extensive treatment of HCM: the asset manager
elaborated on why it considers HCM an investment issue and
encouraged firms to be more forthcoming with HCM information, both
qualitative and quantitative.114 In addition, the 2018 statement listed a
range of HCM topics of particular interest to BlackRock, with a
separate set of engagement topics for boards and management teams,
which stand out for their detailed and specific nature.115 Engagement
priorities issued in subsequent years have carried on the trend toward
greater specificity.116
There has been a subtle but important evolution in BlackRock’s
approach to HCM (and, indeed, corporate governance) between 2017
and 2021. Instead of encouraging boards to focus on HCM by putting
forward engagement priorities, which are usually framed as questions
for discussion, BlackRock now announces its affirmative expectations
for boards to do so: “Given most companies identify their employees
as their greatest asset, we expect boards to oversee human capital
management strategies.”117 In addition, BlackRock states that it will
“hold members of the relevant [board] committee, or the most senior
non-executive director, accountable” for lack of disclosure of the
board’s role in overseeing the firm’s HCM practices.118 This escalation
in BlackRock’s position has contributed to consequential changes in

113. Id.
114. See Michelle Edkins, BlackRock Investment Stewardship’s Approach to
Engagement on Human Capital Management, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Mar. 28, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/28/blackrock-investmentstewardships-approach-to-engagement-on-human-capital-management/ [https://perma.cc/7M
FP-D28Z].
115. Id.
116. BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP’S APPROACH TO ENGAGEMENT ON
HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/
publication/blk-commentary-engagement-on-human-capital.pdf [https://perma.cc/69EEPHCV].
117. Investment Stewardship, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/
about-us/investment-stewardship#engagement-priorities [https://perma.cc/Q9Q6-KZ2Z] (last
visited Feb. 28, 2021).
118. Id.
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board practices, discussed in subpart III.B.3 below, which in turn
comprise another important element of the HCM movement.
While BlackRock remains a leader in terms of emphasis on HCM,
its general stance has been copied by State Street and Vanguard, the
other members of the “big three” group of asset managers that jointly
hold a substantial share of investor capital and exert a powerful
influence within corporate governance.119 State Street discussed HCM
in its annual letter to boards in 2019120 and in 2020 announced that it
will vote against the boards of big companies that underperform
their peers on ESG matters (including HCM).121 Vanguard has also
noted the importance of HCM engagement.122 CalPERs, the largest
public pension fund in the United States, has made the same point.123
In a parallel set of developments, HCM issues have also been taken up
by a different investor demographic—smaller, pro-social investors who
typically seek to influence corporate practices by filing shareholder
proposals. An analysis of recent trends indicates that shareholders
began to submit a meaningful number of HCM-related proposals in
2018, and that by 2019, those proposals encompassed topics such as
119. Asset managers, or investment managers, hold stakes in companies on behalf of
other individual or institutional investors. As such, they are not the ultimate beneficial owners,
but they generally exercise the governance and decision rights that are associated with the
shares they manage. A study from 2019 found that the Big Three collectively vote about 25%
of the shares in all S&P 500 companies; that each holds a position of 5% or more in a vast
number of companies; and that the proportion of equities held by index funds has risen
dramatically over the past two decades. See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the
Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 736 (2019).
120. See Cyrus Taraporevala, 2019 Proxy Letter—Aligning Corporate Culture with
Long-Term Strategy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 15, 2019), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2019/01/15/2019-proxy-letter-aligning-corporate-culture-with-long-termstrategy/ [https://perma.cc/5U36-3JFP] (stating that its engagement strategy is focused on
corporate culture and that “key issues aligned to corporate culture, such as human capital
management; represent important areas for value creation going forward”).
121. See Robin Wigglesworth, State Street Vows to Turn Up the Heat on ESG
Standards, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/cb1e2684-4152-11eaa047-eae9bd51ceba. Notably, State Street views SASB’s disclosure framework (discussed in
subpart III.B.7 infra) as “a minimum set of standards that companies should reach.” Id.
122. See Brian Tomlinson & Mark Tulay, Investor Letter to CEOs: The Strategic
Investor Initiative, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 8, 2018), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2018/03/08/investor-letter-to-ceos-the-strategic-investor-initiative [https://
perma.cc/N2TK-6MGK] (asking companies to address, as part of the engagement process,
how they manage “human capital requirements over the long-term” and how they
communicate future HCM efforts to investors).
123. See, e.g., CALPERS, CALPERS’ GOVERNANCE & SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLES
(2019), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/governance-and-sustainabilityprinciples.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y63J-X4LJ] (noting importance of engagement and listing
human capital management as a priority).
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disclosure of HCM metrics, gender pay equity, and workplace
diversity.124
2.

Investor Initiatives: HCM Rulemaking Petition

Another early and prominent manifestation of the HCM
movement appeared in July 2017, just a few months after BlackRock
began highlighting the issue. The Human Capital Management
Coalition (HCMC), a group of public pension funds with $2.8 trillion
in assets under management led by the UAW Retiree Medical Benefits
Trust, submitted a rulemaking petition to the SEC asking it to consider
adopting disclosure rules related to the knowledge, skills, and
engagement of the workforce.125 The HCMC rulemaking petition
stated that “human capital is a company’s most valuable asset” and that
“stewarding human capital with that in mind will help to preserve and
add value.”126 In addition, the HCMC noted a “broad consensus that
human capital management is important to the bottom line” and
pointed to “a large body of empirical work [showing] that skillful
management of human capital is associated with better corporate
performance, including better risk mitigation.”127 This, the HCMC
argued, rendered HCM “essential to long-term value creation and
therefore material to evaluating a company’s prospects.”128
The rulemaking petition focused on several potential topics for
disclosure, including workforce demographics, workforce stability,
workforce composition, workforce skills and capabilities, workforce
compensation and incentives, workforce culture and empowerment,
workforce health and safety, workforce productivity, and human
rights.129 It received support from the Council of Institutional Investors,
124. See Marc Treviño, 2019 Proxy Season Review: Part 1—Rule 14a-8 Shareholder
Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 26, 2019), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2019/07/26/2019-proxy-season-review-part-1-rule-14a-8-shareholder-proposals
[https://perma.cc/MQ76-VCHV]. Interestingly, more than half (55.6%) of the submitted
proposals were voted on, meaning that firms either did not attempt to obtain or, more likely,
were unsuccessful in obtaining SEC no-action relief that would have allowed them to exclude
the proposals from the proxy statement. Id.
125. See Letter from Meredith Miller, Human Capital Mgmt. Coal., to William Hinman,
Dir. Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 6, 2017) [hereinafter HCMC Petition for
SEC Rulemaking], https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2017/petn4-711.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VGF9-J2S3].
126. Id. at 2.
127. Id. at 1.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 26-27.
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a group representing the broad investor community,130 as well as from
a number of large institutional investors.131 An ESG rulemaking
petition submitted in October 2018 by law professors Jill Fisch and
Cynthia Williams referenced the HCMC petition and reiterated the case
for HCM disclosure.132
The HCMC rulemaking petition played an important part in the
expansion of the HCM movement. It did not appear in a vacuum: in
comment letters submitted in response to the SEC’s 2016 Concept
Release, some investors had mentioned the importance of disclosure
on certain workforce-related topics, alongside a host of other ESG
topics.133 The HCMC petition, however, presented a particularly
detailed case for HCM’s importance while separating HCM disclosure
from disclosure on other ESG topics, thereby prompting more focused
consideration of the issue. This gave the SEC’s Investor Advisory
Committee an occasion to study HCM disclosure and to put forward
recommendations, which ultimately contributed to the adoption of the
SEC’s HCM disclosure rule in August 2020, as discussed in subpart
III.B.5 below.
3.

Changes in Board-Level Governance

The HCM movement is also reflected in several consequential
changes in board governance practices that have occurred since the
mid-2010s. To place these changes in context, it is worth remembering
that the baseline governance frameworks under both state and federal
law make no specific mention of HCM issues.134 Boards’ Caremark
130. See Letter from Jeffrey P. Mahoney, Council of Institutional Invs., to Jay Clayton,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4711/4711-2638207-161248.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYQ2-83RH].
131. See Comments on Rulemaking Petition to Require Issuers to Disclose Information
About Their Human Capital Management Policies, Practices and Performance, SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-711/4-711.htm [https://perma.cc/UY6E-KQ56]
(last visited Mar. 20, 2021).
132. See Letter from Cynthia A. Williams, Professor, Osgoode Hall L. Sch., and Jill E.
Fisch, Professor, Univ. of Pa. L. Sch., to Brent J. Field, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
(Oct. 1, 2018) [hereinafter 2018 ESG Rulemaking Petition], https://www.sec.gov/rules/
petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT4P-K2B8].
133. See Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, Securities Act
Release No. 33-10668, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86614, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,358, 44,369-70
nn.166-182 (proposed Aug. 23, 2019) (discussing investor feedback in response to the 2016
Concept Release).
134. To be sure, this has never absolved boards from having to consider important issues
related to the workforce when such issues arise: a large-scale labor strike, for example, would
certainly command board attention, but it would likely do so on a time-limited basis, until the
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duties under Delaware law are framed in a general way,135 and, until
recently, the question of whether these duties require oversight of HCM
had not been explored. Relatedly, federal corporate governance
obligations have traditionally focused the board’s attention on
corporate executives and executive compensation, not on matters
related to rank-and-file employees, through requirements pertaining to
the compensation committee and the compensation discussion and
analysis (CD&A) section of annual reports.136
This blank regulatory backdrop notwithstanding, recent evidence
suggests that HCM has emerged as a mainstream board concern
through voluntary changes in board practices. The Conference Boards’
HCM Oversight Working Group, which includes more than 100
C-suite executives, among others, has identified HCM oversight as an
emerging best practice.137 External board advisors have been sending
the same message.138 The 2021 proxy voting guidelines issued by ISS
and Glass Lewis contained expanded references to board oversight
over ESG (and, by extension, HCM).139 Even though board
deliberations are confidential and thus unobservable, a survey of 378
public company directors conducted in the fall of 2019—when the
HCM movement was well underway but before it had peaked—found
that at 40% of covered companies, HCM oversight was a focus of
board discussions “regularly (e.g., every board meeting)”; at 30%
HCM was “considered in a more embedded way throughout numerous
issues are resolved. This stands in contrast to a matter such as executive pay, which is
structurally embedded in the governance framework through the mandated compensation
committee.
135. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(imposing an obligation on directors to implement and oversee “information and reporting
systems . . . that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the board
itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within
its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law
and its business performance”). A recent line of Caremark-related cases discussed the need for
reporting systems focused on “essential and mission critical” compliance risks. See Marchand
v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019); In re Clovis Oncology Derivative Litig., No. 20170222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13-15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
136. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Exchange Act.
Release Nos. 33-8732A, 34-54302A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (setting out
compensation committee responsibilities for the CD&A report); Listed Company Manual:
§ 303A.05 Compensation Committee, NYSE, https://nyse.wolterskluwer.cloud/listedcompany-manual [https://perma.cc/FT5L-QPEG] (last updated Nov. 25, 2009).
137. See CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 99, at 2-3.
138. See discussion infra subpart III.B.8.
139. See Brian V. Breheny et al., ISS and Glass Lewis Release Updated Proxy Voting
Guidelines, SKADDEN (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/12
/iss-and-glass-lewis-release [https://perma.cc/JN6W-XTAP].
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board discussions and decisions”; and at the remainder of the covered
companies, it was considered “ad hoc or on an as-needed basis.”140 It
appears, therefore, that boards are heeding demands for board oversight
of HCM, which may not be surprising given the advice coming from
third parties and BlackRock’s admonition that it will “hold [boards]
accountable” if they fail to do so.141 Presumably, board oversight of
HCM also gives board members familiarity with HCM issues, which
enables them to engage with shareholders on HCM matters, another
BlackRock demand.
Whereas at least some of the preceding developments have
garnered attention, several more technical changes in board practices
related to HCM have remained largely under the radar. Two studies
shed light on these practices: a 2019 Willis Towers Watson study of the
largest 100 public companies by revenue (“Willis study”)142 and a 2020
Shearman & Sterling study of the 100 largest non-controlled public
companies (“Shearman study”).143 Five broad trends emerge. First,
approximately 40% of the companies analyzed by either study have
changed the name of the compensation committee by adding words
such as “human resources,” “people resources,” “personnel,” or
“talent” in order to reflect a broader scope of responsibilities.144
Second, firms have been amending their compensation committee
charters to reflect an expansion of the committee’s remit beyond
executive compensation. According to the Willis study, 58% of the
charters of the companies in the sample included responsibility for
oversight of broad-based compensation and benefit programs, 33%
included responsibility for diversity and inclusion programs, and 14%
140. See ERNST & YOUNG, HOW THE GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN CAPITAL AND TALENT IS
SHIFTING 1-2 (2020), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_us/topics/cbm/eyhuman-capital-white-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV2Y-EVR3] (capitalization simplified). A
question that arises with respect to this and other studies relates to the extent we can discuss
trends on the basis of data that in many cases presents board practices as of a single point in
time. This is a natural limitation of the survey evidence that is available. What we know about
the status quo ante, as well as multiple commentators’ observations that practices are “shifting”
or “evolving,” should serve to allay this otherwise legitimate concern.
141. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
142. See Robert Newbury et al., Compensation Committees & Human Capital
Management, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Willis
Study], https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/08/27/compensation-committees-humancapital-management [https://perma.cc/8GS6-KBPM].
143. See SHEARMAN & STERLING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION SURVEY 2020 (2020) [hereinafter SHEARMAN STUDY], http://digital.shearman.
com/corporate-governance/shearmancorpgov-2020 [https://perma.cc/X5U7-MVSF].
144. Id. at 29; Willis Study, supra note 142. Both studies identify this as a new trend.
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included responsibility for culture, employee relations, and
engagement.145 The Shearman study analyzed descriptions of the
compensation committees’ responsibilities (rather than their charters)
and found similar trends.146 Third, in many cases, board committees
other than the compensation committee are tasked with “ESG
oversight”—an umbrella term, which in a number of companies covers
HCM oversight.147 Fourth, HCM expertise is increasingly sought and
valued at the board level. According to the Shearman study, 35% of
companies in the sample expressly identify “human capital
management” as a skill or area of expertise that is important in the
selection of directors.148 Finally, a significant number of companies
now include ESG metrics in the incentive compensation plans for
corporate executives, which is noteworthy because traditionally such
plans have focused almost exclusively on stock price performance.
According to the Shearman study, 32% of incentive plans consider
performance in the area of “talent and succession,” 31% indicate that
“increasing diversity is part of the talent and succession analysis,” and
5% include a metric that relates to employee health and safety.149
The five trends identified in the preceding paragraph suggest that
HCM is becoming hard-wired into a wide array of board practices. To
be sure, both the Willis study and the Shearman study have limitations,
including a fairly small sample size as well as classification and
specification challenges stemming from the inherently broad nature of
the HCM concept. Even if some of the precise data points are open to
question, however, the studies represent a useful supplement to the
qualitative evidence presented throughout this subpart. And, taking all
into account, the general direction of travel is unmistakable: whereas
145. Willis Study, supra note 142.
146. Specifically, the Shearman study found that 13% of companies mentioned talent
development or talent management, 10% mentioned human capital or human capital
management, 8% mentioned culture, 5% mentioned retention, and 3% mentioned pay equity.
SHEARMAN STUDY, supra note 143, at 30.
147. According to the Shearman study, 51% of the companies in the sample assign ESG
oversight responsibility to the nominating and governance committee, 26% to a public
policy/regulatory and compliance/sustainability committee, 7% to a corporate social
responsibility committee, and 2% to the audit committee. Id. at 60.
148. Id. at 55 (capitalization simplified). Pursuant to SEC rules, firms are required to
provide information in their proxy statements about “the specific experience, qualifications,
attributes or skills” of persons nominated to serve as directors. See Proxy Disclosure
Enhancements, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61175, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 (Dec. 23,
2009); Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(e) (2017).
149. SHEARMAN STUDY, supra note 143, at 25. By comparison, only 6% of incentive
compensation plans refer to environmental sustainability. Id.
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as recently as the early-2010s oversight of HCM issues used to be
primarily a management concern, boards are now embracing HCM
oversight as one of their core responsibilities.
4.

Voluntary Disclosure by Public Companies

In addition to information that is strictly required by SEC
disclosure rules, public companies routinely disclose large amounts of
additional information. The only legal constraint on such disclosure
is that the voluntarily disclosed information should not be
materially false or misleading by itself or render any of the required
disclosure materially false or misleading.150 As a general matter,
voluntary disclosure usually entails aspirational statements, discussion
of positive developments that may not be sufficiently material to make
them required disclosures, and information requested by investors,
such as sustainability information. In the run up to the adoption of the
SEC HCM disclosure rule in August 2020, public companies were
disclosing more and more HCM-related information on a voluntary
basis. These voluntary disclosures represented another important early
manifestation of the HCM movement.151
Studies analyzing the proxy statements of large companies in
2019 and 2020 indicated that voluntary HCM disclosures were
increasing but that they were still at an “early stage.” Ernst & Young
found that within its sample of 100 large companies, 50% disclosed
information about workforce diversity, 34% disclosed information
about workforce compensation, and 22% disclosed information about
culture initiatives, workforce health and safety, and workforce skills

150. The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to both voluntary and
mandatory disclosure. See generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 7.1, 12.19 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the various SEC disclosure
requirements and consequences of violations).
151. Consistent with the approach followed by other commentators, this Article
considers HCM-related information disclosed before the SEC’s HCM disclosure rule went into
effect as “voluntary disclosure”; this is due to the lack until 2020 of any disclosure requirements
pertaining to HCM topics (except for the total number of employees and the median worker
pay figure). It is possible, however, that some of the HCM disclosure in question was not
voluntary but instead required under one of the more general disclosure requirements (e.g.,
description of business, risk factors, material trends and uncertainties, among others). The fact
that these disclosures started appearing in the late 2010s but had been previously absent
suggests either that they were, indeed, voluntary at that point in time, or that firms had failed
to fully comply with their obligations with respect to required disclosure in prior years.
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and capabilities.152 White & Case observed similar trends, noting that
there was an increase in both the number of companies providing HCM
disclosure in their proxy statements and in the topics covered between
2019 and 2020.153 An analysis of sustainability reports contained in the
Shearman study discussed above found that all but one of the
companies in the sample released sustainability reports and that the vast
majority of reports covered topics related to the workforce.154
As with most voluntary disclosure, the quality of voluntary HCM
disclosure has been problematic. The Ernst & Young study noted that
the HCM disclosures it analyzed varied in depth and clarity and often
did not identify and report key performance indicators.155 An analysis
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released in July 2020
found the overall quality and comparability of ESG disclosures,
including those on HCM, to be poor. For example, GAO identified
“instances where companies defined terms differently or calculated
similar information in different ways.”156 A lack of consistency was
observed even among companies that used the same ESG standards or
the same reporting framework.157 As concerns the rise of the HCM
movement, the most relevant aspect of the voluntary HCM disclosures
is their growing ubiquity in corporate filings. Looking to the future,
however, the low quality of voluntary HCM disclosures is likely to
presage problems with the quality of the disclosures elicited by the
SEC’s new open-ended HCM disclosure rule, which we turn to next.
5.

SEC Disclosure Rulemaking

In August 2020, the SEC adopted a disclosure requirement
whereby a public company must provide “a description of [its] human
capital resources, including any human capital measures or objectives
152. See ERNST & YOUNG, HOW AND WHY HUMAN CAPITAL DISCLOSURES ARE
EVOLVING 3 (2019), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_us/topics/cbm/eyhow-and-why-human-capital-disclosures-are-evolving.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2PF-DTP3].
153. ESG Disclosure Trends in SEC Filings, WHITE & CASE (Aug. 13, 2020), https://
www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/esg-disclosure-trends-sec-filings [https://perma.cc/S8
SH-8VFY].
154. SHEARMAN STUDY, supra note 143, at 56, 59.
155. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 152, at 2.
156. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-530, PUBLIC COMPANIES:
DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND OPTIONS TO
ENHANCE THEM 32 (2020).
157. Id. at 33. In this respect, GAO’s findings echoed prior research on the quality of
voluntary sustainability disclosure. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure
and the Costs of Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 414-23 (2018); Barnali Choudhury,
Social Disclosure, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 212 (2016).
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that [it] focuses on in managing the business”; the information is
required “to the extent such disclosure is material to an understanding
of the [company’s] business taken as a whole.”158 The SEC’s HCM
disclosure rule was the culmination of a multi-stage process, which
started with investor demands for HCM disclosure in 2016 and 2017,
gained momentum after the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee
issued recommendations in favor of HCM disclosure in 2019, and was
bolstered further by strong support for HCM disclosure in comment
letters on the SEC’s rule proposal in 2019 and 2020. Despite general
agreement that some form of HCM disclosure is warranted, however,
the various participants in this process expressed different views on the
purpose, scope, and format of the new disclosure requirement. Due to
the open-ended nature of the HCM disclosure rule and the absence of
guidance from the SEC, many of these questions remain unresolved.
The exposition that follows provides a chronological overview of key
steps in the rulemaking process; Part IV offers an assessment of the
SEC’s approach to HCM disclosure as part of a comprehensive
analysis and critique of the HCM movement.
Even though most SEC rulemaking petitions do not prompt any
agency action, the HCMC petition on HCM disclosure was an
exception. In March 2018, less than a year after the petition was
submitted, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton noted in testimony to the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General
Government that he “would like to see more disclosure from public
companies on how they think about human capital.”159 The same year,
the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (IAC), a quasi-independent
body attached to the agency, launched a study of the idea of HCM
disclosure.160 The process moved swiftly, and in March 2019, the IAC
produced and formally adopted a detailed “recommendation” in
158. See Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, Securities Act
Release No. 33-10825, Exchange Act Release No. 34-89670, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,726, 63,739
(Oct. 8, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, and 240) [hereinafter Reg. S-K 2020
Modernization Release].
159. See Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2019:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t of the H. Comm. on Appropriations,
115th Cong. 222 (2018) (statement of Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
160. The IAC was established by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and has been operational
since 2012. It is tasked with representing the interests of investors in various matters before the
Commission. The IAC has emerged as an effective voice in debates about the regulation of the
securities markets. See Spotlight on Investor Advisory Committee, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee.shtml [https://perma.cc/ED2VPBHV] (Feb. 14, 2017).
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support of HCM disclosure.161 The IAC recommendation noted
estimates that the implied intangible asset value of the S&P 500 had
grown from an average of 20% in the 1970s to an average of 84% by
2015—evidence that the economy is transitioning from one “based
almost entirely on industrial production to one that is becoming
increasingly based on technology and services.”162 As a result, the IAC
suggested that the disclosure system should also evolve to include
information about intangible assets, such as intellectual property and
human capital. The IAC noted that whereas human capital is
increasingly conceptualized as an investable asset, the SEC’s
traditional disclosure approach has been to treat human capital as a
cost. As a result, the SEC’s disclosure framework, in both its qualitative
and quantitative aspects, has not kept pace with the shift toward
viewing HCM as a primary source of value.
The IAC discussed two different approaches to remedying these
deficiencies in the disclosure regime. First, the IAC suggested that a
principles-based disclosure requirement could ask firms to describe
their HCM policies and strategies for competitive advantage and
comment on their progress in meeting their corporate objectives. The
IAC also discussed a second possibility—mandating disclosure of
specific HCM metrics, since many such metrics are a routine part of
financial due diligence, including basic valuation models in M&A
transactions. According to the IAC, these metrics could include
standardized human capital-related key performance indicators (KPIs),
such as the stability of the workforce, including voluntary and
involuntary turnover and internal hire and promotion rates; the safety
of the workforce—including frequency, severity and lost time due to
injuries, illnesses, and fatalities—and percent of first-tier suppliers that
were audited for safety and health compliance; average hours of
training per employee per year; race/ethnicity and gender diversity
data; and standardized survey measures of employee satisfaction.163
The IAC suggested an extensive, multi-party consultative process
to decide on any new disclosure requirements.164 SEC Chairman Jay
161. SEC INV. ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION ON HUMAN CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT DISCLOSURE 3-5 (2019) [hereinafter IAC Recommendation], https://www.sec.
gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/human-capital-disclosure-recommendation.
pdf [https://perma.cc/SBE2-P5VY].
162. Id. at 1.
163. Id. at 4.
164. Id. at 3 (“We encourage the Commission to learn more from investors, issuers and
the academic community through its customary processes, such as roundtables, concept
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Clayton, who had been skeptical of expanding disclosure requirements
on prior occasions, supported the HCM disclosure initiative by noting
that human capital is the source of economic strength and, for some
firms, “a mission-critical asset.”165 Six members of the IAC voted
against the recommendation and issued a short dissenting statement.166
Because the IAC recommendation called for a departure from
traditional ways of thinking about firm value, and, at least notionally,
came from within the SEC, it attracted much attention in the corporate
governance community.
The SEC took up HCM disclosure in August 2019, only a few
months after the IAC recommendation.167 Whereas the IAC had
suggested that the rulemaking process should start with concept
releases and broad-based roundtables that include investors, firms, and
the academic community, the SEC skipped those steps and included
HCM disclosure as part of a lengthy Proposing Release covering
changes to a number of disclosure items that had been under
consideration for most of the 2010s.168 The formulation of the HCM
disclosure proposal was open-ended and “principles-based”—placing
heavy reliance on the complex and contested concept of materiality—

releases, and proposed rules for public comment, including information about what kinds of
HCM disclosures are already required under other regulatory regimes . . . .”).
165. See Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Meeting of
the Investor Advisory Committee (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/clayton-remarks-investor-advisory-committee-032819 [https://perma.cc/FG5LKCQQ]. Interestingly, this formulation echoes the test for whether the board would have
Caremark oversight duties with respect to HCM matters. See supra note 135 and
accompanying text. This point is analyzed further in subpart IV.B.1 infra.
166. The dissenting IAC members expressed concern that HCM disclosure could be
used to pressure companies to adopt pro-social policies and that the new HCM information
would not be consistent with traditional accounting principles such as conservatism. See SEC
INV. ADVISORY COMM., DISSENT BY MEMBERS OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE
RE: HUMAN CAPITAL DISCLOSURE RECOMMENDATION (2019), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
investor-advisory-committee-2012/human-capital-recommendation-dissent.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YM5H-R7DD].
167. Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-86614, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,358 (Aug. 23, 2019) (proposing amendments to Regulation
S-K to modernize the description of disclosure requirements for businesses, legal proceedings,
and risk factors).
168. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony on “Examining
the SEC’s Agenda, Operations, and FY 2018 Budget Request” (Nov. 15, 2016), https://
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/white-testimony-sec-agenda-fy2018-budget-request.html
[https://perma.cc/645J-BDNC] (summarizing SEC actions as part of the Disclosure
Effectiveness Initiative).
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in line with the SEC’s overall approach to disclosure under Chairman
Clayton and his predecessor, Mary Jo White.169
The Proposing Release generated an extensive comment file
consisting of 98 individual comment letters (alongside 2,847 form
letter submissions).170 The file reflected a broad acknowledgment of the
importance of human capital, and, with the notable exception of three
large public companies,171 support for some form of HCM disclosure.
Even the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Market
Competitiveness, a longstanding and unwavering opponent of any
proposal to expand the SEC disclosure regime, indicated that it was
“cautiously supportive.”172 The comment letters contained
disagreement on the format of HCM disclosure, with a number of
commenters arguing in favor of a “hybrid” or “dual” approach
combining principles-based and prescriptive (or “rules-based”)
requirements.173 The prescriptive requirements would call for the
disclosure of specific metrics or categories of information (sometimes
referred to as “line items”—a term borrowed from financial
169. See discussion infra subpart IV.C.1.
170. See Comments on Proposed Rule: Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101,
103, and 105, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-19/s71119.
htm [https://perma.cc/B9SV-578Z] (Aug. 26, 2020).
171. These public companies were General Motors, Chevron, and UnitedHealth Group.
See Letter from Christopher T. Hatto, Vice President, Controller & Chief Acct. Officer, Gen.
Motors, and Rick E. Hansen, Assist. Gen. Couns. & Corp. Sec’y, Gen. Motors, to Vanessa A.
Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3-4 (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-11-19/s71119-6324040-194699.pdf [https://perma.cc/D35P-VTU3]; Letter
from David A. Inchausti, Vice President & Comptroller, Chevron Corp., to Vanessa A.
Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-11-19/s71119-6323234-194676.pdf [https://perma.cc/G49F-M54R]; Letter
from Thomas E. Roos, Senior Vice President & Chief Acct. Officer, UnitedHealth Grp. Inc.,
to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.
sec.gov/comments/s7-11-19/s71119-6288238-193380.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PTQ-YSZP].
172. Letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Vice President, Ctr. for Cap. Mkts.
Competitiveness, to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Oct. 22,
2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-19/s71119-6324038-194710.pdf [https://perma.
cc/6J4C-X8SS].
173. See, e.g., Letter from Cambria Allen-Ratzlaff, Chair, Hum. Cap. Mgmt. Coal., to
Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 22, 2019) [hereinafter
HCMC Letter], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-19/s71119-6322887-194462.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75VA-4BA2]; Letter from Marcie Frost, Chief Exec. Officer, CalPERS, to
Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 22, 2019) [hereinafter
CalPERS Letter], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-19/s71119-6324067-194727.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FK62-BPE4]; Letter from Brandon J. Rees, Deputy Dir. of Corps. & Cap.
Mkts., AFL-CIO, to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 22,
2019) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Letter], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-19/s71119-63240
55-194715.pdf [https://perma.cc/D776-TMG6].
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accounting), in order to make firm-specific information more useful
and promote some degree of comparability across firms.174
When it came time to finalize the HCM disclosure rule, the SEC
hewed closely to the principles-based approach outlined in the
Proposing Release. Like the rule proposal, the final rule contained
language noting that “depending on the nature of the registrant’s
business and workforce,” relevant HCM information potentially
subject to disclosure may include “measures or objectives that address
the development, attraction and retention of personnel.”175 The Final
Rule Release emphasized that these are not disclosure mandates but
rather represent non-exclusive examples of subjects that may be
material.176 The Final Release also refused to adopt a definition of the
term “human capital,” reasoning that its meaning “may evolve over
time and may be defined by different companies in ways that are
industry specific.”177 The two Democratic SEC commissioners
criticized the SEC’s approach and voted against the Regulation S-K
amendments containing the rule, despite agreeing in principle that
HCM disclosure is needed.178
Given the SEC’s overall reluctance to provide specific guidance,
it remains to be seen whether the new HCM disclosure rule will elicit
any new and meaningful information. Preliminary evidence, which
became available as this Article went to print, suggests that the new
HCM disclosures are fairly brief and contain information that is already
available to analysts from other sources, including voluntary
sustainability reports.179 In addition, most new disclosures entail
174. See, e.g., HCMC Letter, supra note 173; CalPERS Letter, supra note 173; AFLCIO Letter, supra note 173.
175. Reg. S-K 2020 Modernization Release, supra note 158, at 63,760.
176. Id. at 63,739.
177. Id.
178. See Allison Herren Lee, Regulation S-K and ESG Disclosures: An Unsustainable
Silence, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/lee-regulation-s-k-2020-08-26 [https://perma.cc/J93D-LQSW] (noting that she
would have supported the final rule “if it had included even minimal expansion on the topic of
human capital to include simple, commonly kept metrics such as part time vs. full time
workers, workforce expenses, turnover, and diversity”); Caroline Crenshaw, Statement on the
“Modernization” of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/crenshaw-statementmodernization-regulation-s-k [https://perma.cc/QLA9-CK2D] (criticizing the rules as “generic
and vague” and noting that they fail to provide investors with “critical and useful information
about key corporate metrics”).
179. See Amanda Iacone, New SEC Workforce Disclosures Scant on Fresh Information,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 27, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/new-secworkforce-disclosures-scant-on-fresh-information.
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qualitative descriptions of core values, programs, and practices, with
very few covering objectives or metrics used to manage the business.180
6.

Legislative Efforts

The HCM movement has also encompassed legislative efforts,
such as the introduction of bills seeking to mandate detailed and highlyspecific HCM disclosure for public companies, as well as advocacy by
members of Congress in connection with the SEC’s rulemaking
process discussed above. The HCM disclosure bill was first proposed
by Representative Cynthia Axne, Democrat of Iowa, in May 2019,181
and it was approved by the House Financial Services Committee in
February 2020.182 Senator Mark Warner, Democrat of Virginia,
introduced a Senate version of the bill shortly thereafter.183 Though the
bill has not been taken up by either the full House of Representatives
or the Senate as of March 1, 2021, it is noteworthy for its expansive
scope and highly-specific disclosure mandates. It covers all
information categories generally included as part of HCM:
workforce demographics, workforce stability, workforce composition,
skills and capabilities, culture and empowerment, health and safety,
compensation and incentives, and recruiting.184 Within these
categories, the draft bill mandates disclosure of 20 specific metrics or
groups of metrics,185 as well as 9 more general narrative topics.186 The
180. See Cydney Posner, Early Trends in Human Capital Disclosure, COOLEY PUBCO
(Feb. 10, 2021), https://cooleypubco.com/2021/02/10/trends-human-capital-disclosure
[https://perma.cc/H3MN-2TW4].
181. See Hearing before the Subcomm. on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship,
and Capital Markets (May 15, 2019), https://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/event
single.aspx?EventID=403651 (providing link to draft version of the HCM bill).
182. H.R. 5930—Workforce Investment Disclosure Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/5930 [https://perma.cc/4SN4-ZCES] (last visited
Mar. 21, 2021).
183. Press Release, Sen. Mark R. Warner, Financial Services Committee Advances
Axne-Led Legislation to Boost Transparency of U.S. Workforce Development Investments
(Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/2/financial-servicescommittee-advances-axne-led-legislation-to-boost-transparency-of-u-s-workforcedevelopment-investments [https://perma.cc/2V84-WP5V].
184. S. 3361, 116th Cong. § 2 (as referred to the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb.
Affs., Feb. 27, 2020).
185. These include, for example, metrics such as voluntary turnover or retention rate,
involuntary turnover rate, internal hiring rate, internal promotion rate, and the frequency,
severity, and lost time due to injuries, illness, and fatalities, among others. Id.
186. These include, for example, topics such as “policies or practices relating to
subcontracting, outsourcing, and insourcing” and “policies and practices . . . relating to
freedom of association and work-life balance initiatives,” among others. Id.
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bill’s scope exceeds the scope of the already-detailed HCMC
Rulemaking Petition, and it reflects an approach that stands in contrast
to that of the SEC’s HCM disclosure rule. A separate House bill,
introduced in July 2020, sought to impose various obligations,
including HCM disclosure obligations, on firms receiving federal aid
under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)
Act.187
In addition to championing their HCM disclosure bill, Senator
Warner and Representative Axne also wrote to SEC Chairman Clayton
in May 2020 and urged the SEC to finalize the HCM rulemaking
process, particularly in light of the workforce-related business
disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.188 Senator Warner had
sent two prior letters to the SEC on HCM disclosure: first in July 2018,
drawing attention to the importance of the topic (which had not yet
become an area of focus for the agency),189 and then in October 2019,
urging the SEC to require disclosure of specific metrics in the interest
of standardization and comparability instead of relying exclusively on
a principles-based approach.190 Senator Warner was also the driving
force behind GAO’s July 2020 report highlighting the inadequacies of
public companies’ voluntary disclosures related to HCM and other
ESG topics.191
Almost exclusively, the rhetoric employed by Senator Warner and
Representative Axne has reflected an investor-focused, workers-asassets justification for HCM. For example, Warner’s July 2018 letter
noted that “human capital is among a company’s most valuable assets”
and that “without [this] information, investors do not have the ability
to adequately assess the current performance and future prospects of a
company.”192 When the House Financial Services Committee
187. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 116TH CONG., MEMORANDUM 5
(July 14, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110888/documents/HHRG116-BA16-20200714-SD002-U3.pdf.
188. See Letter from Mark R. Warner, U.S. Sen., and Cynthia Axne, U.S. Rep., to Jay
Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 19, 2020), https://axne.house.gov/
sites/axne.house.gov/files/Warner Axne Letter to SEC.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZTM-LL3Z].
189. See Letter from Mark R. Warner, U.S. Sen., to Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n (July 19, 2018) [hereinafter Warner 2018 Letter], https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-06-16/s70616-4186935-172772.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAN6-W5ES].
190. See Letter from Mark R. Warner, U.S. Sen., to Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-19/s71119-63230
56-194575.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7AF-8VDX].
191. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
192. Warner 2018 Letter, supra note 189, at 1 (capitalization simplified).
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considered the HCM disclosure bill, Axne similarly noted that
investors “have extremely limited information about a company’s
workforce, even though it is their greatest asset.”193 As with the
statements of other participants in the HCM movement, however, there
has been some incongruity. For example, despite the focus on investor
interests, the HCM disclosure bill was introduced and discussed at a
congressional hearing whose subject was a “review of proposals to
strengthen the rights and protections for workers.”194
7.

Private Standard-Setting Initiatives

Private standard-setting organizations, including the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (SASB), the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the
Embankment Project for Inclusive Capitalism (EPIC), and the World
Economic Forum (WEF), have done considerable work in the area of
HCM disclosure, making them an important part of the HCM
movement.
SASB’s efforts have been particularly extensive and are likely to
remain so in the future.195 A young but well-resourced organization,
SASB has developed detailed disclosure standards intended to
“identify and standardize disclosure on the most business-crucial
sustainability issues for companies in each of 77 industries.”196 The
standards represent comprehensive and narrowly-tailored disclosure
frameworks, and a number of companies have reported following the
standards in their sustainability reports.197 Human capital is one of five
primary sustainability dimensions addressed by the standards,
193. Bill Flook, House Financial Committee Advances Political Spending, Workforce
Disclosure Bills, THOMSON REUTERS TAX & ACCT. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://tax.thomsonreuters.
com/news/house-financial-services-committee-advances-political-spending-workforcedisclosure-bills [https://perma.cc/5KCA-VHYD].
194. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 116TH CONG., MEMORANDUM 1-2
(2019), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-ba16-20190515-sd002u2_-_memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL5S-RP3J] (capitalization simplified).
195. SASB will operate as the Value Reporting Foundation upon the completion of its
planned merger with the International Integrated Reporting Council, which was announced in
November 2020. See Press Release, Sustainability Acct. Standards Bd., IIRC and SASB
Announce Intent to Merge in Major Step Towards Simplifying the Corporate Reporting
System (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/IIRC-SASBPress-Release-Web-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4KF-RELL].
196. SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., HUMAN CAPITAL BULLETIN 3 (2020)
[hereinafter SASB HUMAN CAPITAL BULLETIN], https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/
2020/12/HumanCapitalBulletin-112320.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6GC-ESQ9].
197. Id.
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alongside environment, social capital, business model and innovation,
and leadership and governance.198 According to SASB, 48 out of its 77
industry standards already contain at least one human capital-related
metric, and so the standards, finalized in 2018 after a stakeholder
consultation process, already cover HCM to a considerable degree.199
Nevertheless, in September 2019, SASB launched a new research
project dedicated solely to human capital with the goal of designing “an
evidence-based framework to support the identification of financially
material impacts related to [HCM].”200 This project is collecting input
from a variety of stakeholders and it is likely to have a significant effect
on HCM’s future development.201
Despite the SEC’s lack of interest in SASB’s work during
Chairman Clayton’s leadership of the agency between 2017 and 2020,
one of SASB’s stated goals is for the SEC to ultimately acknowledge
SASB’s narrowly-tailored standards as an accepted way of meeting
public companies’ disclosure obligations under the federal securities
laws.202 The SASB standards have been endorsed by various corporate
governance actors, including BlackRock.203
SASB has adopted an expansive conception of HCM across four
broad categories: labor practices, employee health and safety,
employee engagement, diversity and inclusion, and supply chain
management. Each of these categories contains various general and
198. Id.
199. Id. at 4-5.
200. Id. at 10.
201. See, e.g., SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK
ON HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE SASB STANDARDS (2020), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/12/Human-Capital_Preliminary-Framework_2020-December_FINAL.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/9ZBQ-YUZG]. This draft document, spanning 125 pages and released in
December 2020, further expands SASB’s conception of HCM.
202. Letter from Thomas L. Riesenberg, Dir. of Legal & Regul. Pol’y, Sustainability
Acct. Standards Bd., to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Oct.
17, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-19/s71119-6313644-193668.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K7WA-4PH3] (“[W]e urge that, if the SEC adopts this principles-based rule, the
Adopting Release state that issuers should consider using the SASB standards as a means of
complying with the rule . . . .”). Paradoxically, this may well happen in the future precisely
because of the vacuum created by the SEC’s inaction on ESG reporting and its principles-based
approach to disclosure. While the SEC was dismantling specific disclosure requirements as
part of its Regulation S-K modernization program, SASB was building up detailed disclosure
frameworks in consultation with investors, firms, and other stakeholders.
203. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK, https://www.
blackrock.com/us/individual/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/B46D-7BC4] (“While no
framework is perfect, BlackRock believes that [SASB] provides a clear set of standards for
reporting sustainability information across a wide range of issues, from labor practices to data
privacy to business ethics.”).
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industry-specific topics and metrics. A comprehensive overview of the
topics and metrics is beyond the scope of this Article, but the following
examples provide some indication of the truly granular nature of
SASB’s approach to HCM. Under the category of employee health and
safety, the disclosure standards for the construction materials industry
include reporting the number of reported cases of silicosis; the
standards for the waste management industry include reporting of the
number of road accidents and incidents; and the standards for the
casinos and gaming industry include reporting the percentage of the
gaming floor where smoking is allowed.204 To be sure, the SASB
standards also cover HCM metrics with a broader appeal, such as
voluntary and involuntary turnover, training expenses, and others.
Alongside their highly-specific nature, another important feature
of the SASB standards is that, according to SASB, they are grounded
in the exact same standard of financial materiality that the SEC has
cited extensively during the Regulation S-K modernization program.205
(SASB is currently considering adopting its own definition, also
grounded in financial materiality.206) As in other areas, SASB’s work
on HCM reflects an investor-focused approach premised on financial
materiality. According to SASB, “the concept of human capital itself
re-frames people as assets rather than as costs,” and “it is clear that
high-quality information about how companies are managing some of
their most important assets can facilitate more robust financial analysis
and more efficient price discovery in markets around the world.”207
In addition to SASB, at least four other organizations have also
been active in setting HCM reporting standards. For example,
204. SASB HUMAN CAPITAL BULLETIN, supra note 196, at 7.
205. SASB’s 2017 Conceptual Framework, under which the original 77 industry
standards were developed, notes: “In identifying sustainability topics that are reasonably
likely to have material impacts, the SASB applies the definition of ‘materiality’ established
under the U.S. securities laws.” SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., SASB CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK 9 (2017), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SASB_
Conceptual-Framework_WATERMARK.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCP2-NQA7]. The
Conceptual Framework then goes on to cite the 1976 United States Supreme Court case TSC
Industries v. Northway, Inc. Id.
206. See SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE SASB
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK & RULES OF PROCEDURE 7 (2020), https://www.sasb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/Invitation-to-Comment-SASB-CF-RoP.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPV5
-2XAF] (“For the purpose of SASB’s standard-setting process, information is financially
material if omitting, misstating, or obscuring it could reasonably be expected to influence
investment or lending decisions that users make on the basis of their assessments of short-,
medium-, and long-term financial performance and enterprise value.”).
207. SASB HUMAN CAPITAL BULLETIN, supra note 196, at 2.
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the International Organization for Standardization has formulated
standards for both external and internal HCM reporting, which were
released in 2018 following extensive consultations.208 The ISO
standards call on companies to publicly report on 23 specific metrics
split across 9 categories and to report internally on 36 additional
metrics.209 The Global Reporting Initiative has also included in its
Global Reporting Standards various detailed topics related to HCM;
the standards form the basis for the sustainability reports prepared by a
number of companies.210 The Embankment Project for Inclusive
Capitalism, formed by the Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism and Ernst
& Young, released a report in 2018 identifying HCM as one of four
drivers of long-term value,211 and recommended HCM reporting by
way of metrics and narrative information along five different
dimensions.212 Finally, in September 2020, the World Economic Forum
released a report delineating a core set of “stakeholder capitalism
metrics,” including HCM metrics, intended to ensure “consistent
reporting of sustainable value creation.”213 Notably, WEF’s standards
rely on a compilation of metrics released by other organizations.214 The
main HCM categories and topics used in the standards put forward by
these organizations are summarized in the Appendix.
The standard-setting landscape is highly dynamic: SASB and GRI
have announced an initiative to develop joint standards.215 SASB has
208. See David McCann, Human Capital Reporting Standards Finally Arrive,
CFO (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.cfo.com/people/2018/12/human-capital-reportingstandards-finally-arrive [https://perma.cc/9LRK-8478].
209. Id.
210. See GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, CONSOLIDATED SET OF GRI SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING STANDARDS (2020), https://www.globalreporting.org/how-to-use-the-gristandards/gri-standards-english-language/. Early-generation sustainability initiatives, such as
the UN Principles for Responsible Investment and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, can be viewed as the progenitors of the current GRI standards.
211. Press Release, Ernst & Young, Embankment Project for Inclusive Capitalism
Releases Report to Drive Sustainable and Inclusive Growth (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.ey.
com/en_gl/news/2018/11/embankment-project-for-inclusive-capitalism-releases-report-todrive-sustainable-and-inclusive-growth [https://perma.cc/9DZ7-F5BH].
212. See COAL. FOR INCLUSIVE CAPITALISM, EMBANKMENT PROJECT FOR INCLUSIVE
CAPITALISM 44 (2018), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_ca/topics/
transaction-advisory-services/ey-the-embankment-project-for-inclusive-capitalism-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5VJ-YDHK].
213. See WORLD ECON. F., MEASURING STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM: TOWARDS
COMMON METRICS AND CONSISTENT REPORTING OF SUSTAINABLE VALUE CREATION 3 (2020),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_IBC_Measuring_Stakeholder_Capitalism_Report_
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW5X-MPX6] (capitalization simplified).
214. See id. at 6-10.
215. Id. at 41.
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also announced that it will merge with the International Integrated
Reporting Council and form the Value Reporting Foundation in
2021.216 The IFRS Foundation, in charge of formulating international
financial reporting standards, has issued a preliminary consultation
paper on sustainability reporting and may also enter this alreadycrowded field.217 Separately, a number of organizations incorporate the
HCM information released pursuant to the various standards into ESG
scoring and ESG rating systems, which are proliferating and gaining
greater prominence.218 Among others, both ISS and Glass Lewis issue
ratings that take into account ESG factors, including HCM factors.219
These organizations further amplify the reach of the HCM reporting
frameworks, albeit in nebulous ways due to the proprietary nature of
most rating methodologies.
8.

Board Advisors’ Focus on HCM Best Practices

The last element of the HCM movement relates to the work of
board advisors—the corporate governance practice groups of law
firms, big-four accounting firms, and executive compensation
consulting firms, among others. By highlighting HCM as an emerging
area of board oversight and commenting on changes in board practices,
advisors have played a considerable part in transforming emerging
practices into best practices. For example, one of the early mentions of
HCM in its present iteration came in a report by the Ernst & Young
Center for Board Matters titled 2017 Board Priorities, published in late
2016; under the caption “questions for the board to consider,” the report

216. See discussion supra note 195.
217. See IFRS FOUND., CONSULTATION PAPER ON SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
(2020), https://cdn.ifrs.org/-/media/project/sustainability-reporting/consultation-paper-onsustainability-reporting.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/NS35-RUU5]. The IFRS Foundation
fulfills its standard-setting function through the International Accounting Standards Board. See
id. at 7.
218. See, e.g., Betty Moy Huber & Michael Comstock, ESG Reports and Ratings: What
They Are, Why They Matter, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 27, 2017), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/27/esg-reports-and-ratings-what-they-are-why-theymatter/ [https://perma.cc/TZ26-UPGY] (describing various ESG rating providers and their
methodologies).
219. See ESG Ratings & Rankings, ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/esg/ratings
[https://perma.cc/2SV2-9AZX] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021); ESG Profile Overview, GLASS
LEWIS, https://www.glasslewis.com/understanding-esg-content [https://perma.cc/KHX328LQ] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
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presented specific HCM topics that boards ought to focus on.220
Publications by prominent law firms, such as Wachtell Lipton, Weil
Gotschal, and Cleary Gottlieb, among others, have used similarly
prescriptive language about the need for boards to focus on HCM
issues.221 So have executive compensation consultants.222 The
Conference Board, an organization that commands authority in
corporate boardrooms, also endorsed HCM as a core board concern in
early 2021.223 In sum, by including HCM as part of various best
practices for boards, these advisors have both contributed to the
substantive development of the HCM movement and enabled it to gain
and sustain momentum.
9.

Antecedents: Public Pension Funds and Labor Unions’ Interest
in HCM

Even though BlackRock’s identification of HCM as an
engagement priority in 2017 was the most visible early manifestation
of the HCM movement, it did not pioneer firm-shareholder
engagement framed around the notion of “human capital
management.” Instead, it appears that such engagement originated a
few years earlier with a group of public pension funds, the Human
Capital Management Coalition (HCMC), which subsequently gained
220. See Steve Klemash & Ann Yerger, 2017 Board Priorities Report (Dec. 31, 2016),
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/31/2017board-priorities-report [https://perma.cc/7YQ6-HBMC] (capitalization simplified).
221. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Spotlight on Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Dec. 3, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/03/spotlight-onboards-8 [https://perma.cc/33UJ-V88R] (writing that “[b]oards should . . . [r]ecognize that
ESG and sustainability are major mainstream governance topics that encompass a wide range
of issues . . . [including] human capital management”); WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP,
BOARD PRIORITIES FOR 2019: LOOKING INWARD AND OUTWARD TO MEET STAKEHOLDER
EXPECTATIONS 2 (2019), https://www.weil.com/~/media/mailings/2019/q1/201935pcagalert.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7PP-8DCX] (“Directors should embrace oversight of culture as a
key board responsibility . . . [and] consider how various components of corporate culture, such
as human capital management, can create opportunities to manage risk and drive results.”);
Human Capital Management Moves to the Front Lines, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/human-capitalmanagement-moves-to-the-front-lines-bod-2019 [https://perma.cc/7ETG-8J9K] (stating that
HCM can no longer be viewed as an issue solely within the purview of management and that
it has become a board-level issue).
222. See, e.g., Rusty O’Kelley & Anthony Goodman, Is Your Board Accountable?,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 16, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2019/09/16/is-your-board-accountable [https://perma.cc/C78D-DHU4]. Many of the reports
cited in subparts II.B.3 and II.B.4 also fall in this category.
223. See CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, supra note 99.
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prominence for its 2017 rulemaking petition on HCM disclosure.224
According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, the HCMC had been
engaging with firms on HCM issues “with little fanfare” since its
founding in 2013.225 The HCMC was focusing on “information on pay,
budgets for training, and whether boards of directors have oversight on
HR matters”—themes that would come to define the HCM
movement.226 Around the same time, the AFL-CIO issued a report
entitled Valuing America’s Greatest Asset: Corporate Disclosure of
Human Capital Management; the report was notable in that it read as
if it came from an organization focused on shareholder wealth
maximization and not one organized expressly for the purpose of
protecting and empowering workers.227
This evidence suggests that the roots of the present-day HCM
movement—a mainstream corporate governance phenomenon with
manifestations across the entire governance landscape—lie with public
pension funds and labor unions. (Incidentally, it also suggests an
expansion of these actors’ approach to corporate governance to include
softer engagement and lobbying for shareholder-oriented disclosure, in
addition to the more heavy-handed engagement through formal
shareholder proposals and litigation, which had been their traditional
focus.228)
C.

Summation: Key Features

The discussion above shows that the HCM movement is a multifaceted phenomenon. For our purposes, three features deserve
particular attention: (1) the movement’s swift rise and broad uptake
within the corporate governance community, (2) the relative lack of
meaningful coordination among the numerous participants in the
movement, and (3) the fact that despite a general lack of consistency in
messaging, virtually all participants in the movement have used a
224. See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
225. See Lauren Weber, Why Top Fund Managers Want Better HR, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
8, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-top-fund-managers-want-better-hr-1441749764
(capitalization simplified).
226. Id.
227. See AFL-CIO, VALUING AMERICA’S GREATEST ASSET: CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
OF HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2016), reprinted in Letter from Heather Slavkin Corzo,
Dir., Corps. & Cap. Mkts., AFL-CIO, to Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
app. B. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-711/4711-2596141-161123.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9QC9-6KMY].
228. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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workers-as-assets justification for HCM’s importance to corporate
governance.
Corporate governance is a field in a perpetual, even frenetic state
of motion, but even by these standards, the rise of the HCM movement
in the late 2010s has been remarkably swift. As we saw in the preceding
subpart, HCM went mainstream in 2017 with BlackRock’s adoption of
HCM as an engagement priority and the HCMC’s submission of an
HCM disclosure rulemaking petition to the SEC. Just three-and-a-half
years later, the SEC had already adopted an HCM disclosure rule, and
many boards of directors were making changes to longstanding
practices in order to incorporate HCM. In the short time period since
the movement’s inception, the list of participants in the discourse on
HCM has grown to include not just investors and public companies but
also legal advisors, accounting firms, executive compensation
consultants, regulators, legislators, and numerous domestic and
international standard-setting organizations. Analyzing the content of
the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, a de facto
clearing house for corporate governance developments, yields data that
provides a rough quantitative illustration of these trends. In each of the
years between 2007 (the Forum’s inception) and 2016, Forum posts
mentioning “human capital” were in the single digits; the term was then
mentioned 31 times in 2017, 61 times in 2018, 117 times in 2019, and
167 times in 2020.229 In addition to this near-universal interest in HCM,
the near-universal support for HCM, discussed above, also stands out.
Other sustainability topics, such as climate change, had been an area of
focus for parts of the corporate governance community for much longer
without generating the same level of interest or support.230
229. Author’s survey of posts appearing on the Harvard Law School Forum on
Corporate Governance. Search Results for “Human Capital,” HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV.,
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?s=%22human%20capital%22&is_v=1 [https://perma.cc/6F
6V-WPMZ] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021). The total number of posts generally held steady over
time, which makes year-on-year comparisons meaningful.
230. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change,
Securities Act Release No. 33-9106, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290,
6,292 (Feb. 8, 2010) (affirming the applicability of existing disclosure requirements to climate
change risk without adopting new requirements). A number of rulemaking petitions have been
filed over the years in respect of environmental and climate change disclosure but have failed
to yield any new disclosure requirements. See id. at 6,291 n.20 (listing shareholder petitions
submitted before 2010); 2018 ESG Rulemaking Petition, supra note 132. (There is indication
that the SEC is changing its approach under new leadership in 2021. See Sylvan Lane, SEC to
Update Climate-Related Risk Disclosure Requirements, THE HILL (Feb. 24, 2021), https://the
hill.com/policy/finance/540377-sec-to-update-climate-related-risk-disclosure-requirements
[https://perma.cc/8X5V-XGB9].)
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The HCM movement’s swift rise goes some way to explaining
the observed lack of coordination among participants in the movement.
But, until recently, there also does not appear to have been much
interest in broad coordination, and multiple organizations and groups
of organizations have been working on the same questions in parallel.
Whether or not this was due to deliberate efforts to compete to
showcase thought leadership or claim ownership of a highly salient
issue, the result is a crowded and fragmented field—many different
voices making relatively similar, though not identical,
pronouncements, and pursuing relatively similar, though not identical,
goals. The entity that is perhaps best suited to serve as a natural nexus
for coordination, the SEC, has not been interested in doing so to date:
the HCM disclosure rule was adopted as part of a much larger
disclosure modernization package, and HCM received little sustained
attention within the agency beyond the IAC’s initial recommendations.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), another
organization with the capacity to coordinate at least some aspects of
HCM, has also avoided this area despite launching a project on the
accounting treatment of intangible assets.231 The result of the lack of
broad coordination has been conceptual uncertainty—both about the
overall scope of HCM and about the specific content of the various
HCM categories. The table contained in the Appendix illustrates this
point in a systematic way.
Despite the inconsistent messaging, a close study of the HCM
movement reveals one common thread: the need for HCM disclosure
and oversight has been justified by emphasizing that employees’
human capital represents an important asset that ought to be managed
in the interest of shareholders. Recall from subpart II.D that there are
two distinct theoretical models of the role of human capital in corporate
governance: the workers-as-assets model and the workers-as-investors
of human capital model. The focus on the former model represents one
of the defining features of the HCM movement: its primary stated
purpose is shareholder wealth maximization rather than improving the
role and status of workers in the corporate enterprise. To be sure, the
two approaches need not be mutually exclusive—workers can and
likely do benefit in a collateral way when firms take up HCM
231. See Project Update: Identifiable Intangible Assets and Subsequent Accounting for
Goodwill, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/FASBContent_C/
ProjectUpdateExpandPage&cid=1176171566054 [https://perma.cc/EG2W-9UJ2] (Jan. 6,
2021).
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disclosure and oversight. When participants in the HCM movement
talk about corporate culture and a firm’s ability to “compete for talent,”
as they sometimes do,232 there is an implication that workers have a
choice where to invest their human capital. In some cases, therefore,
the distinction between “assets” and “investors” may be more
rhetorical than substantive. On the whole, however, the workers-asassets model derives from an entirely different management
philosophy than the workers-as-investors of human capital model. It is
also noteworthy that the HCMC (representing public pension funds),
the AFL-CIO, progressive legislators, and others have adopted a
rhetoric that portrays workers as objects to be managed in the interest
of investors, rather than the direct beneficiaries of the relevant
initiatives.
D.

The HCM Movement in Historical and Comparative Perspective

Examining the HCM movement in historical and comparative
perspective by revisiting the background matters discussed in Part II
offers further insight into its nature.
1.

Historical Perspective

There are obvious thematic similarities between the HCM
movement and the three labor-focused reform initiatives discussed in
subpart II.B—they each focus on workers. The similarities, however,
are not as deep as they may appear, and there are important differences.
Figure 1 presents a comparison across two crucial dimensions—the
initiatives’ intended beneficiaries and the governance roles they assign
to workers—and suggests that the HCM movement operates on a
different plane from the reform efforts that have come before it.

232. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 108 (“America’s largest companies, many of whom are
struggling with a skills gap in filling technical positions, must improve their capacity for
internal training and education to compete for talent in today’s economy and fulfill their
responsibilities to their employees.”).
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Figure 1: Comparison Between the HCM Movement and Prior LaborFocused Reform Initiatives
As Figure 1 shows, each of the three labor-focused reform
initiatives were framed with workers serving as the primary and direct
beneficiaries, and two out of the three envision a direct role for
workers in corporate governance. The worker empowerment agenda
encompasses proposals to give employees various governance rights
akin to those presently enjoyed by shareholders, which would, in turn,
lead to a more equal allocation of the firms’ surplus between
shareholders and employees.233 The worker-shareholder agenda seeks
to encourage workers to make more active use of the financial capital
they hold in their savings and to use the governance rights embedded
in that capital to advocate for labor-friendly reforms, again leading to a
greater share of the firm’s surplus being allocated to workers.234 The
stakeholder primacy agenda urges a redefinition of corporate purpose
to encompass stakeholder (and, by extension, employee) interests
while holding the means of corporate governance relatively intact.235
The HCM movement, by contrast, changes neither the means nor the
ends of corporate governance and, instead, seeks to raise awareness of
the fact that the appropriate management of human capital assets is as
important to firm performance and shareholder returns as the
appropriate management of physical assets. It remains to be seen
whether the HCM movement will end up being a substitute for other
labor-focused reform initiatives, effectively absorbing the energy of
reform advocates, or serve as a precursor to further reforms by
generating additional energy.

233. See discussion supra subpart II.B.1.
234. See discussion supra subpart II.B.2.
235. See discussion supra subpart II.B.3.
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Comparative Perspective

Viewing the HCM movement in comparative perspective
suggests that it is a distinct product of U.S. corporate governance,
despite interest and participation from international players. As regards
disclosure, the EU’s approach differs both in timing and in relative
emphasis. International Accounting Standards as applied in the
European Union have long required some information about workforce
costs and spending, so the dearth of workforce information has not
been quite as pronounced as in the United States.236 In 2014, the EU
directive on non-financial reporting mandated enhanced disclosure of
sustainability information, including workforce information.237
Consultations on potential amendments to address inadequate
reporting were launched in 2020 but were driven primarily by demands
for better environmental and climate disclosure as part of the European
Green Deal.238 While it has not given up on improving employeerelated disclosure within the larger framework of sustainability
disclosure, the European Union has been more focused on substantive
corporate governance. A 2020 report on directors’ duties expressed
concern that “the social norm of shareholder primacy and short-term
pressures from the financial markets” cause directors and executives to
“maximise shareholder value and distribute earnings through dividends
and buybacks, at the same time sacrificing investments (in R&D,
CapEx, employee development, etc.) that are much needed for a
transition to sustainable value creation.”239 The report discussed
various policy options, some of them far-reaching.240 In the United
236. See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
237. See Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
October 2014 Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and
Diversity Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330). The
reporting regime was slow getting off the ground, which required the European Union to issue
non-binding guidance in 2017. See Guidelines on Non-Financial Reporting (Methodology for
Reporting Non-Financial Information), 2017 O.J. (C 215).
238. See Review of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive: Towards an EU-wide ESG
Reporting Standard, ALLEN & OVERY (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/
global/news-and-insights/publications/review-of-the-non-financial-reporting-directive
[https://perma.cc/Z6LA-DPUZ] (noting that “the Commission considers that disclosed
information does not adequately detail how non-financial issues . . . impact companies and
how companies themselves impact society and the environment”).
239. EUR. COMM’N, STUDY ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE vi (2020), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e47928a2d20b-11ea-adf7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en (capitalization simplified).
240. The report’s evidence and analysis have attracted criticism. See Mark J. Roe,
Holger Spamann, Jesse M. Fried, & Charles C.Y. Wang, The European Commission’s
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Kingdom, too, corporate governance reforms pertaining to the
workforce extend much further than non-financial reporting.241 The
corporate governance reforms adopted in 2018 include several
provisions focused on employees, which, somewhat paradoxically,
moved the U.K. closer to the European model at the same time as the
U.K. was preparing to separate from the European Union. Of the
provisions mentioned in subpart II.C, three deserve particular attention
for the way they implement measures that resonate with the worker
empowerment and shareholder primacy agendas in the United States.
These provisions apply to both listed (i.e., public) and unlisted (i.e.,
private) U.K. companies, whereas the U.S. HCM disclosure rule
applies only to public companies.
First, and most notably, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code
now requires board engagement with the workforce and identifies the
appointment of an employee-selected director as one acceptable means
of fulfilling this mandate.242 This resembles proposals for giving
employees the right to elect a share of the board, which sit at the center
of the U.S. worker empowerment agenda.243
Second, any company with more than 250 U.K.-based employees
needs to include in its statutorily-mandated directors’ report a statement
“describing the action that has been taken during the financial year to
introduce, maintain or develop arrangements aimed at (i) providing
employees systematically with information on matters of concern to
them as employees, (ii) consulting employees or their representatives
on a regular basis so that the views of employees can be taken into
account in making decisions which are likely to affect their interests,
(iii) encouraging the involvement of employees in the company’s
performance through an employees’ share scheme or by some other
means, and (iv) achieving a common awareness on the part of all
employees of the financial and economic factors affecting the

Sustainable Corporate Governance Report: A Critique (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working
Paper, Paper No. 553/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3711652.
241. With respect to non-financial reporting (including of HCM information), the U.K.
is pursuing a consultation similar to that in the EU. See DEPT. OF BUSINESS, ENERGY &
INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY, FRAMEWORKS FOR STANDARDS FOR NON-FINANCIAL REPORTING
(2020) (UK), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/935097/frameworks-for-standards-for-non-financial-reporting.pdf.
242. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (summarizing bills by Senators Warren,
Baldwin, and Sanders).
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performance of the company.”244 This is a disclosure provision, which
does not require companies to pursue any of these policies, but it does
focus directors’ attention on the role employees could play and, as a
result, could serve a behavioral function by influencing corporate
governance practices.245 Whereas some of the policies it references are
commonplace industrial relations measures that fit within the definition
of operational participation,246 others, such as provisions (ii) and (iii),
resemble proposals that are part of the U.S. worker empowerment
agenda and relate to employee participation in corporate governance.
Finally, large U.K. companies are required to include in their
statutorily-mandated strategic report a so-called “Section 172(1)
statement” explaining how directors have considered the interests of
stakeholders in decisionmaking.247 Again, this is only a disclosure
requirement, but one that can be expected to serve a behavioral
function. The regulatory guidance provided in respect of this provision
states that companies “will probably want to include” information
about “the issues, factors and stakeholders the directors consider
relevant” in complying with their obligation to have due regard for
stakeholder interests, as well as “information on the effect of that
regard on the company’s decisions and strategies.”248 Taken seriously,
this provision pries open the black box of director decisionmaking and
requires directors to explain how they weigh shareholder interests
against stakeholder interests—a move that is somewhat consonant
with the U.S. stakeholder primacy agenda.
In sum, the comparative examples illustrate that even though
other market economies have been incorporating employee-related
provisions in their corporate governance regimes contemporaneously
244. See The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/860
(UK), at Regulation 13 (amending Part 4 of Schedule 7 of the Large and Medium-Sized
Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008).
245. In addition to their standard informational function, disclosure requirements can
also serve a so-called behavioral function by influencing corporate decisionmaking in
substantive ways. See Bank & Georgiev, supra note 34, at 1146-49.
246. Operational participation is discussed in subpart II.A. See supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
247. See discussion supra note 75. A similar requirement applies to all companies with
more than 250 U.K.-based employees as part of the “employee engagement” disclosure in the
directors’ report. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
248. DEPT. OF BUSINESS, ENERGY & INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE—THE COMPANIES (MISCELLANEOUS REPORTING) REGULATIONS 2018
Q&A 8 (2018) (UK), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/755002/The_Companies__Miscellaneous_Reporting__Regulati
ons_2018_QA_-_Publication_Version_2__1_.pdf (capitalization simplified).
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with the rise of the HCM movement in the United States, the U.S. and
non-U.S. developments are fundamentally different. In the EU and the
U.K., we are seeing a concerted push against shareholder primacy
through the incorporation of measures that resonate with the worker
empowerment and stakeholder primacy agendas; by comparison—and
notwithstanding its novelty, ambition, and importance—the U.S. HCM
movement exists within the traditional shareholder primacy realm.
E.

Explaining the Rise of the HCM Movement

A final part of understanding the HCM movement involves an
inquiry into its rise. Seasoned observers of corporate governance may
find the swift ascendance of the HCM movement in the late 2010s
puzzling, and not without reason. The concept of human capital is not
new to U.S. corporate governance, and there have been many
unsuccessful efforts over the years to improve the role and status of
workers within the corporate enterprise. Moreover, even though the
need for HCM disclosure and oversight is usually justified with
reference to the transition to a knowledge-based economy, this
development is not new either; indeed, the knowledge-based economy
has been part of public discourse for at least three decades.249 We have
also known for decades about the inadequacy of financial accounting
when it comes to capturing the value of intangible assets, including
human capital.250 Even the specific idea of mandating HCM disclosure
has been on the table since the 1990s.251 So what was different this time
around, and why did HCM succeed where other reform initiatives
failed? In light of the analysis presented thus far, and subject to the
qualification that any discussion of the determinants of a phenomenon
as complex as the HCM movement is by its nature subjective and
somewhat speculative, I identify several relevant factors—the broader
socio-economic environment of the 2010s, the important changes in

249. See, e.g., SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF
WORK AND POWER (1988).
250. See, e.g., LEV, supra note 14; MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN M. H. WALLMAN,
UNSEEN WEALTH: REPORT OF THE BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON INTANGIBLES (2001); see also
Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate Financial
Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 26 (2004) (“Another strong complaint against GAAP
is that it penalizes ‘knowledge’-based firms by excluding measures of intellectual and human
capital, wherein real comparative advantages lie.”).
251. See, e.g., BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, supra note 18; O’Connor, supra note
18.
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the corporate governance ecosystem occurring at the same time, and
the malleable and non-disruptive nature of the HCM concept.
The economic devastation wrought by the 2008 financial crisis
and the slow pace of the subsequent recovery placed much stress on
workers during the 2010s. This included growing economic insecurity,
pay disparities, and wealth inequality, problems exacerbated at least in
part by inadequate workforce training, job obsolescence due to
automation, and a U.S. worker skills gap.252 By 2013, labor’s share of
income, a measure of the part of national income allocated to wages
relative to the return on financial capital, was the lowest it had been
since World War II.253 This was accompanied by a growing gap
between relative increases in productivity and wages.254 Scholars also
documented a lack of labor market competition, even in labor markets
characterized by a scarcity of talent.255 A comprehensive study of
human capital covering 195 countries and territories between 1990 and
2016 found that the United States fell from 6th to 27th place in human
capital investment, the only industrialized country to experience such a
drop.256 Divided government, government shutdowns, and an overall
state of political paralysis made regulatory solutions hard to come by,
252. See, e.g., In the Past, America Was Not as Unequal as It Has Become, ECONOMIST
(Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.economist.com/books-and-arts/2019/10/24/in-the-past-americawas-not-as-unequal-as-it-has-become (reviewing three books by leading social scientists
discussing present socio-economic trends related to low economic growth, income and wealth
inequality, worker displacement due to automation, and inadequate levels of workforce
training, among others).
253. See Michael W. L. Elsby et al., The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2013, at 1.
254. See, e.g., The Productivity-Pay Gap, ECON. POL’Y INST., https://www.epi.org/
productivity-pay-gap (July 2019) [https://perma.cc/U4C7-4QN7] (showing that net
productivity rose 69.6% between 1979 and 2018, whereas inflation-adjusted typical worker
pay increased only 11.6%).
255. See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger & Eric Posner, Opinion., Corporate America Is
Suppressing Wages for Many Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/02/28/opinion/corporate-america-suppressing-wages.html (suggesting that
practices such as non-compete clauses in employment contracts are suppressing worker
wages); Suresh Naidu, Eric Posner & Glen Weyl, More and More Companies Have
Monopoly Power over Workers’ Wages. That’s Killing the Economy., VOX (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/4/6/17204808/wages-employers-workersmonopsony-growth-stagnation-inequality (linking depressed worker wages and income
inequality to firms’ monopoly power).
256. See Stephen S. Lim et al., Measuring Human Capital: A Systematic Analysis of
195 Countries and Territories, 1990–2016, 392 LANCET 1217 (2018). During the same time
period, China rose from 69th to 44th place. Other developed countries, including France,
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, all stayed within four spots of their original rank.
Id. at 1222-26.
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and some of the attention shifted to firms’ treatment of their workers.257
The proposition that firms should pay close attention to the
workforce—one of many ways to communicate HCM’s essence—had
broad appeal and generated organic support for the HCM movement in
its early days.
Other societal developments played a part as well. These include
the focus on workplace sexual harassment as part of the MeToo
movement launched in the fall of 2017, the focus on workforce
resilience and health and safety as part of the COVID-19 crisis starting
in the spring of 2020, and the renewed focus on corporations’ efforts to
promote diversity and inclusion following the protests for racial justice
in the summer of 2020. These developments resonated deeply with
participants in the insurgent HCM movement who referenced them on
multiple occasions when making the case for HCM disclosure and
oversight.258 This gave the HCM movement, by then already in
progress, an extra measure of momentum.
In addition to the particular socio-economic conditions of the
2010s, the rise of the HCM movement was likely boosted by the
growing power of BlackRock and other asset managers in corporate
governance. By virtue of the concentration of holdings, a limited
number of players have come to hold considerable voting power and
even greater soft power,259 which they have willingly exercised in the
service of various causes. Some commentators have explained large
asset managers’ advocacy on climate change and social justice issues
as an effort to appeal to younger and more socially conscious
257. See, e.g., Rana Foroohar, Plans for a Worker-Led Economy Straddle America’s
Political Divides, FIN. TIMES (June 9, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/31b843b2-8938-11
e9-a028-86cea8523dc2.
258. See, e.g., supra note 188 and accompanying text (referencing the COVID-19
pandemic in connection with HCM); Lee, supra note 178 (“There is ever-growing recognition
of the importance of diversity from all types of investors. . . . What’s more, since [the HCM
disclosure] rule was proposed, we’ve seen protests regarding racial injustice that have brought
about an unprecedented national conversation on this subject.”); David A. Katz & Laura A.
McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: Shareholder Activism Is the Next Phase of
#MeToo, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 28, 2018), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2018/09/28/corporate-governance-update-shareholder-activism-is-the-nextphase-of-metoo (discussing how various HCM initiatives specifically incorporate
measures to prevent workplace sexual harassment).
259. BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street control approximately 25% of voting
power in S&P 500 companies. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 119, at 736; see also John C.
Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve (Harv. Pub. L.
Working Paper, Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247337 (presenting a
critical perspective on the transformation of corporate governance as a result of the
concentration of power in the hands of asset managers).
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investors.260 Regardless of motivation, the assertiveness displayed by
large asset managers represents a structural change in corporate
governance. As the head of an investing machine with close to $10
trillion in assets under management, BlackRock’s Larry Fink
commands the attention of the broad corporate governance community
and, in particular, of public firm CEOs, since those firms are all part of
BlackRock’s broadly diversified investment portfolio.261 And, unlike
other players with considerable power to set governance standards
(such as proxy advisory firms, for example), BlackRock does not shy
away from publicity. As we saw in subpart III.B.1, HCM has been a
prominent topic in Fink’s annual letters, BlackRock’s engagement
agenda, and in statements from other asset managers.
Lastly, framing and context have likely played a part as well.
HCM is intuitive and non-threatening as a reform agenda, and it
appears positively anodyne next to some of the transformational
proposals coming from progressive politicians262 and from prominent
corporate governance commentators.263 HCM was an easy cause for
BlackRock to champion and also one that the corporate establishment
could get behind at a relatively low cost. In addition to improving firm
performance and, particularly for BlackRock, positive publicity, the
potential upsides also included improving employee relations and
deflecting government-mandated reforms that would be more costly
and intrusive.
IV. CRITIQUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Building upon the evidence and insights developed thus far,
this Part offers a critical assessment of the ways in which HCM is
being incorporated into corporate governance as well as specific
recommendations focused on the roles played by corporate boards,
the SEC, and financial accounting standard-setters. One common
260. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder
Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1301 (2020); ERNST & YOUNG, SUSTAINABLE INVESTING: THE MILLENNIAL
INVESTOR (2017), https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/financialservices/ey-sustainable-investing-the-millennial-investor.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ75KA7U].
261. See About BlackRock, BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/sg/en/about-us
[https://perma.cc/NZ8F-SVAH] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
262. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (summarizing corporate reform bills
by Senators Warren, Baldwin, and Sanders).
263. See STRINE, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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takeaway relates to the need to disambiguate HCM by carefully
defining the concept, breaking it down into its appropriate constitutive
elements, and, to the extent possible, focusing the relevant discussions
on those specific elements. The weight of the empirical evidence and
the appropriate policies for boards, the SEC, and standard-setters will
vary considerably depending on which element is under consideration;
in short, both context and specificity are crucial if the promise of HCM
is to be fully realized. Beyond the need for disambiguation, this Part
highlights the possibility of strategic use and misuse of empirical
studies linking HCM to firm performance, HCM’s status as a “missioncritical” area of board oversight (including the meaning and legal
consequences of this observation), the flaws in the SEC’s open-ended,
principles-based approach to HCM disclosure, which ought be
revisited, and the importance of involving financial accounting
standard-setters (or a suitable substitute body) in developing disclosure
policies in respect of workforce training and compensation and human
capital valuations.
A.

HCM and Firm Performance

The conventional case for HCM in corporate governance is built
on the idea that “better” HCM practices contribute to “better” firm
performance. There have been numerous empirical studies that lend
support to this notion, and they are cited regularly and with authority
by participants in the HCM movement.264 Three related points about
the empirical case for HCM disclosure and oversight deserve
264. A comprehensive report published in 2015 analyzed 92 relevant studies and
concluded that “in aggregate the literature offers considerable empirical evidence that human
capital policies can be material to corporate performance.” AARON BERNSTEIN & LARRY
BEEFERMAN, INV. RESP. RSCH. INST., THE MATERIALITY OF HUMAN CAPITAL TO CORPORATE
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 2, 5 (2015), https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/files/lwp/files/final_human
_capital_materiality_april_23_2015.pdf. The report focused on studies that used as proxies for
firm financial performance indicators widely adopted by institutional investors, including total
shareholder return, return on assets, return on earnings, return on investment, return on capital
employed, profitability, and Tobin’s Q; this was intended to address “a common
misunderstanding that the materiality of [HCM information] is not yet backed up by research
pertinent to mainstream investors.” Id. at 4, 6. A different meta-analysis, which reviewed 66
studies, concluded that human capital characteristics, such as education, experience, and
training, have positive effects on firm performance. See T. Russell Crook et al., Does Human
Capital Matter? A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship Between Human Capital and Firm
Performance, 96 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 443, 443–56 (2011). HCM advocates and the SEC have
cited various other studies. See, e.g., Mark A. Huselid, The Impact of Human Resource
Management Practices on Turnover, Productivity, and Corporate Financial Performance, 38
ACAD. MGMT. J. 635, 643-44 (1995); Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value
Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and Equity Prices, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 621 (2011).
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equal emphasis. First, the empirical studies suffer from various
methodological, conceptual, and definitional limitations.265 Second,
most of these limitations are not unique to the HCM area but are,
instead, common to the empirical literature on the determinants of firm
performance.266 Third, the studies’ limitations are not sufficient reason
to dismiss the links between HCM practices and firm performance.
Given that by some estimates there are hundreds if not thousands
of relevant studies,267 it is ultimately impossible to adjudicate the
strength of the general empirical case in support of HCM.
Disambiguating HCM and examining specific categories is likely to
offer better payoffs. In light of the limitations of empirical research
on firm performance, however, policymakers and corporate
decisionmakers should be wary of making empirical support either a
necessary or a sufficient condition for proceeding with HCM-focused
reforms in corporate governance. There also needs to be careful
consideration of how firm performance is measured and resistance to
using one-dimensional metrics. Relatedly, some data-driven research
on firm performance is based at least in part on doctrines of scientific
management, also known as Taylorism, which have been criticized for
their single-minded focus on maximizing worker productivity.268 The
265. A recent working paper by Adam Badawi and Frank Partnoy offers a compelling
analysis of various problems with the design of ESG metrics and their actual use in academic
research. See Adam B. Badawi & Frank Partnoy, Measuring How Corporations Impact
Society: The Relationship Between ESG Metrics and Securities Litigation 9-17 (Oct. 26,
2020), https://insights.truvaluelabs.com/hubfs/Academic%20Research%20Network/ARN
_Partnoy_ESGandLitigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8MU-TRQU].
266. Some mainstream researchers have uncharitably described this literature as a
“factor zoo.” See Campbell R. Harvey & Yan Liu, A Census of the Factor Zoo 1 (Feb. 25,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341728 (“The rate of factor
production in the academic research is out of control. We document over 400 factors published
in top journals. Surely, many of them are false.”). One of the principal ways of measuring
changes in firm value over time, Tobin’s Q, does not withstand close scrutiny. See Robert
Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s q, 73 VAND. L. REV. 353, 354 (2020) (“Our
message for corporate law scholars is straightforward: view with suspicion the large body of
empirical law and finance scholarship that misuses Tobin’s q.”) The problems with the metric
are further compounded at firms with a large share of intangible assets. Id. at 396-98.
267. See BERNSTEIN & BEEFERMAN, supra note 264, at 4 (reporting that a 2013 paper
found 248 articles on the links between “HR policy” and indicators of firm operational
performance, whereas a 2009 paper estimated that employee job satisfaction had been studied
in approximately 10,000 articles).
268. See, e.g., BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 59
(2018) (discussing the tenets and applications of Taylorism and noting that “[t]he Taylorist
vision of efficient management is focused on minimizing costs associated with misallocated or
wasted human capital, effort, and attention”). Frischmann and Selinger also note: “Taylorism
and Fordism are famous both for their underlying objective, namely, to increase efficiency,
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widespread implementation of tools of workforce surveillance in the
name of optimizing performance offers new possibilities for scientific
management with troubling implications.269 If the growing emphasis
on HCM by boards and investors is fomenting a return to, or the
entrenchment of, Taylorism—and this is an important research
question for management scholars—then HCM should attract more
critical scrutiny as a firm management phenomenon. Such scrutiny can
benefit from and enhance the analysis of HCM as a corporate
governance phenomenon presented here.
B.

HCM and Corporate Boards

Some of the most prominent manifestations of the HCM
movement involve changes in board-level governance. As discussed in
subpart III.B.3, these have included adding HCM as an area of board
oversight, discussing HCM topics as part of board-shareholder
engagement, expanding the remit of the compensation committee to
cover HCM matters, highlighting HCM as an important area of
expertise for director nominees, and even incorporating HCM as a
factor in setting incentive-based executive compensation. These
extensive changes happening over a short period raise questions about
the scope of directors’ fiduciary duties, the allocation of
decisionmaking authority within the corporation, and the appropriate
boundaries of board autonomy.
1.

HCM as a “Mission-Critical” Oversight Area

Both the statements and the actions of participants in the HCM
movement imply that there is now a presumption that oversight of
matters related to the workforce is mission-critical for many modern
firms: proper HCM is viewed as an important component of business
success, and inadequate HCM could be a source of business risk. When
discussing the topic of mandatory HCM disclosure in March 2019,
then-SEC Chairman Jay Clayton stated that he “believe[s] that the
strength of our economy and many of our public companies is due, in
significant and increasing part, to human capital, and for some of those
quality, and productivity for the ultimate benefit of managers, owners, and capitalists, and
means, specifically by managing factory workers in various ways that get them to behave like
machines.” Id. at 55.
269. See Digital Taylorism, ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.economist.com/
business/2015/09/10/digital-taylorism (suggesting that “[a] modern version of ‘scientific
management’ threatens to dehumanise the workplace”).
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companies human capital is a mission-critical asset.”270 It is logical to
ask, therefore, whether directors’ fiduciary duties under state law
require HCM oversight? Can a board’s lack of HCM oversight
constitute a breach of fiduciary duties, and, if so, under what
circumstances? Fiduciary duties related to oversight are invariably
nuanced and contextual, and any liability analysis would depend on the
particular facts of the case. The baseline standard for director conduct
set by Caremark is considered permissive,271 and for a long time, the
case law offered little guidance on the specific subject areas requiring
board oversight, speaking broadly of “compliance with law” and
“business performance.”272
Two Delaware cases from 2019, Marchand v. Barnhill and
In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation, offered some
additional guidance. In Marchand, the Delaware Supreme Court
overturned the Court of Chancery and allowed a Caremark complaint
to proceed because, inter alia, the company had “no system of boardlevel compliance monitoring and reporting” in respect of food safety,
which, crucially, was “essential and mission critical” for the
company.273 In Clovis, the Court of Chancery allowed a Caremark
complaint to proceed because the board “consciously ignored red flags
that revealed a mission critical failure to comply with . . . FDA
regulations.”274 Interpretations of these cases differ, with the term
“mission critical” attracting particular attention.275

270. See Clayton, supra note 165 (emphasis added).
271. A corporation’s board may be liable for breach of fiduciary duty if “(a) the
directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or
(b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its
operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
attention.” Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (restating
and applying the Caremark standard). Caremark duties fall under the duty of loyalty and not
under the duty of care. This is notable because the now-widespread charter exculpation
provisions are limited to claims for monetary damages under the duty of care and cannot
exculpate directors and officers from liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2020).
272. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
273. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 822, 824 (Del. 2019) (emphasis added). The
court pointed out that there was “no committee overseeing food safety, no full board-level
process to address food safety issues, and no protocol by which the board was expected to be
advised of food safety reports and developments.” Id. at 809.
274. In re Clovis Oncology Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL
4850188, at *15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (emphasis added).
275. After a detailed analysis of the two cases and the various interpretations, Adam
Badawi and Frank Partnoy note that “the ‘mission critical’ standard could support a conclusion
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It is worth noting that in addition to “mission critical failure to
comply,” the Clovis court also referenced “‘mission critical’ regulatory
compliance risk,” “‘mission critical’ operations,” “mission-critical
regulatory issues,” and a “mission critical product.”276 This raises the
question: Is the key to oversight liability the mission-critical nature of
the company’s compliance failure, its regulatory compliance risk, its
operations, its regulatory issues, its product, or some combination
thereof? It is left to future cases to answer this question.
Despite uncertainty with respect to the meaning of the missioncritical standard, HCM’s demonstrated importance suggests that HCM
oversight failures could result in Caremark liability. Actionable failures
would look differently at different companies depending on the
business model, operations, and the attendant regulatory compliance
risks—beyond abiding the law, “the mission” at each company is
different, and, hence, what is deemed mission-critical would also be
different. As we have seen, some companies identify specific HCM
topics they consider important; those that do not would do well to
disambiguate “HCM” because the catch-all term covers a wide array
of topics, as well as different populations such as non-employee
contractors and those employed within the supply chain.277 Fiduciary
duty breaches could potentially result from (1) failures to identify
HCM factors (and, hence, failures to implement a system of boardlevel compliance monitoring and reporting in respect of those factors);
(2) failures to implement a system that corresponds to the identified
factors; or (3) failure to monitor and oversee the system that has been
implemented.
2.

The Optimal Locus of Expertise and Control over HCM

Discussions of the need for board oversight of HCM are often
based on the unstated premise that moving from the traditional
structure where HCM is a management-only issue to a structure where
HCM is a strategic issue that commands the attention of both firm
management and the board of directors will improve firm performance
and risk management. In other words, board involvement and board
oversight are indicia of better corporate governance. But involvement
and oversight alone are insufficient, and, moreover, could quite
that oversight standards are related to ESG and sustainability.” Badawi & Partnoy, supra note
265, at 43.
276. See Clovis, 2019 WL4850188, at *12-15.
277. See discussion supra subpart III.B; discussion infra Appendix.
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possibly be counterproductive in the absence of adequate expertise and
bandwidth. HCM encompasses a host of complex matters; depending
on the circumstances, effective board oversight thereof can—with
equal legitimacy—reach down to the lower levels of the organizational
hierarchy or stop at a more general level. It may well be that full-time
management, rather than the part-time boards of directors, would be
better placed to oversee HCM policies once they reach a certain level
of technical specificity. There is likely to be a different set of optimal
arrangements at each firm, which would depend on various attributes
of the business, the level of expertise of the board, and other factors. As
a result, participants in the HCM movement ought to pay considerably
more attention to designing the right oversight structures and
determining which matters deserve board time, rather than viewing
board oversight as an unalloyed good. Recall that Caremark requires
boards to implement reporting and information systems and controls
and then monitor and oversee these systems and controls. Overloading
the board with oversight responsibilities in respect of non-essential and
non-mission-critical matters in an overbroad effort to satisfy the first
part of the Caremark standard of conduct may prevent the board from
meeting the second part of the standard due to limitations of either
expertise or bandwidth.
In a related vein, it is necessary to carefully consider the
appropriate allocation of responsibility for HCM within the board.
Tasking an already-existing board committee with HCM oversight
represents one possible approach, and many boards have selected the
compensation committee.278 Commentators have even urged for the
compensation committee to be “reconceived” to focus on employeerelated matters.279 A strong argument in favor of this approach is that
by considering both executive and non-executive compensation
matters, the committee can ensure broad internal consistency of
compensation practices and appropriate “gainsharing” among
executives and rank-and-file employees.280 For example, it may be
more difficult for compensation committee members to sign off on
below-average employee pay if they have just considered and approved
278. See discussion supra subpart III.B.C.
279. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Kirby M. Smith, Toward Fair Gainsharing and a Quality
Workplace For Employees: How a Reconceived Compensation Committee Might Help Make
Corporations More Responsible Employers and Restore Faith in American Capitalism, 76
BUS. LAW. 31 (2020-2021).
280. Id. at 51-56.
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CEO pay at 75% of the firm’s peer group, or to oppose employee
unionization if they have just paid for a negotiation lawyer to assist the
CEO in bargaining against the firm.281 In a nutshell, forcing cognitive
dissonance on the compensation committee might cause it to make
different decisions. It bears noting, however, that boards as a whole
have—for decades and without discomfort—presided over decisions
that do not reflect gainsharing. In addition, this line of argument in
support of vesting HCM oversight with the compensation committee is
based on desired changes in substantive decisionmaking, which may
be more controversial than arguments with a more neutral normative
cadence.
Procedural and institutional considerations militate against
assigning most or all HCM oversight responsibility to the
compensation committee. First, the compensation committee already
has a host of statutory responsibilities related to executive
compensation and the CD&A report.282 Second, even though the
compensation committee would be a natural fit for matters related to
workforce compensation, such matters comprise a relatively small part
of HCM’s overall scope, as illustrated by the discussion in Part III.
Here again it would be beneficial to disambiguate the various aspects
of HCM, spell out oversight duties, and allocate oversight
responsibility accordingly. It might be worth considering the merits of
a dedicated HCM committee, which can be modeled after the audit and
compensation committee.283 If HCM reporting becomes more detailed,
either voluntarily or as a result of new SEC mandates, the need for an
HCM committee is likely to become more prominent because of the
oversight demands associated with internal and external reporting
mechanisms. One of the main responsibilities of the audit committee,
generally considered the most important board committee, is to ensure
the integrity of financial reporting and the internal systems and controls
related to financial reporting. An ESG or sustainability committee
covering HCM, in addition to environmental oversight and reporting,
presents another possible model of allocating responsibility for HCM
within the board. The evolution of boards and board structures is

281. Id. at 54.
282. See Regulation S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2018).
283. Possibilities include giving this committee the power to hire HCM consultants
directly and requiring that at least one HCM or HR expert sit on such a committee, much like
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the audit committee to have a financial expert.

710

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:639

subject to active academic debate,284 and the optimal locus of board
expertise and control over HCM should be considered as part of this
debate.
3.

The Dangers of Coercive and Mimetic Isomorphism in Corporate
Governance

At their core, firms are complex organizations, and much of
corporate governance deals with organizational processes and
structures. According to neo-institutional theories, organizations can
evolve either as a result of competitive dynamics (e.g., competition in
product, capital, or labor markets), or for institutional reasons.285 There
are several different kinds of convergence in organizational processes
and structures (termed isomorphism) due to institutional factors:
coercive isomorphism, resulting from the imposition of external
pressures or mandates;286 mimetic isomorphism, resulting from
organizations copying one another, often under conditions of
uncertainty and in a quest for legitimacy;287 and normative
isomorphism, representing convergence stemming from the
development of best practices, often in a professional context.288 This
284. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Boards 3.0: An Introduction, 74 BUS.
LAW. 351, 353 (2019) (advocating a model of “thickly informed, well-resourced, and highly
motivated directors who could credibly monitor managerial strategy and operational skill” in
the place of “the present board model . . . [of] thinly informed, under-resourced, and boundedly
motivated” directors); Faith Stevelman & Sarah C. Haan, Boards in Information Governance,
23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 179, 180-81 (2020) (highlighting the board’s role in “knowledge synthesis,
reporting oversight, and institutional deliberation constitutive of the firm’s identity”); Stavros
Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (2020)
(arguing that sustainability oversight can help boards obtain information from internal and
external constituencies and mitigate social risk).
285. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOCIO. REV. 147
(1983).
286. Id. at 150 (noting that coercive isomorphism “results from both formal and
informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are
dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function”).
287. Id. at 151 (“When organizational technologies are poorly understood . . . when
goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations
may model themselves on other organizations. The advantages of mimetic behavior in the
economy of human action are considerable; when an organization faces a problem with
ambiguous causes or unclear solutions, problemistic search may yield a viable solution with
little expense . . . .”).
288. Id. at 152 (noting that normative isomorphism stems primarily from
professionalization, which is described as “the collective struggle of members of an occupation
to define the conditions and methods of their work, to control ‘the production of producers’ . . .
and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy” (quoting
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theoretical framework has not been applied to corporate governance
before, and it offers particularly useful ways of thinking about the
changes being brought about by the HCM movement.
The conditions giving rise to the HCM movement, discussed in
subpart III.E, have triggered both uncertainty as to the appropriate level
of oversight and disclosure of workforce-related matters and a quest for
legitimacy whereby firms seek to demonstrate to external stakeholders,
such as investors, proxy advisors, and society at large, that they are
doing right by workers. In addition, BlackRock and, to a more limited
extent, certain other market players have exerted both formal and
informal pressures on firms to comply with a new HCM rulebook that
is highly prescriptive with respect to disclosure, engagement, and
oversight. Taking this into account, the adaptive behaviors displayed
by firms, i.e., the various changes to board-level governance we have
observed, bear the characteristics of both mimetic and coercive
isomorphism. There have also been processes at play that suggest some
degree of normative isomorphism, since various third parties have
engaged in the development of best practices. But given the
fragmentation of the field, the broad scope of HCM, and its novelty as
a corporate governance concern, it is questionable whether these
deliberative processes have, thus far, resulted in much guidance that is
specific enough to be usable. The other possible explanation for the
observed degree of convergence in board practices—competitive
dynamics—also seems less likely.289
There are serious downsides to both mimetic and coercive
isomorphism, which firms and participants in the HCM movement
should bear in mind during the next stages of HCM’s integration into
corporate governance. As far as mimetic isomorphism is concerned,
there is little reason to believe that firms will improve their
performance in a consistent manner by copying from one another in
response to external pressure; to be sure, actual outcomes would
depend on the nature and extent of the copying, but the substantial
degree of heterogeneity in firm business models and structures suggests
caution. In the realm of coercive isomorphism, many of the
recommendations for incorporating HCM in board governance follow
MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 40
(1977)).
289. We can expect that one of the prerequisites for competition on the basis of HCM
practices would be adequate information about each firm’s practices. To date, such information
has been both scarce and low-quality. See discussion supra subpart III.B.4.
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generic checklists formulated by BlackRock. As we have seen,
BlackRock actively transmits these recommendations to the firms in its
portfolio.290 The pressure to comply is both implicit given BlackRock’s
market power and explicit by virtue of BlackRock’s declaration that it
will hold boards accountable.291 Perhaps unsurprisingly, recent
evidence points to a high degree of compliance with BlackRock’s
mandates.292 It is nevertheless doubtful that BlackRock has the
legitimacy and accountability to determine the parameters of what
constitutes desirable HCM and to set policies that are, in effect,
mandatory.
In addition to questions about the propriety of BlackRock’s power
and influence, there are questions about its resources and expertise, as
well as about its incentives. By its own account, BlackRock employs
(only) about 45 analysts in its investment stewardship team; these
analysts cover approximately 16,000 companies across 85 markets
worldwide and an ever-expanding array of subject areas on which
BlackRock takes a position.293 The number of analysts compares
unfavorably with the numbers employed by proxy advisors and rating
agencies.294 This lack of capacity can lead to low-quality
290. BlackRock and commentators occasionally refer to these firms as “[BlackRock’s]
portfolio companies,” which is both misleading and telling. BlackRock does not own or
formally control these companies, but it often acts as if it does. See, e.g., BLACKROCK,
BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP 6 (2020) [hereinafter BLACKROCK STEWARDSHIP
PRACTICES], https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-profile-ofblackrock-investment-stewardship-team-work.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EY8-SU6V]
(referencing “our portfolio companies”); Amy Whyte, Evidence Shows That Larry Fink’s
Annual Letters Actually Work, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.institutional
investor.com/article/b1qqdhmzgrwbb3/Evidence-Shows-That-Larry-Fink-s-Annual-LettersActually-Work [https://perma.cc/QK6J-55J5] (discussing effects of Fink’s “public letter[s] to
the CEOs of his firm’s portfolio companies”).
291. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
292. See Andrea Pawliczek et al., A New Take on Voice: The Influence of BlackRock’s
“Dear CEO” Letters (Jan. 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=37630
42 (finding that firm disclosures issued immediately following Larry Fink’s annual letters echo
themes from the letters and that BlackRock rewards compliance by more often siding with
management of compliant firms than non-compliant firms in votes on annual shareholder
proposals).
293. See BLACKROCK STEWARDSHIP PRACTICES, supra note 290, at 5, 16. BlackRock
claims that its team is the largest in the industry, which implies that other asset managers have
an even greater expertise and capacity problem. For prior criticism of asset managers on such
grounds, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89 (2017).
294. For example, ISS, which focuses predominantly on issuing corporate governance
recommendations, has approximately 2,200 employees across 29 global offices in 15
countries; Moody’s Investor Services has approximately 11,400 employees in more than 40
countries. Undoubtedly, many of these employees cover administrative functions, but given
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recommendations and the introduction of harmful practices, or, at the
very least, to shallow recommendations and pro forma compliance.
Finally, due to its status as a universal investor/universal owner,
BlackRock has rational incentives to maximize the value of its entire
portfolio rather than the value of individual firms within the
portfolio.295 While this approach would not be problematic from the
point of view of investors who are fully diversified, some of
BlackRock’s portfolio-maximizing recommendations may have a
negative effect on the value of individual firms within the portfolio and,
consequently, result in welfare losses for investors who are either
undiversified or differently diversified.
As is often the case in corporate governance, these problems do
not have easy solutions, but awareness of them makes it more likely
that they can be solved. The push to incorporate HCM oversight in
board practices, while well underway, is still in its early stages. By
accelerating the development of best practices (and doing so in a
coordinated and deliberative manner), participants in the HCM
movement can still prevent mimetic and coercive approaches from
setting in. In theory, the availability of enhanced information about
each firm’s HCM policies, the topic to which we turn next, can also
facilitate competitive evolution via capital markets (investors
evaluating and rewarding firms that display good HCM practices) or
labor markets (prospective employees doing the same), which may
counterbalance the institutional factors that have dominated thus far.
C.

HCM and the SEC

The SEC’s adoption of an HCM disclosure rule in August 2020
represented a milestone in the development of the SEC disclosure
regime: for the first time, firms were called on to disclose broad
information about their workforce. As discussed in subpart III.B.5,
however, the HCM disclosure rule reflects an open-ended, principlesbased approach. The rule does not prescribe specific information or
the nature of ISS’s and Moody’s business, we can also expect that a substantial number of them
are analysts. See About ISS, ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/about/about-iss (last visited
Mar. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/X5BN-X3MM]; Investor Relations, MOODY’S, https://ir.
moodys.com/home/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/GT89-E7YC].
295. Since BlackRock’s aggregate equity portfolio is roughly weighted by market
capitalization, focusing on strategies tailored to the largest firms, which represent the largest
share of the portfolio, would have a more beneficial aggregate effect than focusing on strategies
tailored to smaller firms. The large-firm strategies, however, are likely inappropriate for
smaller firms and may hurt these firms and their investors.
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metrics subject to disclosure, and, instead, calls for “a description of
[the company’s] human capital resources, including any human capital
measures or objectives [it] focuses on in managing the business”; the
information is required “to the extent such disclosure is material to an
understanding of the [company’s] business taken as a whole.”296 The
SEC’s approach was not entirely unreasonable, but it was nevertheless
inadequate. This subpart critiques the HCM disclosure rule as it
currently stands and offers recommendations for a potential future
round of HCM rulemaking.
1.

From HCM Materiality to HCM Disclosure Rulemaking

As a preliminary matter, it is worth emphasizing one important
outcome from the SEC rulemaking process: The work of the SEC’s
Investor Advisory Committee (IAC) and the extensive feedback from
numerous investors, including investors with different profiles,
demonstrated the significance of HCM as a mainstream investor
concern. Moreover, the SEC was unanimous in its judgment that an
HCM disclosure requirement was warranted. The two Republican
commissioners and the SEC Chairman voted in favor of the rule,
whereas the two Democratic commissioners voted against it on the
grounds that it did not go far enough.297 This agreement about the
materiality of HCM as a disclosure area is notable because virtually all
new disclosure requirements adopted during the 2010s—including
congressionally-mandated requirements pursuant to the Dodd Frank
Act—were opposed by Republican SEC commissioners on the
grounds that the topics they covered were not material to investors.298
296. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (quoting statements of SEC
Commissioners Allison Herren Lee and Caroline Crenshaw).
298. See, e.g., Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at
the 34th Annual Current Financial Reporting Issues Conference (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.
sec.gov/news/speech/piwowar-current-financial-reporting-issues-conference.html [https://
perma.cc/XX5U-P5BS] (criticizing the SEC’s adoption of congressionally-mandated pay ratio
and conflict mineral disclosure rules and arguing that “[t]he focus on non-material, special
interest disclosure provisions is a deplorable corruption of our mission to protect investors, to
ensure fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and to facilitate capital formation”); see also
Business Roundtable, BRT Letter on the Core Principles for Regulating the U.S. Financial
System (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.businessroundtable.org/brt-letter-on-the-core-principlesfor-regulating-the-usfinancial-system [https://perma.cc/BMS2-EKSF] (arguing that certain
Dodd-Frank disclosure rules are in conflict with “the materiality standard for public company
disclosure”). Setting aside the substantive merits of these assertions of non-materiality, the
legal logic motivating them is flawed. Contrary to arguments made in the context of DoddFrank rule implementation, when a disclosure rule is mandated by Congress, there is no
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In short, the SEC rulemaking process served to reveal the materiality
of human capital as an investor concern.
But how do we go from a broad finding of materiality to crafting
a rule that elicits material information? And what does “material” mean
in this context? Note that throughout the HCM rulemaking process
(and the much-lengthier process of disclosure regime modernization
during the 2010s) the SEC invoked the formulation of materiality
stemming from the 1976 Supreme Court case TSC Industries v.
Northway.299 Materiality is one of the required elements for
establishing securities law liability resulting from a misstatement or
omission of information. As part of its explication of the liability test,
the TSC Industries court noted that information is material if there is a
“substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider it
important” in making an investment or voting decision; in other words,
“there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”300
requirement that it meet a test of materiality before it is required to be implemented by the
SEC. Congress’s determination that a particular disclosure rule is warranted renders the
information covered by the rule presumptively material. Materiality is not a constitutional
requirement, and, moreover, no act of Congress has ever limited the SEC’s general authority
to promulgate public company disclosure rules by requiring that such rules be material. The
Supreme Court has never taken a case challenging the validity of an SEC-adopted disclosure
rule (much less a congressionally-mandated disclosure rule) on materiality or any other
grounds. When the D.C. Circuit has struck down SEC rules, it has been for failure to carry out
adequate cost-benefit analysis; the D.C. Circuit has not found that cost-benefit analysis requires
an assessment of materiality. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir.
2011); Chamber of Com. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The closest the D.C. Circuit
has come to considering materiality in the context of SEC disclosure rulemaking has been to
rule that the SEC is entitled to deference in its determination on the materiality (or lack thereof)
of particular topics. During the 1970s, the National Resources Defense Council challenged the
SEC’s refusal to pursue disclosure rulemaking in response to its petition, which the SEC had
justified on the grounds that the requested information was not material; the D.C. Circuit sided
with the SEC. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979). These
points are important because it is likely that any expansion of the SEC’s HCM disclosure rule
along the lines advocated in subpart IV.C.3, as well as any new ESG or climate change
disclosure rules, will be criticized and potentially challenged on materiality grounds.
299. Former SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has repeatedly cited the TSC Industries
definition as the test for whether a new disclosure requirement is warranted, and other SEC
Commissioners have done the same. See, e.g., Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Remarks on Telephone Call with Investor Advisory Committee Members, SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-remarksinvestor-advisory-committee-call-020619 [https://perma.cc/5ZX9-B32G] (setting out
requirement for “materiality—as so well defined by Justice Marshall [in TSC Industries]”).
300. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining
materiality in the context of a proxy fraud action under Rule 14a-9); Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
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In making the determination of materiality in the context of securities
fraud cases, courts apply a variety of judge-made heuristics, and, for
practical purposes, require evidence that a particular misstatement or
omission had an impact on the company’s stock price.301 If the
investor-plaintiff cannot show stock market impact, then the
misstatement or omission in question is deemed not material, and hence
there is no legal liability. This process may work reasonably well in the
context of adjudicating liability ex post, but it is of little utility in setting
disclosure requirements ex ante.
Before analyzing the SEC’s open-ended, principles-based
approach to HCM disclosure, which uses the TSC Northway
formulation of materiality as its sole guidepost, consider how the SEC
has approached similar problems in the past. On multiple occasions
when it has decided (or been directed by Congress) to incorporate into
the disclosure regime a requirement pertaining to a new asset class or
a new disclosure topic, the SEC has set out to develop an informationgenerating framework containing specific guidance; these processes
have often taken years of sustained work to complete. For example,
during the 1970s, the SEC developed a framework for the disclosure
of oil and gas assets with input from relevant stakeholders.302
Following the global financial crisis, the SEC developed a framework
for the disclosure of statistical information about asset-backed
securities.303 There is also a dedicated framework related to
485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (adopting the TSC Industries materiality formulation in the
context of securities fraud actions under Rule 10b-5).
301. See George S. Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots
in Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 620-25 (2017) (examining the content of the
materiality standard, various approaches to applying it, and the associated challenges).
302. See Modernization of Oil and Gas Reporting, Securities Act Release No. 33-8995,
Exchange Act Release No. 59192, 74 Fed. Reg. 2158, 2159 (Jan. 14, 2009) (discussing the
history of the oil and gas disclosure framework). The disclosure requirements were introduced
pursuant to a directive in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, which required the
SEC to “take such steps as may be necessary to assure the development and observance of
accounting practices to be followed in the preparation of accounts by persons engaged, in
whole or in part, in the production of crude oil or natural gas in the United States.” See 42
U.S.C. §§ 6201–6422. In formulating and refining the oil and gas accounting framework, the
SEC worked with the Department of Energy, the Society of Petroleum Engineers (a global
organization), and other expert agencies; in addition, it outsourced some of the work to FASB.
This model of multi-stakeholder involvement can be deployed in any future round of HCM
disclosure rulemaking.
303. See Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, Securities Act Release
No. 33-9638, Exchange Act Release No. 72982, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,184, 57,186 (Sept. 24, 2014)
(adopting new rules because “the financial crisis highlighted that investors and other
participants in the securitization market did not have the necessary information and time to be
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information about executive compensation.304 With respect to
financial information, Regulation S-X sets out detailed disclosure
rules, whereas the staff accounting bulletins, the SEC’s financial
reporting manual, and other documents provide extensive guidance.305
Finally, the SEC spent more than two decades developing the MD&A
disclosure framework to ensure accurate and comparable reporting,
even though in theory the goal of MD&A is simply to allow the
investor to see the firm’s performance and results of operations
“through the eyes of management.”306 In each of these cases, the
disclosure rules use the concept of materiality in a targeted way—to
qualify specific disclosure items in order to prevent the overdisclosure
of information. Cognizant of the difficulties firms encounter in making
materiality determinations, the SEC has also issued materiality
guidance applicable in specific circumstances, such as Staff
Accounting Bulletin 99 (qualitative materiality of financial
information)307 and Item 303 of Regulation S-K (disclosure of
forward-looking information).308
Contrary to its historical approach and despite HCM’s
complexity and novelty as a disclosure area, the SEC did not find it
necessary to develop an HCM information-generating framework or
offer any guidance for making HCM materiality determinations.
Instead, the SEC placed its full faith behind the TSC Industries
able to fully assess the risks underlying asset-backed securities and did not value asset-backed
securities properly or accurately”).
304. See supra notes 136, 282 and accompanying text.
305. See Staff Interpretations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
interps.shtml [https://perma.cc/2P6J-LR9A] (last updated Jan. 8, 2021).
306. See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange
Act Release No. 48960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003) (providing supplemental
guidance on key topics and summarizing prior guidance since 1980).
307. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999).
The SEC noted that SAB 99 “is not intended to change current law or guidance in the
accounting or auditing literature.” Id. at 45,155. The wording of the accounting definition of
materiality does not track TSC Industries, and stakeholders disagree on whether the two
definitions are identical in substance.
308. See Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835,
Exchange Act Release No. 26831, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,961, 54 Fed. Reg.
22,427, 22,430 n.27 (May 24, 1989) (“[Item 303] mandates disclosure of specified forwardlooking information, and specifies its own standard for disclosure—i.e., reasonably likely to
have a material effect. . . . The probability/magnitude test for materiality approved by the
Supreme Court in Basic . . . is inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.”). This statement further
contradicts assertions that materiality as defined in TSC Industries (from which Basic derives)
is the universal “touchstone” of the public company disclosure regime.
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formulation of materiality, in effect trusting it to serve as an automatic,
self-executing disclosure criterion. This was part and parcel with the
SEC’s repeated emphasis on “principles-based disclosure
requirements rooted in materiality” between 2016 and 2020.309 But can
such an open-ended, principles-based approach to HCM disclosure
elicit information about the many different HCM topics that investors
have attested are material to their decisionmaking?
2.

The Missing Principles for “Principles-Based HCM Disclosure”

The principles-based approach reflected in the August 2020 HCM
disclosure rule is inadequate for several related reasons: it gives firms
too much discretion and not enough guidance about what to disclose;
it fails to produce a baseline “mix of information” that could enable
firms to make the extensive materiality judgments it requires; and it
fails to elicit information that is comparable, standardized, and
decision-useful for investors. The question of adequacy is in part an
empirical one. Preliminary evidence from the first round of HCM
disclosure, as well as prior evidence about voluntary HCM disclosure
(discussed in subparts III.B.5 and III.B.4, respectively), suggests that
the quality of disclosure provided by firms has been low so far, which
validates the theoretical and practical concerns raised below. It bears

309. Indeed, a review of public statements and speeches by SEC commissioners during
this period suggests that if an observer who knew nothing about securities regulation set out to
read these public statements and speeches, the observer would come away thinking that there
is little more to the disclosure regime than the TSC Industries formulation of materiality; the
observer would learn nothing about the specialized disclosure rules and materiality guidance
discussed above. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 299 (emphasizing that the SEC’s disclosure
requirements must be rooted in the principle of materiality as defined in TSC Industries); Elad
L. Roisman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Speech at the Society for
Corporate Governance National Conference (July 7, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
roisman-keynote-society-corporate-governance-national-conference-2020 [https://perma.cc/
RJH7-S94Q] (“Materiality is the touchstone of our public company disclosure regime . . . a
standard that has been defined by the Supreme Court [in TSC Industries] and followed for
decades. I am a proponent of the SEC’s principles-based materiality standard now more than
ever.”). Yet, the brief statement of Commissioner Hester Peirce upon the conclusion of the
Regulation S-K rulemaking process in August 2020 gives away the fact that instead of ensuring
conformity with a longstanding “touchstone”—a rather uncontroversial proposition—the
SEC’s open-ended, principles-based approach moves the goalpost. See Hester M. Peirce,
Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting on Modernization of
Regulation S-K 101, 103, and 105, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.
sec.gov/news/public-statement/peirce-reg-s-k-2020-08-26 [https://perma.cc/HFQ4-5X9U]
(noting that she “would have preferred to eliminate the remaining vestiges of a prescriptive
approach, such as the requirement to disclose the number of employees” (emphasis added)).
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noting that most of these concerns also apply to ESG disclosure areas
beyond HCM, including climate-related disclosures.
A principles-based approach to HCM disclosure can work only
if the SEC supplies principles that are sufficiently clear to guide firms’
disclosure decisions. The TSC Industries formulation of materiality—
while elegant and superficially intuitive—cannot in and of itself serve
as such a principle. It asks firms to step into the shoes of a fictional
“reasonable investor” and make predictive judgments about the
significance the reasonable investor would ascribe to information
about each of the many broad categories that fall within the domain of
HCM.310 Notably, because HCM information is unlike any of the other
types of information currently part of the disclosure regime, existing
materiality guidance in respect of the latter is of little help. Moreover,
whereas many disclosure areas have a financial component covered
by the accounting regime, which can aid in making difficult
materiality and disclosure determinations, HCM information is not
covered by the accounting regime, which means that it, too, cannot be
a source of guidance. In the absence of guidance, firms can be
expected to take advantage of the discretion afforded by the rule and
avoid disclosure when it makes rational sense to do so.
The decision whether or not to disclose information is binary by
necessity, but materiality itself is not—it often exists in a gray,
probabilistic space where an argument can be made both that
something is material and that it is not. In practice, this means that in
many cases the disclosure decision is not the result of a conclusive
finding of materiality, but, rather, of the weighing of the costs of
disclosure against the risk of liability for non-disclosure. With an
open-ended HCM disclosure rule and no prescribed disclosure
categories, the risk of both detection and liability are substantially
lower.
Relying on the TSC Industries formulation of materiality to elicit
all relevant disclosure also sets a very high bar in terms of significance
and administrability. Consider the difference between the informationgenerating frameworks described in subpart IV.C.1 and the HCM
disclosure rule. The information-generating frameworks relate to
matters that have been deemed broadly material; the specific items
included in the frameworks are either not subject to a separate
materiality test or, when they are, are subject to a materiality test in a
310. See Georgiev, supra note 301, at 624 (discussing the concept of the reasonable
investor as used in the context of materiality determinations under TSC Industries).
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very targeted way. For example, Item 1202 of Regulation S-K requires
disclosure of various types of natural resource reserves (proved,
probable, possible, developed, undeveloped) by continent for oil,
natural gas, synthetic oil, and synthetic gas.311 The rule does not
require the materiality of each individual item to be tested using the
TSC Industries test, and for good reason. The summary executive
compensation table required by Item 402(c)(1) of Regulation S-K
takes the same approach: it requires disclosure of the salary, bonus,
stock awards, stock option awards, and other specified elements of
executive compensation without subjecting the elements or the
amounts involved to the TSC Industries test. By contrast, the HCM
disclosure rule is designed in a way that subjects every single piece of
information to the TSC Industries test. In addition to being difficult
and potentially unreliable, as discussed above, these materiality
judgments are also costly in terms of management time and input from
legal and other advisers. The SEC extolled the benefits of the
flexibility afforded by an open-ended, principles-based approach, but
it failed to take into account the costs associated with putting all HCMrelated information through the dense and resource-intensive sieve
that is the TSC Industries materiality test.
Another problem with the SEC’s open-ended approach
premised on TSC Industries is that it is arguably inconsistent with a
close reading of the TSC Industries case itself. Recall that TSC
Industries applies materiality in the context of an ex post inquiry into
securities fraud liability. Notably, the case uses the concept of “the
total mix of information made available”: this is the baseline against
which courts are to test the materiality of any misstatement or
omission in order to determine whether it can support a finding of
liability. As such, the case pre-supposes the existence of a “total mix”
of relevant information; without a total mix, there is no baseline
against which to test—and the materiality test itself does not work. To
be sure, part of the total mix comes from voluntary disclosure, but
voluntary disclosure alone cannot produce a balanced picture of the
underlying reality that would serve as a baseline for determining
liability.312 Implicitly, then, it is the SEC’s job to design an
311. See Regulation S-K, Item 1201 (Disclosure of Reserves), 17 CFR § 229.1202
(2019).
312. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) (discussing the inadequacy
of a voluntary disclosure approach to securities regulation).
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information-generating framework that produces the appropriate total
mix. Seen this way, TSC Industries does not prohibit the SEC from
mandating disclosure items that eschew the TSC Industries test for
materiality; instead, TSC Industries practically requires the SEC, as
the regulator in charge of securities markets, to mandate such
disclosure items.313 Without a proper total mix of information, the
enforcement structure of securities regulation would simply struggle
to work.
In a related vein, the total mix needs to include consistent
information about other firms, so that investors can compare firms for
purposes of making investment decisions. Without comparable
information, even individual materiality and disclosure judgments
may be difficult. The first part of the TSC Industries formulation,
which is the part the SEC most often alludes to, obscures the reality
that materiality is a contextual judgment and that the relevant context
often transcends the individual firm. Consider a firm with a particular
rate of workplace health and safety accidents. For purposes of
determining the materiality of this HCM information and, hence, the
existence of a duty to disclose, the TSC Industries test requires the firm
to discern (1) whether there is a substantial likelihood that the
reasonable investor would consider this information important in
making an investment decision, or, in other words, (2) whether there
is a substantial likelihood that the reasonable investor would view this
information as significantly altering the total mix of available
information.314
To make this judgment, the reasonable investor would almost
certainly need to know how the firm’s rate of workplace health and
safety accidents compares to the rate at other firms. If it is significantly
above the norm, the information would be material and the firm would
have a duty to disclose it. The problem, of course, is that even though
the firm in question cannot judge the materiality of its own information
without also knowing the same information about other firms, those
313. It is possible to argue that the total mix itself should only contain material
information, but then the TSC Industries test would suffer from an endogeneity problem. On a
conceptual level, materiality is both contextual and relative—significant information takes on
the property of materiality by comparison to information that is less significant and hence not
material. The total mix therefore should contain information of various levels of significance
in order to enable such comparative judgments.
314. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (stating the TSC Industries formulation
of materiality). While courts have elided this question, the right way to think about the two
parts of TSC Industries is as alternative methodologies for testing for materiality, either one of
which should be sufficient to render a piece of information material.
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other firms do not have an absolute obligation to disclose their own
information; under the principles-based approach, their disclosure
obligations are also contingent on a materiality determination. Firms’
materiality judgments, in other words, are inextricably linked, but the
unstructured, open-ended HCM disclosure rule does not take this
reality into account.315 And even if different firms end up releasing the
same types of information, which would in theory make comparisons
possible, the absence of standardized metrics would render such
comparisons meaningless or, worse, misleading.316 Carrying on with
the example of the rate of workplace health and safety accidents, this
rate needs to be standardized so that it is comparable across firms,
which involves using the same definition of an accident in terms of
severity and covering the same employee base.
In its release adopting the HCM disclosure rule, the SEC
acknowledged investors’ concerns about the lack of comparability
under a principles-based approach but then quickly dismissed those
concerns by simply stating: “we do not believe that prescriptive
requirements or a designated standard or framework will ensure more
comparable disclosure given the variety in registrant operations as well
as how registrants define, calculate, and assess human capital
measures.”317 This statement is illogical on its face—the purpose of
imposing any standard or framework would be to ensure that firms with
different operational profiles define and calculate information in a
consistent way. Comparability will come about only after a standard or
framework is put in place; to say that comparability is not possible
because there currently isn’t any comparability makes little sense. The
only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the SEC’s strained
justification for going with a principles-based approach is that the SEC
believes that HCM information cannot be standardized in the same
ways that other types of information have been standardized. Yet, the
SEC offers no support for this bold assertion, and the assertion is
contradicted by the available evidence discussed in subpart III.B of this

315. For a general discussion of the interfirm effects of securities disclosure, see
Georgiev, supra note 301, at 652-54.
316. The GAO report on voluntary ESG disclosure practices, discussed in subpart
III.B.4, illustrates this point. The GAO report also noted that even firms purporting to use the
same disclosure frameworks sometimes end up presenting information differently. This may
be seen as a problem with the frameworks as they exist today, but it is likely to be at least as
much a problem with firms’ diligence and expertise in applying the frameworks.
317. Reg. S-K 2020 Modernization Release, supra note 158, at 63,739.
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Article.318 To be sure, some HCM measures will be easier to
standardize than others; some may even be impossible to standardize.
But there are plenty of measures that would be easy to standardize: in
addition to the rate of workplace accidents discussed above, such easyto-standardize measures include voluntary and involuntary turnover
(discussed in subpart IV.C.3 below), annual amounts spent on
workforce training and compensation (discussed in subpart IV.D.1
below), and others.
3.

HCM Disclosure Rulemaking Round Two

In light of the foregoing critique, it would be advisable for the
SEC to engage in a second round of rulemaking with a view to
expanding the August 2020 HCM disclosure rule. This should be a
dedicated and deliberative process involving multiple stakeholders.319
Even though it has fairly limited experience with HCM to date, the SEC
is still best placed to serve as a nexus for coordination among the many
participants in the HCM movement described in subpart III.B, as well
as any new participants such as financial accounting standard-setters
(as recommended in subpart IV.D).320 Developing an information318. This includes the detailed HCM disclosure frameworks developed by SASB, GRI,
ISO, and others. There is also an entire academic subdiscipline of human resource accounting,
dating back to the 1960s, which neither the SEC nor the private standard-setters have engaged.
See FLAMHOLZ, supra note 17; see also infra notes 341 & 346 and accompanying text.
319. This is in line with the process envisioned in the March 2019 recommendations of
the SEC Investor Advisory Committee; the SEC did not follow these recommendations. See
supra note 164 and accompanying text.
320. The mission of the SEC includes promoting capital formation. Though it is
frequently invoked, particularly as a counterweight to imposing new investor-protection
measures, the term “capital formation” does not have a statutory definition. It is generally
understood to refer to firms’ ability to raise financial capital. Evidence suggests, however, that
firms in certain industries have a much harder time attracting human capital than financial
capital and that human capital is much more important to these firms’ success. See, e.g., Vijay
Govindarajan et al., Why We Need to Update Financial Reporting for the Digital Era, HARV.
BUS. REV. (June 8, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/06/why-we-need-to-update-financial-reportingfor-the-digital-era (noting that “[f]inancial capital is assumed to be virtually unlimited, while
certain types of human capital are in short supply”); Eric Ries, Foreword, in SCOTT KUPOR,
SECRETS OF SAND HILL ROAD: VENTURE CAPITAL AND HOW TO GET IT, at xi (2019) (observing
that “[p]ossibly for the first time in history, we’re talent-constrained instead of capitalconstrained”). If certain firms do not need help with raising financial capital but do have a
problem attracting human capital, then there is at least an argument to be made that in today’s
economy the reference to capital formation in the SEC’s mission should be understood to
encompass human capital formation in addition to financial capital formation. The SEC can
promote human capital formation with the tools that have traditionally been at its disposal:
mandated disclosure (adding information that would help firms attract human capital) and
oversight of equity issuances (since the employees of start-ups often receive various equity
instruments in exchange for their investment of human capital).
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generating framework for HCM disclosure involves both formulating
specific disclosure items and deciding on larger conceptual issues;
whereas the former can be delegated to a third party, the latter often
involve complex policy judgments, which require a decisionmaker
with both regulatory expertise and democratic legitimacy. Based on the
analysis presented in this Article, the following conceptual issues and
recommendations deserve consideration as part of any future HCM
rulemaking initiative.
Disambiguating HCM. An important challenge to formulating
specific disclosure rules stems from the broad nature of the notion of
HCM. As illustrated in Part III and the Appendix, stakeholders have
included a wide variety of general categories under the catch-all
umbrella of HCM, and there is no complete overlap among these
different conceptions of HCM. There is even less overlap among the
specific information items and metrics that fall within the different
general categories. To this end, any future SEC rulemaking should seek
to disambiguate HCM and promote a focused discussion of individual
categories, such as training and development, diversity and inclusion,
workforce compensation, etc. It should be much easier to argue that a
metric within a particular category, such as the rate of voluntary and
involuntary workforce turnover or total compensation expense, for
example, is material and should be disclosed, than to make the same
argument for one of the highly-detailed HCM disclosure frameworks
discussed in subpart III.B.7. Relatedly, the SEC can consider
mandating the disclosure of a limited set of information categories and
metrics at first and then revisit the matter on a periodic basis.321
Standardization and Comparability. Not all HCM information
lends itself to standardization and comparability across firms, but
important categories that can be standardized should be. As discussed
above, the materiality of a particular piece of firm-specific information
often depends at least in part on information provided by other firms.
For an investor, the rate of voluntary turnover at a given firm is likely
to mean little on its own—to interpret the information, the investor
would need to know both the historical trends at the particular firm and,
importantly, how the firm compares to its peers. In order for investors
to make such inter-firm comparisons for purposes of investment or
321. In its October 2019 comment letter, the Human Capital Management Coalition
proposed a set of basic disclosure categories, which in its view are fundamental to human
capital analysis. These disclosure categories will be a particularly sensible starting point for
any expansion of the HCM disclosure rule. See HCMC Letter, supra note 173, at 26.
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voting decisions, firms should disclose the same types of information,
and this disclosure needs to have informational integrity (i.e., be
accurate, comprehensible, and complete).322
The Comply-or-Explain Option. A comply-or-explain approach to
disclosure may offer a middle ground between highly-prescriptive line
items and the existing open-ended, principles-based HCM disclosure
rule. The SEC could come up with specific HCM metrics that would
be required, but, importantly, allow firms to opt out of disclosure so
long as they state a valid reason for doing so.323 Under this approach, a
firm would be able to avoid the disclosure of an ill-fitting metric, but it
should not be able to avoid disclosure of otherwise relevant information
for opportunistic reasons. Another way to think of the comply-orexplain approach is as a system of pre-set defaults, a favored approach
in corporation and other entity statutes at the state level.324 The complyor-explain approach has been used effectively in the United Kingdom
and elsewhere.325 An affirmative representation that a particular metric
or type of information is not material for a particular firm is much more
helpful to investors than the observed absence of the metric or type of
information from the unstructured HCM narrative; such an affirmative
representation also makes public and private enforcement for
disclosure violations much easier than it otherwise would be.
Regulatory Choice About False Positives vs. False Negatives. In
determining its overall approach to HCM disclosure and the need to
disclose particular types of information, the SEC should consider the
relative costs of false positives (disclosure of immaterial information)
and false negatives (non-disclosure of material information), also
known as Type I and Type II errors, respectively. Assuming that
disclosure requirements cannot be calibrated with precision, which
kind of imprecision is worse: overdisclosure or underdisclosure? While
the issue deserves systematic analysis, there is reason to believe that
the cost of false negatives would be greater than the cost of false
positives; this, in turn, suggests that the SEC should seek to avoid rules
322. See Bank & Georgiev, supra note 34, 1180-89 (discussing the notion of
informational integrity—the accuracy, comprehensibility, and completeness of information
subject to mandatory disclosure).
323. See Virginia Harper Ho, “Comply or Explain” and the Future of Nonfinancial
Reporting, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 317 (2017) (describing the “comply or explain”
approach).
324. See Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of
Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1396-97 (1992).
325. See Harper Ho, supra note 323.
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that elicit too little information, even if this comes at the expense of
occasional overdisclosure. The costs of requiring the disclosure of
immaterial information would include increasing the regulatory burden
on firms, and arguably exposing investors to “information overload.”
The first concern is mitigated by the fact that firms already possess at
least some of the information that may be mandated for disclosure,326
whereas the second concern stems from a model of investor
information gathering and processing that does not fully reflect presentday reality.327 Given the resource-intensive nature of materiality
determinations and the potential for strategic nondisclosure due to the
low likelihood of detection and liability, as discussed above, the
argument that certain basic information items should not be prescribed
for disclosure because they may not be universally material seems
particularly unpersuasive.328 Relatedly, even requiring the disclosure of
clearly material information is sometimes called into question on the
grounds that the required information may be commercially sensitive;
326. Such is the case, for example, with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s EEO-1 Report, which requires most firms to provide a record of their
employment data categorized by ethnicity, race, gender, job category and designated salary
bands. See EEO-1 Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo-1-survey/eeo-1-frequently-asked-questionsand-answers [https://perma.cc/VS4Z-GJJE] (last visited Sept. 29, 2020); see also Edkins,
supra note 161 (“Investors recognize that most companies are already in possession of HCM
data on their workforce, but are cautious of disclosing this information.”); SEC INV. ADVISORY
COMM., supra note 161, at 3 (“Companies use many metrics to evaluate the success of their
HCM strategies and investments.”).
327. See Georgiev, supra note 301, at 670-72 (presenting a critical assessment of the
information overload hypothesis and the associated evidence); Erik F. Gerding, Disclosure 2.0:
Can Technology Solve Overload, Complexity, and Other Information Failures?, 90 TUL. L.
REV. 1143 (2016) (suggesting that the information overload hypothesis is overstated and that
technical solutions can ameliorate most information overload problems).
328. During the HCM rulemaking process, the concern that the SEC might accidentally
mandate disclosure of some piece of information that is not universally material, and thereby
dilute the dubious purity of the principles-based approach, reached extreme proportions: the
SEC’s 2019 proposing release suggested abolishing the “number of employees” disclosure
requirement, which until 2018 was the lone workforce-related disclosure item, and leaving the
disclosure decision to firms’ materiality calculus. It is unclear under what circumstances the
reasonable investor would not wish to know the number of employees, how supplying this
information might contribute to information overload, or what would be saved by deleting the
requirement to provide it from Regulation S-K. The SEC reversed course in the final release
but did not offer a justification for treating the number of employees differently than, say,
information about turnover, workforce compensation expense, or workforce training expense.
See Reg. S-K 2020 Modernization Release, supra note 158, at 63,739, 63,755 n.333 (citing
empirical studies about financial materiality of both annual growth in employee count and
employee turnover but failing to explain why a prescriptive rule is warranted for the former
and not the latter).
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this objection appears less persuasive in the context of HCM because
of the difficulty in replicating a firm’s success by copying its HCM
policies.329
D.

HCM and Financial Accounting

Financial accounting standards are central to corporate disclosure
and reporting and play an important, albeit sometimes ignored, role in
corporate law.330 Financial accounting has received little attention from
participants in the HCM movement: as discussed in Part III, the focus
has been, instead, on developing new disclosure frameworks centered
around HCM. Relatedly, FASB has been conspicuously absent from
the ongoing HCM discourse. One explanation for this is the inability
of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to account for any
type of intangible asset (and not just human capital), a decades-long
problem that remains unresolved despite its growing urgency.331 This
subpart highlights inadequacies in the current state of affairs and
suggests that financial accounting has an important part
to play if human capital concerns are to be effectively incorporated
in corporate governance.
The focus is on two issues: (1) the undifferentiated presentation
of firms’ human capital spending on firms’ income statements, and
(2) the absence of any accounting for the value of human capital assets
329. See, e.g., Alden M. Hayashi, HR Information Disclosure, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV.
(Apr. 15, 2003), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/human-resources-hr-informationdisclosure (suggesting that human capital, unlike traditional resources such as land and
equipment, is difficult to replicate successfully). Separately, as I have argued elsewhere, any
competitive costs may in fact be offset by competitive benefits that accrue to other firms. When
engaging in rulemaking, the SEC is required by statute to consider “in addition to the protection
of investors, whether the [rulemaking] will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.” See Georgiev, supra note 301, at 659 (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §
77b(b), § 78c(f)). A number of empirical and theoretical studies have shown that disclosure
can promote competition, which suggests that disclosure rules may offer an added benefit,
which the SEC should consider when engaging in cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, the SEC
generally uses competition in the opposite way, as an argument against imposing additional
disclosure requirements. See id. at 658-62.
330. See, e.g., A. A. Berle, Jr., Accounting and the Law, 13 ACCT. REV. 9, 9 (1938)
(stating that “rules of accounting have become, in large measure rules of law”).
331. See, e.g., WAYNE S. UPTON, JR., FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., PUB. NO. 219-A,
SPECIAL REPORT: BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL REPORTING, CHALLENGES FROM THE NEW
ECONOMY (2001), http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/fasb/uptonApril01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ET6L-SPYT] (summarizing challenges with the accounting treatment of
intangibles from FASB’s perspective); BLAIR & WALLMAN, supra note 250. An ongoing,
multi-stage FASB project examining intangibles does not cover human capital. See supra note
231 and accompanying text.
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on the asset side of firms’ balance sheets. Whereas questions of board
oversight over HCM and HCM disclosure have dominated
conversations about HCM, the more technical issues discussed below
have received very little attention. The discussion is framed with
reference to FASB and the traditional financial accounting regime, but
most of the information in question can also be elicited through
disclosure rules put in place by the SEC.
1.

Human Capital Spending

The most significant human-capital-related expenses incurred by
firms relate to employee compensation (salaries, bonuses, and benefits,
including retirement benefits) and firm-sponsored workforce training.
In both instances, these costs are lumped together with other expenses
on the income statement, which obscures relevant information and
makes human capital spending an attractive target during cost-cutting
rounds.332
Under current rules, workforce training expenses are part of
selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A), a general
category that covers overhead items ranging from marketing expenses,
to professional services, to office supplies. As a catch-all category,
SG&A often contains expenses arising from inefficiencies.
Understandably, investors view high SG&A amounts or year-on-year
increases in SG&A amounts as a negative signal about the firm’s
current operations and future prospects; conversely, lower SG&A
amounts or year-on-year reductions in SG&A amounts are viewed as a
positive signal.333 A firm can therefore improve its bottom line in the
short term by foregoing productivity-enhancing workforce training or
cutting existing training, even though such actions would be damaging
in the longer term. Notably, this treatment of workforce training
spending stands in contrast to the treatment of R&D spending, which
332. In line with accounting conventions, I refer to spending on human capital as an
expense and not an expenditure, even though the term expenditure more accurately reflects the
long-term productive capacity of human capital. Under current accounting rules, spending on
human capital is treated as an accounting expense, whereas spending on physical assets such
as manufacturing plants, equipment, and machinery is treated as an accounting expenditure. In
other words, spending on human capital is accounted as a cost, whereas spending on physical
assets is accounted as an investment in the firms’ productive capacity, which is subject to
capitalization and depreciation or amortization over time.
333. See Angela Hanks et al., Workers or Waste? How Companies Disclose—or Do
Not Disclose—Human Capital Investments and What to Do About It, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(June 8, 2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2016/06/08/138706
/workers-or-waste [https://perma.cc/6EGN-XLSN].
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is listed as a separate line item on the income statement. If a firm cuts
R&D spending under pressure from activist shareholders, this would
show up in the financial statements, putting all investors on notice;
when a firm does the same with workforce training spending, investors
only see a decrease in the SG&A amount.334
Information about employee compensation expenses presents
similar problems. Setting aside the median worker pay figure required
for the calculation of the deeply-flawed CEO pay ratio,335 neither the
accounting rules nor the SEC disclosure rules provide a way for
investors to gauge with any specificity what a firm pays its workers.
Yet, this information is quite likely to be relevant when investors
analyze a firm on its own terms, over time, or in relation to industry
peers. Even the total amount spent on worker salaries is not disclosed.
Instead, it is lumped into other aggregate figures presented in the
financial statements: cost of goods sold (COGS) for the direct labor
costs used to produce a good, and SG&A for all other labor costs.336
(To be sure, in certain cases the presentation of non-recurring items,
such as a one-time restructuring charge, or information contained in
other parts of the financial statements or the MD&A discussion, may
provide some additional information about employee compensation on
an ad hoc basis.337 Stock-based employee compensation expenses are

334. Spending on R&D and human capital is expensed and does not show up on a firm’s
balance sheet as an asset. (Acquired R&D is a limited exception and can be shown on the
balance sheet.) Expensing reduces taxable income, providing a tax incentive for firms to spend
on R&D. But expensing also ensures that these investments look like operating expenses
without capturing the potential future value firms recoup from that initial investment.
Expensing implies that a dollar spent on research or on workforce training in one year will not
increase the firm’s future value. This may produce a disincentive for firms to invest in R&D—
one that does not exist for physical capital which is capitalized; the disincentive is mitigated
by the fact that R&D is broken down separately. The same disincentive also exists for human
capital spending, but, unlike R&D, it is not mitigated because there is no separate breakdown
of human capital expenses. See id.
335. See Bank & Georgiev, supra note 34.
336. See generally Chris B. Murphy, Operating Expenses vs. SG&A, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/101314/what-are-differences-between-operatingexpenses-and-sga.asp [https://perma.cc/748Y-5QLK] (May 31, 2020) (examining
administrative expenses, operating expenses, and SG&A).
337. With respect to employee compensation expenses, data suggests that only 15% of
firms in the S&P 500 index report this information on a voluntary basis. See Letter from
Anthony Hesketh, Lancaster Univ. Mgmt. Sch., to Anne Sheehan, Chairman, SEC Inv. Adv.
Comm. 3 (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/265-28/26528-5180428-183533.
pdf [https://perma.cc/KN8V-FQAV].
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also disclosed as a separate line item under SFAS 123, but such
expenses generally apply only to executive-level employees.338)
This undifferentiated treatment of human capital-related spending
is clearly a problem if investors wish to understand a firm’s approach
to training and compensation. But it is a problem even if investors are
not interested in these matters because human capital-related expenses
influence important line items, such as SG&A and COGS. These line
items are key components of a number of financial ratios used to
analyze and compare firms, such as gross margin, profit margin,
operating margin, earnings per share, price-earnings ratio, and return
on stockholders’ equity.339
In light of the foregoing, FASB should consider changes to
financial accounting standards to require the disclosure of workforce
training expenses and employee compensation expenses. This
represents another form of disambiguation—disaggregating existing
accounting line items to present specific and decision-useful
information. In the case of workforce training expenses, FASB can use
as a reference point expense classification methodologies developed by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in its surveys of employer-provided
training during the 1990s,340 as well as existing human resource
accounting methodologies and ISO standards.341 In the case of
employee compensation expenses, there is already international
precedent for disclosure, which can serve as a partial model. Pursuant
to International Accounting Standard 19, Employee Benefits (IAS 19),
firms that follow IFRS are required to disclose the amounts paid in
wages, salaries, and social security contributions, among other
information.342 As a general matter, the presentation of human capital338. See Summary of Statement No. 123: Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation
(Issued 10/95), FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum123.shtml
[https://perma.cc/BH2N-24HF] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
339. See generally What Are the Main Income Statement Ratios?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/102714/what-are-main-income-statementratios.asp [https://perma.cc/7QRQ-BKS5] (Mar. 21, 2021) (providing an overview of financial
ratios that appear in common income statements).
340. Survey of Employer-Provided Training, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.
bls.gov/ept/overview.htm [https://perma.cc/SG82-QLFM] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
341. See generally Eric G. Flamholtz et al., Human Resource Accounting: A Historical
Perspective and Future Implications, 40 MGMT. DECISION 947 (2002) (surveying the
development of human resource accounting systems since the 1960s).
342. See IAS 19 Employee Benefits, IFRS, https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-ofstandards/ias-19-employee-benefits [https://perma.cc/Z4C3-7UBX] (last visited Mar. 10,
2021). This information is disclosed under captions such as “personnel expense,” “personnel
costs,” and “salaries [and] wages,” among others. See, e.g., EUR. DIRECTORIES GRP.,
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related spending on the income statement is straightforward in that it
does not raise any serious valuation issues.343
2.

Human Capital Valuations

By contrast, valuation is a major challenge to including human
capital as an asset on firms’ balance sheets. This is due to the expansive
nature of the concept. Recall that any firms’ stock of human capital is
comprised of the acquired knowledge, skills, competencies, and other
attributes embodied in its employees and used in productive ways by
the firm.344 Quantifying the value of “knowledge, skills, competencies,
and other attributes” presents obvious difficulties. Moreover, human
capital does not fit the current technical definition of assets (“probable
future economic benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity
as a result of past transactions or events”).345 Even though firms exert
control over their employees, this control is fundamentally distinct
from the control firms have over physical assets such as machines or
more traditional intangible assets such as intellectual property. The
employer-employee relationship is a voluntary relationship grounded
in principles of contract and agency law. These considerations explain

CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2019
(2020), https://www.europeandirectories.com/uploads/p9WhjAk1/ConsolidatedFinancial
Statements31.12.2019EDMidcoS.r.l.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLQ2-JLV4].
343. Though they lie outside the scope of the present discussion, pensions and other
post-retirement benefits can be viewed as future human-capital-related expenses. They do
present valuation challenges, but those have already been addressed by the system of financial
accounting. See PWC, PENSIONS AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (2019), https://www.pwc.com/us/
en/cfodirect/assets/pdf/accounting-guides/pwc-guide-pension-and-employee-benefits.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DA9J-KTF9].
344. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
345. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, STATEMENT
OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 6 ¶ 25 (2008) (emphasis added). The Concepts
Statement goes on to say that an asset “embodies a probable future benefit that involves a
capacity, singly or in combination with other assets, to contribute directly or indirectly to future
net cash inflows . . . . [A] particular entity can obtain the benefit and control others’ access to
it, and . . . the transaction or other event giving rise to the entity’s right to or control of the
benefit has already occurred.” Id. ¶ 26. IFRS defines an asset as “[a] resource controlled by an
entity as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow
to the entity.” IFRS, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 8 (2018),
https://www.ifrs.org/-/media/project/conceptual-framework/fact-sheet-project-summary-andfeedback-statement/conceptual-framework-project-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/39UX5C7U].
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why FASB has long been reluctant to even consider the inclusion of
human capital in financial statements.346
Two factors suggest that a change in approach may be advisable.
First, if financial accounting continues to exclude intangible assets, the
value of financial statements to investors will continue to decrease.
Leading accounting scholars have estimated that between the 1950s
and the 2010s, the relevance of the information contained in financial
statements decreased twofold, a trend largely tracking the rise of
intangible assets.347 Second, if firms and investors view human capital
as a mission-critical productive asset—and that indeed is the key
message of the HCM movement—then it is necessary to explore ways
to bring human capital within the accounting framework and its
depiction of assets. These two factors go to the dual role of accounting
policy: to prescribe information structures and individual items that
have to be disclosed in financial reports in order to make such reports
useful to investors and, also, to establish standards for the preparation
and presentation of this information.348
There is a deep and extensive literature on human resource
accounting dating back to the 1960s, which has not been referenced by
the present-day HCM movement. This can be explained in part by the
technical nature of the literature—its objective has been to overcome
the specific valuation, measurement, and definitional challenges
associated with incorporating human capital into the existing
framework of financial accounting.349 This work is clearly relevant to
the HCM movement, and as an expert body with standard-setting
authority, FASB is best placed to engage with it. Doing so could enrich
the HCM movement and help overcome its somewhat acontextual
nature. The impetus need not come from within FASB: despite its
substantial autonomy, regulators and policymakers do have the ability
346. See Ingrid Smithey Fulmer & Robert E. Ployhart, “Our Most Important Asset”: A
Multidisciplinary/Multilevel Review of Human Capital Valuation for Research and Practice,
40 J. MGMT. 161, 171-72 (2014).
347. See BARUCH LEV & FENG GU, THE END OF ACCOUNTING AND THE PATH FORWARD
FOR INVESTORS AND MANAGERS 31 (2016). This trend is even more pronounced in the case of
new firms entering the market: the accounting relevance for firms that went public in the 1950s
was over 85%, whereas the same for firms that went public in the 2000s was approximately
25%. This decrease in accounting relevance can be linked to the rise of intangibles, since each
decade’s new firms have new business models, which are much more likely to depend on
intangible assets in line with the overall economy’s shift from traditional to intangible assets.
Id. at 89.
348. See LEV, supra note 14, at 120-21.
349. See Flamholtz et al., supra note 341; Fulmer & Ployhart, supra note 346.
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to direct FASB’s attention to human capital accounting should they
wish to do so.350 There could also be opportunities for collaboration
with FASB’s international counterpart, the International Accounting
Standards Board, which has traditionally been more active in the area
on intangible assets and which launched a consultation on
sustainability reporting in 2020.351
FASB may need to be prompted to act because, in line with its
historical reluctance to consider human capital, FASB’s current earlystage project on intangibles, launched in 2019, does not cover human
capital assets.352 Indeed, references to human capital on FASB’s
website, a repository of information about its activities, are largely
limited to a handful of third-party comment letters urging FASB to
consider human capital assets at various times over the years.353 Yet,
FASB is capable of executing complex projects that focus on the
treatment of assets. For example, it revised accounting principles as
recently as 2016 to add a major new item, operating leases, to firms’
balance sheets; previously, those leases were not capitalized and were
treated solely as expenses, similar to the current treatment of human
capital expenses.354 An employment contract in respect of human
capital shares basic conceptual similarities with an operating lease in
respect of a physical asset: in both cases, a firm enters into a contract
that allows for the temporary use of a productive asset without
conveying an ownership right. If operating leases belong on the balance
sheet, then it may be easier to make the case that human capital assets
do as well.

350. It is worth noting that even though FASB has enjoyed substantial autonomy and
independence since its establishment in 1973, the SEC exercises informal oversight and
provides some input into its agenda; Congress has also periodically taken an interest in
influencing FASB’s work. See, e.g., Mark Maurer, U.S. House Subcommittee Scrutinizes
Accounting Rule Maker, WALL. ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-shouse-subcommittee-scrutinizes-accounting-rule-maker-11582150442.
351. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
352. See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., INVITATION TO COMMENT: IDENTIFIABLE
INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND SUBSEQUENT ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL (2019), https://www.fasb.
org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1176172950529 [https://perma.cc/6D59BRA5].
353. See, e.g., Letter from Bill Patterson, Dir., Off. of Inv., AFL-CIO, to Timothy S.
Lucas, Dir. of Rsch. & Tech. Activities, FASB (Oct. 5, 2001), https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/
CommentLetter_C/ViewCommentLetter&cid=1175803143035.
354. See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE 2016-02,
LEASES (TOPIC 842) (2016), https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?
cid=1176167901010 [https://perma.cc/B6W2-LZR5].
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BEYOND CORPORATE LAW: A HUMAN CAPITAL PROTECTION
AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

The analysis presented in this Article has highlighted HCM’s
status as an important corporate governance phenomenon; in the
process, it has also revealed that HCM resonates well beyond the
corporate governance realm. Even though HCM has been offered as a
solution to corporate law problems (inadequate disclosure of and
oversight over critical firm resources), it has also drawn strong support
from actors focused on much bigger problems (wealth inequality,
economic insecurity, inadequate workforce training, and others), which
at best have an attenuated nexus to the core concerns of corporate
law.355 This observation suggests that the rise of the HCM movement
is not only a quest for solutions but also a symptom of regulatory
vacuums in various other areas of law. It is important to ask, therefore,
whether HCM, a privately-coordinated corporate law phenomenon,
can serve to fill those regulatory vacuums. If firms optimize various
HCM metrics in an effort to improve corporate performance, would
this contribute in a material way to solving larger societal problems
related to the workforce? Put simply, does HCM’s promise transcend
corporate law?
While broadly supportive of the HCM movement in corporate
law, this Article sounds a note of caution with respect to HCM’s
potential to address problems outside corporate law. It is important to
remember that, notwithstanding its broad and intuitive appeal, the
HCM movement—much unlike past labor-focused reform
initiatives—is grounded in traditional notions of shareholder wealth
maximization and investor protection. The HCM movement certainly
has a role to play in improving the visibility and standing of workers
within firms, and it may also contribute to illuminating some of the
broader social and economic problems related to workers. But it would
be unrealistic to expect that it could solve those problems. Moreover,
even if the conditions are now ripe for a move away from the
longstanding shareholder wealth maximization paradigm of corporate
governance—as argued by policymakers, scholars, and the Business
Roundtable—the HCM movement is ill-suited to take a central role
under a new stakeholder-centered regime because its core rationale
derives from the shareholder wealth maximization paradigm. Certain
HCM initiatives may even be detrimental to workers since,
355. These actors include, for example, the AFL-CIO, legislators, and others.
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especially when it comes to the allocation of surplus within the firm,
the interests of employees and shareholders are not always congruent.
Overemphasis and overreliance on HCM will thus put undue pressure
on existing corporate governance systems and may crowd out other,
more targeted policy interventions. This would also render the HCM
movement akin to various initiatives to use corporate governance tools
to solve non-corporate governance problems that have drawn critical
attention from scholars.356
Acknowledging these realities suggests the need for a
governmental human capital development and worker protection
agenda focused on the bigger problems that the privately-coordinated
HCM movement is incapable of solving. Put differently, the HCM
movement has highlighted that current socio-economic conditions
require new measures aimed at the development and protection of
human capital, not just its management. If workers are firms’ most
important assets, as is so often asserted, then surely a nation’s
workforce ought to be its most important asset as well. A national
human capital agenda is also needed because shareholder wealth
maximization initiatives do not always translate into total welfare
maximization. Reducing employee turnover, for example, may be
viewed as a desirable outcome from the point of view of shareholders
because it protects the firm’s human capital investments. The same,
however, may not be optimal from a societal point of view if it is
achieved through means that hinder employee mobility and stymie the
dissemination of knowledge across the economy.
The menu of policy options for a national human capital
development agenda is extensive, and it is beyond the scope of this
Article to define the agenda’s contours. Possibilities include a variety
of public or public-private initiatives, from new government

356. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Addressing Economic Insecurity: Why Social
Insurance Is Better Than Corporate Governance Reform, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 21,
2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/08/21/addressing-economic-insecurity-whysocial-insurance-is-better-than-corporate-governance-reform [https://perma.cc/7ZPD-FRK3];
Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 32; Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Shifting Influences
on Corporate Governance: Capital Market Completeness and Policy Channeling (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., L. Working Paper No. 546/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3695309.
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programs;357 to changes in labor law,358 tax law,359 and antitrust law;360
to a new body of human capital law;361 to more fundamental reforms
of corporate law,362 among others. As ever, formulating an effective
agenda will entail difficult policy choices. From the vantage point of
corporate law, however, implementing a broader national human
capital development agenda will improve the HCM movement by
modulating the expectations for what firms’ management, boards, and
the SEC can realistically achieve with the tools at their disposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rise of the HCM movement—the broad set of initiatives in
support of both investor-facing HCM disclosure and board-level
oversight of HCM matters—is a singular moment in the development
of U.S. corporate governance. After several decades of successive and
ultimately unsuccessful attempts to increase the prominence of workers
357. See, e.g., STEPHEN STEIGLEDER & LOUIS SOARES, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, LET’S
GET SERIOUS ABOUT OUR NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL: A PLAN TO REFORM THE U.S.
WORKFORCE TRAINING SYSTEM (2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
issues/2012/06/pdf/workforce_training.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G39-84FS] (offering proposals
for various government initiatives to improve workforce training).
358. See, e.g., SHARON BLOCK & BENJAMIN SACHS, CLEAN SLATE FOR WORKER POWER,
HARV. L. SCH., CLEAN SLATE FOR WORKER POWER: BUILDING A JUST ECONOMY AND
DEMOCRACY (2020), https://assets.website-files.com/5ddc262b91f2a95f326520bd/5e28fba29
270594b053fe537_CleanSlate_Report_FORWEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAF4-C2W8]
(proposing a comprehensive suite of labor law reforms in the interest of worker
empowerment).
359. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1981 (2015)
(demonstrating how the current tax regime contributes to underinvestment in education and
offering potential solutions); ERICA YORK, TAX FOUND., TAX TREATMENT OF WORKER
TRAINING (2019), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20190320180040/Tax-Treatment-ofWorker-Training-FF-644.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4FK-GF9R] (reviewing proposals to improve
the tax treatment of firms’ investment in human capital).
360. See, e.g., Zoe Willingham & Olugbenga Ajilore, The Modern Company Town,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/
reports/2019/09/10/474336/modern-company-town [https://perma.cc/GT75-ZYJN]
(proposing various ways to address the monopsony power of employers vis-à-vis workers);
Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective
Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 969 (2016) (demonstrating how antitrust law acts as a constraint
on low-wage workers’ ability to organize and offering reform suggestions).
361. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the
Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 793 (2015) (calling for “reform [of]
human capital law from a nebulous set of harmful doctrines to a body of law committed to the
promotion of innovation, knowledge flow, and economic growth”).
362. See, e.g., STRINE, supra note 4; Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The
Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder Primacy to Shared Governance, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2419
(2020) (proposing a shared governance model to replace shareholder primacy).
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in corporate governance, firms’ employees are finally gaining visibility
in corporate disclosure reports and attention in corporate boardrooms.
But, as this Article has pointed out, such visibility and attention does
not mean that employees have taken a seat at the board table or that
directors have started to treat employee concerns on par with
shareholder concerns; this is a crucial, yet heretofore overlooked,
aspect of HCM’s introduction into corporate governance. The
analytical rationale at HCM’s core is to treat workers as assets—firms’
“most important” and “most valuable” assets—but assets nonetheless.
This approach can yield collateral benefits in terms of employees’
economic status and working conditions, but it need not necessarily do
so. The workers-as-assets justification for HCM is an investor-focused
justification. It differs from a justification conceptualizing employees
as “investors” of the human capital embodied in them. If the focus were
on firms competing for talent (i.e., the investment of human capital by
employees) just like they compete for the investment of financial
capital by shareholders and bondholders, the attendant legal
protections, including governance rights, would have to look different.
These important distinctions notwithstanding, HCM is a positive
and much-overdue corporate governance development: HCM
disclosure can contribute to better and more accurate firm valuation by
shining a spotlight on a key driver of success in the modern knowledgebased economy; HCM oversight at the board level can ensure that
boards focus appropriately on the management of what has come to be
referred to as a “mission-critical asset.” There is much work,
challenging yet highly consequential, that lies ahead. Corporate
governance actors need to determine the proper scope of HCM,
establish context-specific links between HCM indicators and firm
management, develop effective and narrowly-tailored frameworks for
HCM disclosure and HCM oversight, and identify the optimal ways to
address worker-related concerns in firms’ institutional structures. This
Article has sought to lay the analytical, theoretical, and normative
foundations for these real-world decisions and for future academic
inquiries into the HCM movement and the incorporation of ESG
concerns into U.S. corporate law.

738

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:639

APPENDIX: PRIMARY HCM CATEGORIES ACCORDING
ORGANIZATIONS

TO

SELECT

The following table presents the primary HCM categories and
dimensions identified by core participants in the HCM movement.
(Source: Compiled by the author based on the latest available
information as of March 1, 2021.)
Organization
SEC – Reg. S-K
Amendment (Aug. 2020)
SEC – Recommendations
of Investor Advisory
Committee (IAC)

U.S. Congress (Rep.
Axne & Sen. Warner) –
Proposed “Workforce
Investment Disclosure
Act”
Human Capital
Management Coalition
(HCMC)

BlackRock

Sustainability
Accounting Standards
Board (SASB)/Value
Reporting Foundation

Primary HCM Categories &
Dimensions
Number of employees; any material
“measures or objectives that address
the development, attraction and
retention of personnel”
Workforce demographics; workforce
stability; workforce training; health
and safety; workforce diversity;
compensation and incentives [Note:
categories derived from IAC’s
examples of KPIs]
Workforce demographics; workforce
stability; workforce composition;
workforce skills and capabilities;
workforce culture and empowerment;
workforce health and safety;
workforce compensation and
incentives; workforce recruiting
Workforce demographics; workforce
stability; workforce composition;
workforce skills and capabilities;
workforce culture and empowerment;
workforce health and safety;
workforce productivity; human rights;
workforce compensation and
incentives
Employee development; corporate
culture; compensation; diversity &
commitment to equal employment
opportunity; health and safety; labor
relations; supply chain labor standards
Labor practices; employee health &
safety; employee engagement,
diversity & inclusion; supply chain
management

Discussed
in:
Subpart
III.B.5
Subpart
III.B.5

Subpart
III.B.6

Subpart
III.B.2

Subpart
III.B.1

Subpart
III.B.7

2021]
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International
Organization for
Standardization (ISO)

Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI)

Embankment Project for
Inclusive Capitalism
(EPIC)

World Economic Forum
(WEF)

Compliance and ethics; costs;
diversity; leadership; organizational
culture; organizational safety, health,
and well-being; productivity;
recruitment, mobility, and turnover;
skills and capabilities; succession
planning; workforce availability
Employment; labor and management
relations; occupational health and
safety; training and education;
diversity and equal opportunity; nondiscrimination; freedom of association
and collective bargaining
Workforce costs; attraction,
recruitment and turnover; workforce
composition and diversity; training,
learning and development;
engagement and wellbeing; employee
health; organizational culture
Dignity and equality; health and wellbeing; skills for the future
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